Narrative:

On sep/xa/99, we departed sfo for pdx. The entire flight was routine except for the last few moments. As we arrived into the portland area, ATIS was reporting clear, visibility 10 mi and to expect the mill charted visual procedure. As we approached the mill still on vectors we were told to look for a dash 8. We called the traffic in sight and were told to follow the traffic, we could turn to intercept final rather than executing the remainder of the visual procedure, and we were cleared for the visual. We acknowledged and intercepted runway 28R. We were instructed to contact tower in which we did. The controller cleared us to land on runway 28L. We queried tower and they thought we had been assigned the left. He asked us to sidestep and we landed on runway 28L with no incident. We contacted tower on the ground and he told us it was his responsibility to assign runway assignments and the confusion regarding which final we were on 'was no fault of your own.' however, I feel this confusion is a great example of complacency and miscom on all parts. We were anticipating the 'mill' which has you overfly final and typically intercept runway 28R localizer. This is what we did and we never confirmed this is what approach wanted. In addition, we kept the visual with the dash 8 but he went to the runway 28L. The controller, however, was vague. He cleared us on the visual with no runway assignment to my knowledge. Thus, we thought it was the mill visual which is for runway 28R. There were no other aircraft in the area and it was VMC. However, this does illustrate how miscom or lack of could have caused a conflict. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that the charted visual procedure at pdx is a little vague and at times keeps the flight high on the final. He said pilots like to know what runway they will be landing on as far out as possible. Because he flies into pdx often, the reporter says most of the time he knows what to expect, but added, it gets confusing sometimes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 FLC ON APCH TO PDX ARE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW A DASH 8 ON A CHARTED VISUAL TO RWYS 28L&R, THEN SWITCHED TO THE TWR WITHOUT A RWY ASSIGNMENT.

Narrative: ON SEP/XA/99, WE DEPARTED SFO FOR PDX. THE ENTIRE FLT WAS ROUTINE EXCEPT FOR THE LAST FEW MOMENTS. AS WE ARRIVED INTO THE PORTLAND AREA, ATIS WAS RPTING CLR, VISIBILITY 10 MI AND TO EXPECT THE MILL CHARTED VISUAL PROC. AS WE APCHED THE MILL STILL ON VECTORS WE WERE TOLD TO LOOK FOR A DASH 8. WE CALLED THE TFC IN SIGHT AND WERE TOLD TO FOLLOW THE TFC, WE COULD TURN TO INTERCEPT FINAL RATHER THAN EXECUTING THE REMAINDER OF THE VISUAL PROC, AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND INTERCEPTED RWY 28R. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT TWR IN WHICH WE DID. THE CTLR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 28L. WE QUERIED TWR AND THEY THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED THE L. HE ASKED US TO SIDESTEP AND WE LANDED ON RWY 28L WITH NO INCIDENT. WE CONTACTED TWR ON THE GND AND HE TOLD US IT WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIGN RWY ASSIGNMENTS AND THE CONFUSION REGARDING WHICH FINAL WE WERE ON 'WAS NO FAULT OF YOUR OWN.' HOWEVER, I FEEL THIS CONFUSION IS A GREAT EXAMPLE OF COMPLACENCY AND MISCOM ON ALL PARTS. WE WERE ANTICIPATING THE 'MILL' WHICH HAS YOU OVERFLY FINAL AND TYPICALLY INTERCEPT RWY 28R LOC. THIS IS WHAT WE DID AND WE NEVER CONFIRMED THIS IS WHAT APCH WANTED. IN ADDITION, WE KEPT THE VISUAL WITH THE DASH 8 BUT HE WENT TO THE RWY 28L. THE CTLR, HOWEVER, WAS VAGUE. HE CLRED US ON THE VISUAL WITH NO RWY ASSIGNMENT TO MY KNOWLEDGE. THUS, WE THOUGHT IT WAS THE MILL VISUAL WHICH IS FOR RWY 28R. THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA AND IT WAS VMC. HOWEVER, THIS DOES ILLUSTRATE HOW MISCOM OR LACK OF COULD HAVE CAUSED A CONFLICT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THE CHARTED VISUAL PROC AT PDX IS A LITTLE VAGUE AND AT TIMES KEEPS THE FLT HIGH ON THE FINAL. HE SAID PLTS LIKE TO KNOW WHAT RWY THEY WILL BE LNDG ON AS FAR OUT AS POSSIBLE. BECAUSE HE FLIES INTO PDX OFTEN, THE RPTR SAYS MOST OF THE TIME HE KNOWS WHAT TO EXPECT, BUT ADDED, IT GETS CONFUSING SOMETIMES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.