Narrative:

Radar sectors combined. Traffic density (10+ aircraft) contributing to single controller saturation. No associate or handoff position for this or any radar position at the TRACON. ATC specialist at msn are not trained for, as well as, not proficient to work this volume of traffic. Management inability to design/develop position (ie, handoffs or associate) able to relieve workload on radar controller with regards to coordination, strip management, flow control, etc. A radar sector is created for 7-10 days of eaa contributing to airspace stratification. This position is not staffed or decombined for the 355 days preceding eaa. Frequency congestion related to eaa aircraft requesting services -- both IFR and VFR. ZAU, as well as msn ATCT, workloads are so demanding that manual (verbal) coordination, with regard to handoffs, was required by myself on 2 jet departures at the time of the operational error. Normally, automation satisfies this requirement. 4 landline (verbal) calls were made regarding the 2 jets. Had the calls not occurred, 2 additional operrors or deviations may have. Insufficient staffing due to FAA downsizing poses threats against development of much needed associate and handoff position required to preclude further operrorsecond officerpdevs. Lahso was a major contributing factor. Msn runways all intersect. Prior to alpa/FAA negotiations of lahso, traffic flowed routinely without delays. Air carrier air crew refusal to accept a GA aircraft to hold short of the air carrier runway has extremely increased workloads and vectors. In this situation, had the air carrier air crew been able to accept this clearance, there would not have been a vector that contributed to the operational error. The ARTS iie equipment failed to alert myself to a potential conflict. The aircraft concerned were on a collision course at 6000 ft, 1 3/4 NM apart at the closest point of approach when I observed the aircraft and took immediate action. ARTS iie equipment is routinely unreliable in providing controllers with alerts in a timely manner, therefore sacrificing separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MSN CTLR ACTIONS NOT TIMELY TO SEPARATE OVERTAKING TFC AT 6000 FT.

Narrative: RADAR SECTORS COMBINED. TFC DENSITY (10+ ACFT) CONTRIBUTING TO SINGLE CTLR SATURATION. NO ASSOCIATE OR HDOF POS FOR THIS OR ANY RADAR POS AT THE TRACON. ATC SPECIALIST AT MSN ARE NOT TRAINED FOR, AS WELL AS, NOT PROFICIENT TO WORK THIS VOLUME OF TFC. MGMNT INABILITY TO DESIGN/DEVELOP POS (IE, HDOFS OR ASSOCIATE) ABLE TO RELIEVE WORKLOAD ON RADAR CTLR WITH REGARDS TO COORD, STRIP MGMNT, FLOW CTL, ETC. A RADAR SECTOR IS CREATED FOR 7-10 DAYS OF EAA CONTRIBUTING TO AIRSPACE STRATIFICATION. THIS POS IS NOT STAFFED OR DECOMBINED FOR THE 355 DAYS PRECEDING EAA. FREQ CONGESTION RELATED TO EAA ACFT REQUESTING SVCS -- BOTH IFR AND VFR. ZAU, AS WELL AS MSN ATCT, WORKLOADS ARE SO DEMANDING THAT MANUAL (VERBAL) COORD, WITH REGARD TO HDOFS, WAS REQUIRED BY MYSELF ON 2 JET DEPS AT THE TIME OF THE OPERROR. NORMALLY, AUTOMATION SATISFIES THIS REQUIREMENT. 4 LANDLINE (VERBAL) CALLS WERE MADE REGARDING THE 2 JETS. HAD THE CALLS NOT OCCURRED, 2 ADDITIONAL OPERRORS OR DEVS MAY HAVE. INSUFFICIENT STAFFING DUE TO FAA DOWNSIZING POSES THREATS AGAINST DEVELOPMENT OF MUCH NEEDED ASSOCIATE AND HDOF POS REQUIRED TO PRECLUDE FURTHER OPERRORS/OPDEVS. LAHSO WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. MSN RWYS ALL INTERSECT. PRIOR TO ALPA/FAA NEGOTIATIONS OF LAHSO, TFC FLOWED ROUTINELY WITHOUT DELAYS. ACR AIR CREW REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A GA ACFT TO HOLD SHORT OF THE ACR RWY HAS EXTREMELY INCREASED WORKLOADS AND VECTORS. IN THIS SIT, HAD THE ACR AIR CREW BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS CLRNC, THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A VECTOR THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE OPERROR. THE ARTS IIE EQUIP FAILED TO ALERT MYSELF TO A POTENTIAL CONFLICT. THE ACFT CONCERNED WERE ON A COLLISION COURSE AT 6000 FT, 1 3/4 NM APART AT THE CLOSEST POINT OF APCH WHEN I OBSERVED THE ACFT AND TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION. ARTS IIE EQUIP IS ROUTINELY UNRELIABLE IN PROVIDING CTLRS WITH ALERTS IN A TIMELY MANNER, THEREFORE SACRIFICING SEPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.