Narrative:

While making an approach to landing, I unintentionally allowed my plane to get unduly close to another. Approximately 8 mi south of frg, I contacted republic tower and was given a straight-in approach for runway 32. The controller got my n-numbers wrong for the second time and for some reason when I called back to again clarify, he came back and changed my straight-in to a 'report right downwind for runway 32.' being on the opposite side of the airport, I thought that it was a bit awkward and unexpected but felt it was understandable because runway 32 is right traffic. I was now at 1200 ft MSL and sse of the field. Since I had not received any vectors, I turned north intending to pass the field by a wide enough margin on the east side and then head west, until such time that I could turn left to enter the 45 degree right downwind entry for runway 32. However, when at approximately 2 mi east of the field and only 1-2 mins since I was on the straight-in for runway 32, the tower instructed me to identify. I complied and the controller responded by saying that he had me on downwind and I am cleared to land on runway 32. While I just began to turn to the left, in response to the controller's last transmission but not yet able to acknowledge his clearance, the second aircraft, a bellanca who had just reported entering downwind, transmitted that he was already on downwind. The controller replied, by saying that he only wanted me (my n-number) to respond. I told him something to the effect that I was not yet on downwind. He asked for my heading. I replied with 345 degrees or some northwest heading. He instructed me to make an immediate right turn to avoid opposite traffic. I acknowledged also telling him that I had the traffic in sight. I believe the problem arose because of diminished planning and attention on the part of the controller and a hesitant, all too compliant, attitude on my part. At the time that I was cleared to land, I was prepared to make what would have amounted to a 250 degree turn because I felt that that was what the controller wanted me to do and he must know something that I do not. While I wanted to challenge the controller's clearance I was not fast enough. If I had been surer of the situation, I may have refused the clearance to land explaining that I was not on the downwind but in fact merely crossing the extended downwind leg and now heading away from it. In general, the things that could have improved this situation: pilot -- 1) repeat all tower instructions. 2) communicate more quickly and effectively with the tower. 3) if any doubt, voluntarily give your proposed route to the controller. 4) give wider breadth to the airport when maneuvering, especially at night. 5) do not accept a clearance that you believe may be risky. 6) it is not enough to follow a controller's instruction blindly. A pilot needs to understand as much of the situation as possible. Controller -- 1) if at all possible, explain your instructions however briefly. 2) avoid, if possible, changing instructions repeatedly. 3) know who each of the aircraft in your area are at all times and their direction of flight. 4) do not allow an unexpected event, like an aircraft going for the right downwind instead of the left, to confuse you. 5) absolutely do not issue instructions or clrncs to an aircraft that you have not absolutely and positively idented beyond any doubt. 6) do not hesitate to question a pilot with respect to other traffic or where he/she is in relation to the airport. Pilots often are a helpful resource to controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 NMAC AT FRG IN THE PATTERN.

