Narrative:

On initial contact with departure, controller assigned 250 KIAS until further advised. I was flying (first officer). I used a speed intervention in VNAV climb and set 250 KTS in the window. Approaching 10000 ft MSL, the captain was 'eyes out' providing me with steering guidance to avoid the multiple twring cumulo nimbus to our north. At 10000 ft MSL, I'd forgotten we were still speed restr and I set the speed window to 300 KTS. I did not communicate this action to the captain and he was still 'eyes out' concentrating on the deviation for WX. As our speed approached 300 KTS, center called to inquire if he had assigned normal speed. I realized then I'd exceeded the speed restr and set 250 KTS and corrected the deviation. I also advised the captain (obviously too late) that I set an incorrect speed. There was a flight ahead of us, but I don't think there was any loss of separation. The cause of the incident was simple -- I did not communicate my actions to the captain. Had I done so, he would have reminded me of the speed restr. Also, a common practice (but not procedure) is to set 249 KTS in the window if given a speed restr of 250 KTS. The odd number certainly works in alerting the flight crew of a restr speed. I've used it in the past and it works well, so I'll readopt this practice as a mental reminder. As far as crew communication goes, I'll return to a simple procedure we used in military communication, which worked very well: 1) what do I know? 2) who needs to know it? And 3) have I told them yet?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR'S ACFT X WAS ASSIGNED A SPD RESTR, WHICH THEY DID NOT ADHERE TO.

Narrative: ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH DEP, CTLR ASSIGNED 250 KIAS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. I WAS FLYING (FO). I USED A SPD INTERVENTION IN VNAV CLB AND SET 250 KTS IN THE WINDOW. APCHING 10000 FT MSL, THE CAPT WAS 'EYES OUT' PROVIDING ME WITH STEERING GUIDANCE TO AVOID THE MULTIPLE TWRING CUMULO NIMBUS TO OUR N. AT 10000 FT MSL, I'D FORGOTTEN WE WERE STILL SPD RESTR AND I SET THE SPD WINDOW TO 300 KTS. I DID NOT COMMUNICATE THIS ACTION TO THE CAPT AND HE WAS STILL 'EYES OUT' CONCENTRATING ON THE DEV FOR WX. AS OUR SPD APCHED 300 KTS, CTR CALLED TO INQUIRE IF HE HAD ASSIGNED NORMAL SPD. I REALIZED THEN I'D EXCEEDED THE SPD RESTR AND SET 250 KTS AND CORRECTED THE DEV. I ALSO ADVISED THE CAPT (OBVIOUSLY TOO LATE) THAT I SET AN INCORRECT SPD. THERE WAS A FLT AHEAD OF US, BUT I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY LOSS OF SEPARATION. THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT WAS SIMPLE -- I DID NOT COMMUNICATE MY ACTIONS TO THE CAPT. HAD I DONE SO, HE WOULD HAVE REMINDED ME OF THE SPD RESTR. ALSO, A COMMON PRACTICE (BUT NOT PROC) IS TO SET 249 KTS IN THE WINDOW IF GIVEN A SPD RESTR OF 250 KTS. THE ODD NUMBER CERTAINLY WORKS IN ALERTING THE FLC OF A RESTR SPD. I'VE USED IT IN THE PAST AND IT WORKS WELL, SO I'LL READOPT THIS PRACTICE AS A MENTAL REMINDER. AS FAR AS CREW COM GOES, I'LL RETURN TO A SIMPLE PROC WE USED IN MIL COM, WHICH WORKED VERY WELL: 1) WHAT DO I KNOW? 2) WHO NEEDS TO KNOW IT? AND 3) HAVE I TOLD THEM YET?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.