Narrative:

While cruising at FL200 approximately 30 mi west of lit, the flight attendant called via intercom and advised of a 'smoke smell in the cabin.' the flight attendant requested assistance. First officer went into the cabin to investigate. Upon return to the flight deck, first officer advised of smelling a smell when leaving the flight deck, but finding no smoke, odor or problem in the cabin. Just prior to the call from the flight attendant, I observed the standby pitch trim indicator move from 1/2 to the full down position and return to the 1/2 position. Approximately 20 mins later, the flight attendant called again via intercom and advised 'the smell had returned to the cabin.' the flight attendant requested my assistance. I entered the cabin and neither smelled or observed anything unusual. This intercom call was also preceded by the standby pitch trim indicator moving from 1/2 to the full down position and return to the 1/2 position. Upon my return to the flight deck, I discussed the trim and options with the first officer. I then called ATC requesting priority direct dfw, also inquiring about the nearest suitable airports, due to our altitude and we were showing 9.5 mins to dfw. I decided that was the best course of action. I then called dispatch/moc and discussed the trim situation. I was advised to pull circuit breaker N4. This was done and no further unusual trim indications were observed. When switched over to regional approach control, I was given a vector to 290 degrees. I advised the controller I needed direct dfw and would declare if that were necessary. The controller asked for souls and fuel on board. Landing on runway 17L at dfw was uneventful. Exiting the runway at taxiway Q6 I called the cabin and verified everything was all right, while the fire department looked over the aircraft. I was then asked my intentions. I next received a 'hydraulic' cwp light with a single stroke chime. I observed zero hydraulic quantity, zero main accumulator pressure and zero outboard brake accumulator pressure. I feathered and shut down the left engine, notified the tower, and inbound I could not move the aircraft and requested a tow from inbound. While waiting for the passenger bus to arrive, I ran the right engine for AC and electrical power. I received an 'left duct zero temperature' indicator light and the duct temperature was pegged on the high side. Called for the duct overtemp checklist and secured the r-hand hp bleed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: on callback reporter states that he was not aware if maintenance had been able to locate the source for the odor or smoke as reported by the flight attendant. In addition, reporter states that although the standby pitch trim 'indicator' moved in an erratic manner, it had no bearing whatever with the odor of smoke or the controllability of the elevator. In fact this is not an infrequent occurrence and is an anomaly associated with the type of indicator. Reporter further states that he took aggressive braking action after landing with no explanation why he felt the need for maximum performance stop. It was after the aircraft taxied clear of the runway when the pilot was alerted to the loss of pressure and then fluid. Probably as a result of hard braking. Reporter does not know of the final determination from maintenance as to the source of the odor and he believes the aircraft was put back into service after an inspection and maintenance action on the brakes. Callback conversation with reporter of acn 448402 revealed the following information: the first officer indicated that she was the PF on a saab sf-340B during this leg and that dfw was their destination. She reviewed the maintenance write-ups and found nothing for an extended period. Recently, she found a newly entered write up indicating that maintenance had replaced the air conditioning packs before the flight in question. The first officer described the odor as being chemical, rather than an electrical smell, somewhat like baking goods. The hydraulic fluid loss that they experienced upon landing was an unassociated problem, as was the standby pitch indicator malfunction. There had been no previous write ups on the hydraulic nor on the pitch indicator. The first officer stated that the captain allowed her to continue as he had flown with her all month andhad confidence in her abilities. Since so many disparate problems were cropping up, he felt that he should manage all of the issues, stay on top of ATC, and maintain communication with their company moc. Unfortunately, after the flight, the company criticized this crew, saying the most experienced pilot should have been flying. The analyst disagrees with the company's position and feels that this captain utilized his resources exceedingly well and was able to ensure the successful outcome of the flight by not getting distracted by flying duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAN ACR FLC FLYING EMB120 NEAR LIT IS ADVISED OF AN ODOR PRODUCED BY AN UNDETERMINED SOURCE IN THE CABIN.