Narrative: WHILE MAKING AN APCH TO LNDG, I UNINTENTIONALLY ALLOWED MY PLANE TO GET UNDULY CLOSE TO ANOTHER. APPROX 8 MI S OF FRG, I CONTACTED REPUBLIC TWR AND WAS GIVEN A STRAIGHT-IN APCH FOR RWY 32. THE CTLR GOT MY N-NUMBERS WRONG FOR THE SECOND TIME AND FOR SOME REASON WHEN I CALLED BACK TO AGAIN CLARIFY, HE CAME BACK AND CHANGED MY STRAIGHT-IN TO A 'RPT R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 32.' BEING ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE ARPT, I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS A BIT AWKWARD AND UNEXPECTED BUT FELT IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE BECAUSE RWY 32 IS R TFC. I WAS NOW AT 1200 FT MSL AND SSE OF THE FIELD. SINCE I HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY VECTORS, I TURNED N INTENDING TO PASS THE FIELD BY A WIDE ENOUGH MARGIN ON THE E SIDE AND THEN HEAD W, UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT I COULD TURN L TO ENTER THE 45 DEG R DOWNWIND ENTRY FOR RWY 32. HOWEVER, WHEN AT APPROX 2 MI E OF THE FIELD AND ONLY 1-2 MINS SINCE I WAS ON THE STRAIGHT-IN FOR RWY 32, THE TWR INSTRUCTED ME TO IDENT. I COMPLIED AND THE CTLR RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD ME ON DOWNWIND AND I AM CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 32. WHILE I JUST BEGAN TO TURN TO THE L, IN RESPONSE TO THE CTLR'S LAST XMISSION BUT NOT YET ABLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE HIS CLRNC, THE SECOND ACFT, A BELLANCA WHO HAD JUST RPTED ENTERING DOWNWIND, XMITTED THAT HE WAS ALREADY ON DOWNWIND. THE CTLR REPLIED, BY SAYING THAT HE ONLY WANTED ME (MY N-NUMBER) TO RESPOND. I TOLD HIM SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT I WAS NOT YET ON DOWNWIND. HE ASKED FOR MY HDG. I REPLIED WITH 345 DEGS OR SOME NW HDG. HE INSTRUCTED ME TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO AVOID OPPOSITE TFC. I ACKNOWLEDGED ALSO TELLING HIM THAT I HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. I BELIEVE THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE OF DIMINISHED PLANNING AND ATTN ON THE PART OF THE CTLR AND A HESITANT, ALL TOO COMPLIANT, ATTITUDE ON MY PART. AT THE TIME THAT I WAS CLRED TO LAND, I WAS PREPARED TO MAKE WHAT WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO A 250 DEG TURN BECAUSE I FELT THAT THAT WAS WHAT THE CTLR WANTED ME TO DO AND HE MUST KNOW SOMETHING THAT I DO NOT. WHILE I WANTED TO CHALLENGE THE CTLR'S CLRNC I WAS NOT FAST ENOUGH. IF I HAD BEEN SURER OF THE SIT, I MAY HAVE REFUSED THE CLRNC TO LAND EXPLAINING THAT I WAS NOT ON THE DOWNWIND BUT IN FACT MERELY XING THE EXTENDED DOWNWIND LEG AND NOW HDG AWAY FROM IT. IN GENERAL, THE THINGS THAT COULD HAVE IMPROVED THIS SIT: PLT -- 1) REPEAT ALL TWR INSTRUCTIONS. 2) COMMUNICATE MORE QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH THE TWR. 3) IF ANY DOUBT, VOLUNTARILY GIVE YOUR PROPOSED RTE TO THE CTLR. 4) GIVE WIDER BREADTH TO THE ARPT WHEN MANEUVERING, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. 5) DO NOT ACCEPT A CLRNC THAT YOU BELIEVE MAY BE RISKY. 6) IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO FOLLOW A CTLR'S INSTRUCTION BLINDLY. A PLT NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND AS MUCH OF THE SIT AS POSSIBLE. CTLR -- 1) IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, EXPLAIN YOUR INSTRUCTIONS HOWEVER BRIEFLY. 2) AVOID, IF POSSIBLE, CHANGING INSTRUCTIONS REPEATEDLY. 3) KNOW WHO EACH OF THE ACFT IN YOUR AREA ARE AT ALL TIMES AND THEIR DIRECTION OF FLT. 4) DO NOT ALLOW AN UNEXPECTED EVENT, LIKE AN ACFT GOING FOR THE R DOWNWIND INSTEAD OF THE L, TO CONFUSE YOU. 5) ABSOLUTELY DO NOT ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS OR CLRNCS TO AN ACFT THAT YOU HAVE NOT ABSOLUTELY AND POSITIVELY IDENTED BEYOND ANY DOUBT. 6) DO NOT HESITATE TO QUESTION A PLT WITH RESPECT TO OTHER TFC OR WHERE HE/SHE IS IN RELATION TO THE ARPT. PLTS OFTEN ARE A HELPFUL RESOURCE TO CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.