Narrative:

In this situation, I was a low time CFI flying as a second pilot to a higher time CFI on a ferry flight between tn and nj. The pace of the 12 hour flight was pushed by the more experienced pilot's desire to make it home in time for a business appointment. The high pressure pace was characterized by improper traffic pattern procedures around (fuel stops) airports and sometimes inadequate preflight actions. The last 20 mins of the flight occurred after official sunset, which in an aircraft not equipped for night operation, was pushing it. We landed at XA25 at our final destination, an uncontrolled, lit field. There was one other aircraft in the traffic pattern. While no conflict occurred, the possibility of our unlit aircraft having one in such a situation was high. I feel that the urgency which the higher time CFI felt was classic 'get homeitis' and added unnecessary risk to the flight. I feel that I, as the second pilot, who was also in a decision making position, felt out-ranked by the higher time pilot who was more familiar with the make and model flown. I deferred my decision making position in an uncomfortable situation due to my lack of experience -- both in general and in the make and model of aircraft flown. I feel that if I had asserted myself and told the other pilot that my comfort level had been exceeded, it may have caused him to at least re-examine the situation and perhaps reduce the level of risk which he was assuming.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PLT, ACCOMPANIED BY ANOTHER INSTRUCTOR, LANDED AFTER OFFICIAL SUNSET WHEN THE PIPER J3 CUB HE WAS FLYING DID NOT HAVE NAV LIGHTS FOR NIGHT FLT.

Narrative: IN THIS SIT, I WAS A LOW TIME CFI FLYING AS A SECOND PLT TO A HIGHER TIME CFI ON A FERRY FLT BTWN TN AND NJ. THE PACE OF THE 12 HR FLT WAS PUSHED BY THE MORE EXPERIENCED PLT'S DESIRE TO MAKE IT HOME IN TIME FOR A BUSINESS APPOINTMENT. THE HIGH PRESSURE PACE WAS CHARACTERIZED BY IMPROPER TFC PATTERN PROCS AROUND (FUEL STOPS) ARPTS AND SOMETIMES INADEQUATE PREFLT ACTIONS. THE LAST 20 MINS OF THE FLT OCCURRED AFTER OFFICIAL SUNSET, WHICH IN AN ACFT NOT EQUIPPED FOR NIGHT OP, WAS PUSHING IT. WE LANDED AT XA25 AT OUR FINAL DEST, AN UNCTLED, LIT FIELD. THERE WAS ONE OTHER ACFT IN THE TFC PATTERN. WHILE NO CONFLICT OCCURRED, THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR UNLIT ACFT HAVING ONE IN SUCH A SIT WAS HIGH. I FEEL THAT THE URGENCY WHICH THE HIGHER TIME CFI FELT WAS CLASSIC 'GET HOMEITIS' AND ADDED UNNECESSARY RISK TO THE FLT. I FEEL THAT I, AS THE SECOND PLT, WHO WAS ALSO IN A DECISION MAKING POS, FELT OUT-RANKED BY THE HIGHER TIME PLT WHO WAS MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE MAKE AND MODEL FLOWN. I DEFERRED MY DECISION MAKING POS IN AN UNCOMFORTABLE SIT DUE TO MY LACK OF EXPERIENCE -- BOTH IN GENERAL AND IN THE MAKE AND MODEL OF ACFT FLOWN. I FEEL THAT IF I HAD ASSERTED MYSELF AND TOLD THE OTHER PLT THAT MY COMFORT LEVEL HAD BEEN EXCEEDED, IT MAY HAVE CAUSED HIM TO AT LEAST RE-EXAMINE THE SIT AND PERHAPS REDUCE THE LEVEL OF RISK WHICH HE WAS ASSUMING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.