Narrative:

Flight finally taxied out from gate approximately 45 mins late due to delays caused by ramp closure from lightning and maintenance's assistance with insufficient oxygen on board to carry the FAA maintenance safety inspector who was riding on our jump seat. No sooner did we finally taxi out from the gate when pit closed the airport for departures due to a level 5 thunderstorm passing over the field. We held on taxiway C short of taxiway V for approximately 25 mins, at which point concern over dropping below our takeoff minimum fuel load became a reality. Now over 1 hour late, and in an attempt to avert having to return to the gate to refuel, I elected to shut down the #1 engine to conserve fuel while we waited out the storm. Approximately 10 mins later the airport opened to all aircraft but us as phl had imposed further departure delays for all inbound phl flts. Because our flight was at the #1 spot holding short of taxiway V we were in the way of aircraft waiting behind us who could depart so ATC instructed us to move behind the deice pad to wait for our phl slot. Because the airbus is not allowed to taxi with 1 engine, we commenced with the xbleed engine procedure to start the #1 engine. The handbook naturally asks that you ensure the area behind you is clear prior to conducting this procedure, and upon asking ATC if it was clear behind us we learned that ATC had positioned a commuter aircraft directly behind us. Stuck between a rock and a hard place of choosing between advancing power sufficient enough to start an engine and risk possibly blowing the commuter aircraft behind us, or slowing easing the power up on the single engine so as to repos to a point where the xbleed start could be accomplished, I chose the latter, as I deemed it to be the safest course of action. Either action would have been conducted against company policy, the fact that either had to be performed with an FAA inspector on board is regrettable. The inspector commended my copilot and I for a job well done once we finally arrived in phl so it is assumed that he is either unaware that the airbus is not recommended to taxi single engine, or he is truly a logical human being who understands the predicament that was before us. Lesson learned: when trying to conserve fuel for the company and further delays for our passenger, choose only to shut down an engine at a location where no one else can be positioned behind you or pilots will be faced with the same dilemma each time the engine must be restarted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN AIRBUS A320 TAXIED ON 1 ENG, EVEN THOUGH HE KNEW THAT IT WAS CONTRARY TO COMPANY POLICY AND THE ACFT OPERATING PROCS, IN ORDER TO AVOID JETBLAST TO ANOTHER ACFT HOLDING BEHIND WHEN STARTING THE OTHER ENG.

Narrative: FLT FINALLY TAXIED OUT FROM GATE APPROX 45 MINS LATE DUE TO DELAYS CAUSED BY RAMP CLOSURE FROM LIGHTNING AND MAINT'S ASSISTANCE WITH INSUFFICIENT OXYGEN ON BOARD TO CARRY THE FAA MAINT SAFETY INSPECTOR WHO WAS RIDING ON OUR JUMP SEAT. NO SOONER DID WE FINALLY TAXI OUT FROM THE GATE WHEN PIT CLOSED THE ARPT FOR DEPS DUE TO A LEVEL 5 TSTM PASSING OVER THE FIELD. WE HELD ON TXWY C SHORT OF TXWY V FOR APPROX 25 MINS, AT WHICH POINT CONCERN OVER DROPPING BELOW OUR TKOF MINIMUM FUEL LOAD BECAME A REALITY. NOW OVER 1 HR LATE, AND IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVERT HAVING TO RETURN TO THE GATE TO REFUEL, I ELECTED TO SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG TO CONSERVE FUEL WHILE WE WAITED OUT THE STORM. APPROX 10 MINS LATER THE ARPT OPENED TO ALL ACFT BUT US AS PHL HAD IMPOSED FURTHER DEP DELAYS FOR ALL INBOUND PHL FLTS. BECAUSE OUR FLT WAS AT THE #1 SPOT HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY V WE WERE IN THE WAY OF ACFT WAITING BEHIND US WHO COULD DEPART SO ATC INSTRUCTED US TO MOVE BEHIND THE DEICE PAD TO WAIT FOR OUR PHL SLOT. BECAUSE THE AIRBUS IS NOT ALLOWED TO TAXI WITH 1 ENG, WE COMMENCED WITH THE XBLEED ENG PROC TO START THE #1 ENG. THE HANDBOOK NATURALLY ASKS THAT YOU ENSURE THE AREA BEHIND YOU IS CLR PRIOR TO CONDUCTING THIS PROC, AND UPON ASKING ATC IF IT WAS CLR BEHIND US WE LEARNED THAT ATC HAD POSITIONED A COMMUTER ACFT DIRECTLY BEHIND US. STUCK BTWN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE OF CHOOSING BTWN ADVANCING PWR SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO START AN ENG AND RISK POSSIBLY BLOWING THE COMMUTER ACFT BEHIND US, OR SLOWING EASING THE PWR UP ON THE SINGLE ENG SO AS TO REPOS TO A POINT WHERE THE XBLEED START COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED, I CHOSE THE LATTER, AS I DEEMED IT TO BE THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. EITHER ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED AGAINST COMPANY POLICY, THE FACT THAT EITHER HAD TO BE PERFORMED WITH AN FAA INSPECTOR ON BOARD IS REGRETTABLE. THE INSPECTOR COMMENDED MY COPLT AND I FOR A JOB WELL DONE ONCE WE FINALLY ARRIVED IN PHL SO IT IS ASSUMED THAT HE IS EITHER UNAWARE THAT THE AIRBUS IS NOT RECOMMENDED TO TAXI SINGLE ENG, OR HE IS TRULY A LOGICAL HUMAN BEING WHO UNDERSTANDS THE PREDICAMENT THAT WAS BEFORE US. LESSON LEARNED: WHEN TRYING TO CONSERVE FUEL FOR THE COMPANY AND FURTHER DELAYS FOR OUR PAX, CHOOSE ONLY TO SHUT DOWN AN ENG AT A LOCATION WHERE NO ONE ELSE CAN BE POSITIONED BEHIND YOU OR PLTS WILL BE FACED WITH THE SAME DILEMMA EACH TIME THE ENG MUST BE RESTARTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.