Narrative: WHILE CRUISING AT FL200 APPROX 30 MI W OF LIT, THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED VIA INTERCOM AND ADVISED OF A 'SMOKE SMELL IN THE CABIN.' THE FLT ATTENDANT REQUESTED ASSISTANCE. FO WENT INTO THE CABIN TO INVESTIGATE. UPON RETURN TO THE FLT DECK, FO ADVISED OF SMELLING A SMELL WHEN LEAVING THE FLT DECK, BUT FINDING NO SMOKE, ODOR OR PROB IN THE CABIN. JUST PRIOR TO THE CALL FROM THE FLT ATTENDANT, I OBSERVED THE STANDBY PITCH TRIM INDICATOR MOVE FROM 1/2 TO THE FULL DOWN POS AND RETURN TO THE 1/2 POS. APPROX 20 MINS LATER, THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED AGAIN VIA INTERCOM AND ADVISED 'THE SMELL HAD RETURNED TO THE CABIN.' THE FLT ATTENDANT REQUESTED MY ASSISTANCE. I ENTERED THE CABIN AND NEITHER SMELLED OR OBSERVED ANYTHING UNUSUAL. THIS INTERCOM CALL WAS ALSO PRECEDED BY THE STANDBY PITCH TRIM INDICATOR MOVING FROM 1/2 TO THE FULL DOWN POS AND RETURN TO THE 1/2 POS. UPON MY RETURN TO THE FLT DECK, I DISCUSSED THE TRIM AND OPTIONS WITH THE FO. I THEN CALLED ATC REQUESTING PRIORITY DIRECT DFW, ALSO INQUIRING ABOUT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPTS, DUE TO OUR ALT AND WE WERE SHOWING 9.5 MINS TO DFW. I DECIDED THAT WAS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. I THEN CALLED DISPATCH/MOC AND DISCUSSED THE TRIM SIT. I WAS ADVISED TO PULL CIRCUIT BREAKER N4. THIS WAS DONE AND NO FURTHER UNUSUAL TRIM INDICATIONS WERE OBSERVED. WHEN SWITCHED OVER TO REGIONAL APCH CTL, I WAS GIVEN A VECTOR TO 290 DEGS. I ADVISED THE CTLR I NEEDED DIRECT DFW AND WOULD DECLARE IF THAT WERE NECESSARY. THE CTLR ASKED FOR SOULS AND FUEL ON BOARD. LNDG ON RWY 17L AT DFW WAS UNEVENTFUL. EXITING THE RWY AT TXWY Q6 I CALLED THE CABIN AND VERIFIED EVERYTHING WAS ALL RIGHT, WHILE THE FIRE DEPT LOOKED OVER THE ACFT. I WAS THEN ASKED MY INTENTIONS. I NEXT RECEIVED A 'HYD' CWP LIGHT WITH A SINGLE STROKE CHIME. I OBSERVED ZERO HYD QUANTITY, ZERO MAIN ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE AND ZERO OUTBOARD BRAKE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE. I FEATHERED AND SHUT DOWN THE L ENG, NOTIFIED THE TWR, AND INBOUND I COULD NOT MOVE THE ACFT AND REQUESTED A TOW FROM INBOUND. WHILE WAITING FOR THE PAX BUS TO ARRIVE, I RAN THE R ENG FOR AC AND ELECTRICAL PWR. I RECEIVED AN 'L DUCT ZERO TEMP' INDICATOR LIGHT AND THE DUCT TEMP WAS PEGGED ON THE HIGH SIDE. CALLED FOR THE DUCT OVERTEMP CHKLIST AND SECURED THE R-HAND HP BLEED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ON CALLBACK RPTR STATES THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE IF MAINT HAD BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE THE SOURCE FOR THE ODOR OR SMOKE AS RPTED BY THE FLT ATTENDANT. IN ADDITION, RPTR STATES THAT ALTHOUGH THE STANDBY PITCH TRIM 'INDICATOR' MOVED IN AN ERRATIC MANNER, IT HAD NO BEARING WHATEVER WITH THE ODOR OF SMOKE OR THE CONTROLLABILITY OF THE ELEVATOR. IN FACT THIS IS NOT AN INFREQUENT OCCURRENCE AND IS AN ANOMALY ASSOCIATED WITH THE TYPE OF INDICATOR. RPTR FURTHER STATES THAT HE TOOK AGGRESSIVE BRAKING ACTION AFTER LNDG WITH NO EXPLANATION WHY HE FELT THE NEED FOR MAX PERFORMANCE STOP. IT WAS AFTER THE ACFT TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY WHEN THE PLT WAS ALERTED TO THE LOSS OF PRESSURE AND THEN FLUID. PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF HARD BRAKING. RPTR DOES NOT KNOW OF THE FINAL DETERMINATION FROM MAINT AS TO THE SOURCE OF THE ODOR AND HE BELIEVES THE ACFT WAS PUT BACK INTO SVC AFTER AN INSPECTION AND MAINT ACTION ON THE BRAKES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 448402 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO INDICATED THAT SHE WAS THE PF ON A SAAB SF-340B DURING THIS LEG AND THAT DFW WAS THEIR DEST. SHE REVIEWED THE MAINT WRITE-UPS AND FOUND NOTHING FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD. RECENTLY, SHE FOUND A NEWLY ENTERED WRITE UP INDICATING THAT MAINT HAD REPLACED THE AIR CONDITIONING PACKS BEFORE THE FLT IN QUESTION. THE FO DESCRIBED THE ODOR AS BEING CHEMICAL, RATHER THAN AN ELECTRICAL SMELL, SOMEWHAT LIKE BAKING GOODS. THE HYD FLUID LOSS THAT THEY EXPERIENCED UPON LNDG WAS AN UNASSOCIATED PROB, AS WAS THE STANDBY PITCH INDICATOR MALFUNCTION. THERE HAD BEEN NO PREVIOUS WRITE UPS ON THE HYD NOR ON THE PITCH INDICATOR. THE FO STATED THAT THE CAPT ALLOWED HER TO CONTINUE AS HE HAD FLOWN WITH HER ALL MONTH ANDHAD CONFIDENCE IN HER ABILITIES. SINCE SO MANY DISPARATE PROBS WERE CROPPING UP, HE FELT THAT HE SHOULD MANAGE ALL OF THE ISSUES, STAY ON TOP OF ATC, AND MAINTAIN COM WITH THEIR COMPANY MOC. UNFORTUNATELY, AFTER THE FLT, THE COMPANY CRITICIZED THIS CREW, SAYING THE MOST EXPERIENCED PLT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FLYING. THE ANALYST DISAGREES WITH THE COMPANY'S POS AND FEELS THAT THIS CAPT UTILIZED HIS RESOURCES EXCEEDINGLY WELL AND WAS ABLE TO ENSURE THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE FLT BY NOT GETTING DISTRACTED BY FLYING DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.