Narrative:

Takeoff and initial climb were normal until approximately FL230, at which point I heard a loud bang, felt the aircraft shudder, saw and heard the autoplt and autothrottle disconnect and the aircraft began to roll right. I was the PF and immediately leveled the wings and stepped on the rudder and lowered the nose to maintain speed. I looked at the engine gauges and saw the EPR and N1 rolling back. The egt was red at 782 degrees, well above the 645 degree limit. The captain next asked me to confirm the right throttle. He then pulled it to idle. There was no change in engine indications, including egt. At this point with no response to throttle movement, I considered the engine damaged and called for the engine fire, severe damage, separation, qrc checklist. The captain then said, 'right engine fuel control switch confirm,' to which I responded, 'we need to get the qrc out.' he then said,' I've had 4 engine failures before and know how to do it from memory.' this immediately increased the stress level for me, as company policy is to use the qrc. This did not seem a good place to get in a debate about the issue. As the next step on the qrc was fuel control switch, and he had idented the correct switch, I said, 'confirmed.' he then took the switch to cutoff. I then said, 'I would feel a lot better about this if we got out the qrc.' he then proceeded to get out the qrc and to the best of my knowledge at that time complete it. I would later find out after landing that he decided not to pull the fire handle. This, however, was never discussed with me in the cockpit and I assumed it had been done. We then declared an emergency with ATC and got delaying vectors while the captain briefed the flight attendant and we set up for the approach. We received a wind report of 340 degrees at 8 KTS. ATC offered us runway 26. A brief discussion then took place. I preferred to land on runway 8 and advocated this. As we were west of the airport at this time, it offered a straight-in over flat terrain and an ILS with vertical guidance. That captain said that with the tailwind and terrain to the east he preferred to circle and land on runway 26. The captain took control of the aircraft and we set up and briefed for a visual to runway 26. We ran the approach descent checklist, seated the flight attendant and landed uneventfully. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was a B757-200 with P&west 2037 engines. The reporter said what was considered to be engine stalls were actually high and low turbine failures and maintenance determined the problem was caused by the electronic engine control failure. The reporter said maintenance found the turbine had been overtemped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 IN CLB AT FL230 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO #2 ENG LOSS OF PWR AND VIBRATION CAUSED BY THE ELECTRONIC ENG CTL FAILURE.

Narrative: TKOF AND INITIAL CLB WERE NORMAL UNTIL APPROX FL230, AT WHICH POINT I HEARD A LOUD BANG, FELT THE ACFT SHUDDER, SAW AND HEARD THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE DISCONNECT AND THE ACFT BEGAN TO ROLL R. I WAS THE PF AND IMMEDIATELY LEVELED THE WINGS AND STEPPED ON THE RUDDER AND LOWERED THE NOSE TO MAINTAIN SPD. I LOOKED AT THE ENG GAUGES AND SAW THE EPR AND N1 ROLLING BACK. THE EGT WAS RED AT 782 DEGS, WELL ABOVE THE 645 DEG LIMIT. THE CAPT NEXT ASKED ME TO CONFIRM THE R THROTTLE. HE THEN PULLED IT TO IDLE. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN ENG INDICATIONS, INCLUDING EGT. AT THIS POINT WITH NO RESPONSE TO THROTTLE MOVEMENT, I CONSIDERED THE ENG DAMAGED AND CALLED FOR THE ENG FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, SEPARATION, QRC CHKLIST. THE CAPT THEN SAID, 'R ENG FUEL CTL SWITCH CONFIRM,' TO WHICH I RESPONDED, 'WE NEED TO GET THE QRC OUT.' HE THEN SAID,' I'VE HAD 4 ENG FAILURES BEFORE AND KNOW HOW TO DO IT FROM MEMORY.' THIS IMMEDIATELY INCREASED THE STRESS LEVEL FOR ME, AS COMPANY POLICY IS TO USE THE QRC. THIS DID NOT SEEM A GOOD PLACE TO GET IN A DEBATE ABOUT THE ISSUE. AS THE NEXT STEP ON THE QRC WAS FUEL CTL SWITCH, AND HE HAD IDENTED THE CORRECT SWITCH, I SAID, 'CONFIRMED.' HE THEN TOOK THE SWITCH TO CUTOFF. I THEN SAID, 'I WOULD FEEL A LOT BETTER ABOUT THIS IF WE GOT OUT THE QRC.' HE THEN PROCEEDED TO GET OUT THE QRC AND TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AT THAT TIME COMPLETE IT. I WOULD LATER FIND OUT AFTER LNDG THAT HE DECIDED NOT TO PULL THE FIRE HANDLE. THIS, HOWEVER, WAS NEVER DISCUSSED WITH ME IN THE COCKPIT AND I ASSUMED IT HAD BEEN DONE. WE THEN DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND GOT DELAYING VECTORS WHILE THE CAPT BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND WE SET UP FOR THE APCH. WE RECEIVED A WIND RPT OF 340 DEGS AT 8 KTS. ATC OFFERED US RWY 26. A BRIEF DISCUSSION THEN TOOK PLACE. I PREFERRED TO LAND ON RWY 8 AND ADVOCATED THIS. AS WE WERE W OF THE ARPT AT THIS TIME, IT OFFERED A STRAIGHT-IN OVER FLAT TERRAIN AND AN ILS WITH VERT GUIDANCE. THAT CAPT SAID THAT WITH THE TAILWIND AND TERRAIN TO THE E HE PREFERRED TO CIRCLE AND LAND ON RWY 26. THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND WE SET UP AND BRIEFED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 26. WE RAN THE APCH DSCNT CHKLIST, SEATED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A B757-200 WITH P&W 2037 ENGS. THE RPTR SAID WHAT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE ENG STALLS WERE ACTUALLY HIGH AND LOW TURBINE FAILURES AND MAINT DETERMINED THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY THE ELECTRONIC ENG CTL FAILURE. THE RPTR SAID MAINT FOUND THE TURBINE HAD BEEN OVERTEMPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.