Narrative:

Began to board the aircraft at XA30 am. The APU was inoperative and there was no air carts available to provide cooling air to the cabin. Numerous complaints from passenger about the steamy conditions in cabin were heard by crew. The signal man informed us that their headsets were inoperative and that they would be performing hand signals. Once the cargo doors were closed, checklists were complete, we had clearance to start the right engine to provide some cooling to the cabin. Once the after start checklist was completed, the signal to disconnect the ground equipment was done. When the cabin was secure, a thumbs up was made by captain to indicate a ready to push off gate. The tug driver signaled that we were cleared to start the left engine. As a slow, straight, push off the gate was made, we decided to start the left engine. As the cross start was being made, the captain slowly added power to roughly 70% N2 which didn't seem to hinder the pushback operation. We got a normal start, and as I began the after start flow, I heard a bang in the nosewheel well followed by a second bang. Unsure as to what was occurring (and no headsets with ramp personnel) the captain stopped the aircraft. There was no signal ground personnel in sight. A second glance outside the cockpit, I noticed a signal woman appear at the 4 O'clock position, signaling to stop the aircraft. The captain shut down the right engine. The ground crew kept pointing to the nose gear. A ground crew member left to get a headset and inform us as to what had happened. Eventually, we had mechanics plug in and tell us they thought we may not be able to straighten out the nose gear and taxi back to the gate. We shut down the left engine and decided to deplane the passenger with the aid of the station manager. We secured the cockpit and stayed with the aircraft until it was towed to the gate area. It should be noted that, the flight deck crew members did perform all operations according to the MD80 handbook and flight operations policy manual. Contributing factors to this mishap include: an inoperative APU requiring an engine cross-start procedure, no air-conditioning carts at the airport to combat the heat and humidity within the cabin, and maybe most importantly, the ground crew without headsets to be in constant contact with the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80. DURING PUSHBACK, THE TUG AND ACFT TOW BAR JACKKNIFED.

Narrative: BEGAN TO BOARD THE ACFT AT XA30 AM. THE APU WAS INOP AND THERE WAS NO AIR CARTS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE COOLING AIR TO THE CABIN. NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS FROM PAX ABOUT THE STEAMY CONDITIONS IN CABIN WERE HEARD BY CREW. THE SIGNAL MAN INFORMED US THAT THEIR HEADSETS WERE INOP AND THAT THEY WOULD BE PERFORMING HAND SIGNALS. ONCE THE CARGO DOORS WERE CLOSED, CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE, WE HAD CLRNC TO START THE R ENG TO PROVIDE SOME COOLING TO THE CABIN. ONCE THE AFTER START CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED, THE SIGNAL TO DISCONNECT THE GND EQUIP WAS DONE. WHEN THE CABIN WAS SECURE, A THUMBS UP WAS MADE BY CAPT TO INDICATE A READY TO PUSH OFF GATE. THE TUG DRIVER SIGNALED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO START THE L ENG. AS A SLOW, STRAIGHT, PUSH OFF THE GATE WAS MADE, WE DECIDED TO START THE L ENG. AS THE CROSS START WAS BEING MADE, THE CAPT SLOWLY ADDED PWR TO ROUGHLY 70% N2 WHICH DIDN'T SEEM TO HINDER THE PUSHBACK OP. WE GOT A NORMAL START, AND AS I BEGAN THE AFTER START FLOW, I HEARD A BANG IN THE NOSEWHEEL WELL FOLLOWED BY A SECOND BANG. UNSURE AS TO WHAT WAS OCCURRING (AND NO HEADSETS WITH RAMP PERSONNEL) THE CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT. THERE WAS NO SIGNAL GND PERSONNEL IN SIGHT. A SECOND GLANCE OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT, I NOTICED A SIGNAL WOMAN APPEAR AT THE 4 O'CLOCK POS, SIGNALING TO STOP THE ACFT. THE CAPT SHUT DOWN THE R ENG. THE GND CREW KEPT POINTING TO THE NOSE GEAR. A GND CREW MEMBER LEFT TO GET A HEADSET AND INFORM US AS TO WHAT HAD HAPPENED. EVENTUALLY, WE HAD MECHS PLUG IN AND TELL US THEY THOUGHT WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE NOSE GEAR AND TAXI BACK TO THE GATE. WE SHUT DOWN THE L ENG AND DECIDED TO DEPLANE THE PAX WITH THE AID OF THE STATION MGR. WE SECURED THE COCKPIT AND STAYED WITH THE ACFT UNTIL IT WAS TOWED TO THE GATE AREA. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, THE FLT DECK CREW MEMBERS DID PERFORM ALL OPS ACCORDING TO THE MD80 HANDBOOK AND FLT OPS POLICY MANUAL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS MISHAP INCLUDE: AN INOP APU REQUIRING AN ENG CROSS-START PROC, NO AIR-CONDITIONING CARTS AT THE ARPT TO COMBAT THE HEAT AND HUMIDITY WITHIN THE CABIN, AND MAYBE MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE GND CREW WITHOUT HEADSETS TO BE IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.