Narrative:

I was conducting a BFR with the reviewee who is himself a CFI. We were 10 mi north of the field. I had no answer. I switched on radio #2 with no answer. I told him to radio xyz with his push-to-talk. No answer. I asked him if he was familiar with the area. Reviewee told me that he was familiar with the field and that he already had landed there. We were about to enter the magenta shaded contour of the class east airspace when I decided to radio both tower and traffic. We discussed the radio problem and I assumed that the CTAF was not operating. Reviewee didn't suggest or mention a doubt about my decision. I thought he knew the field and the CTAF operations better than I could since I was not familiar with xyz. He told me that he needed to practice lndgs and we kept our heading toward xyz at 2500 ft. We entered the blue dashed line of class D airspace and I believed it was downgraded to a class east since we had no answer on the CTAF frequency 124.0. We kept radioing our position, altitude and intentions -- full stop landing -- on both frequencys. We radioed on both frequencys that we were entering left downwind for runway 25, base runway 25, checked for traffic in final and called in final for a full stop landing. We exited the runway on the taxiway facing the tower, seemingly inoperative. We radioed that we were taxiing to runway 25. During the taxiing and approaching the end of the taxiway, we saw a cessna on short final. It did a touch-and-go. We waited off the runway until the cessna was airborne well above the ground (400 ft or so) and started its turn outbound. We taxied onto the active runway 25 after having radioed our intention to take off and depart wbound on both frequencys. We took off and left frequency 4-5 mi outbound. Upon arrival, ground control told us to call xyz tower. I called and I talked to an unidented person who asked me my name, address, personal and professional phone numbers and my medical and pilot certificate numbers. I first told him our tail number and volunteered the rest of the information. He asked me if I saw a red gun light from the tower upon takeoff and if we had radio contact prior to entering class D airspace. I said no. I told him that I radioed on both frequencys and that I thought that the tower was inoperative. He told me that I would have heard something on 124.1 and that there was no need to contact unicom since the tower was operating. I unfolded my chart and told him that a crease had erased the last digit of the CTAF frequency 124.1 and that I dialed in 124.0. I called tower 10-15 mins later to ask to speak with the manager. The person with whom I had already spoken told me that he was the manager. I asked him his name and again offered to drive to and show him my chart with the crease. He declined. I told him that I was concerned about the outcome of the 'pilot report' for deviation and I asked him what would happen to my job and license. He told me 'I report, they investigate.' contributing factors: I trusted reviewee because of his CFI experience and his knowledge of the area, to proceed toward xyz airport. The sky was empty, the visibility was great. There was no ceiling. These factors led me to believe that safety was not compromised. We opened our eyes and ears and saw one plane doing 1 touch-and-go at xyz airport. We heard the AWOS and had no reason to think that our radios were OTS. I double- and triplechked my reading of the CTAF frequency, seeing only 124__ (blank). How it was discovered: over the phone with manager of xyz tower. Corrective actions: I dialed both frequencys 124.0 CTAF and 123.05 unicom so that we could transmit on and monitor both frequencys. In accord with my chief pilot, I will take an examination on regulations (far parts 61 and 91). I will take a class with an FSDO representative on that subject matter. Perceptions: blurred by my reading of the CTAF frequency over the crease (last digit), feeling of being 'safe' with another CFI who had previous experience of the area that I didn't have and who flew recently, feeling of doing 'the right thing' when entering a class east airspace since I/we assumed the tower was inoperative, and when transmitting on both frequencys to insure being heard when entering the airspace, I/we didn't see any activity or gun light from the tower. When we took off from runway 25, we were facing a bright sun, low on the horizon. Judgements: poor. Decision: impaired by perceptions. Factors affecting the quality of human performance: no experience of the area and misreading of the frequency on the map. Actions or inactions: 1) actions: use of 2 frequencys and see and avoid strategy. 2) inactions: not diverting the flight toward an airspace I was more familiar with. What can be done to prevent a recurrence: 1) pilots: check on different sources (terminal and sectional charts, AFD) of the information. 2) ATC: monitor unicom frequency when CTAF is operating.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 CFI'S OUT FOR A BFR LANDED AND TOOK OFF AT CLASS D ARPT WITHOUT CONTACT WITH TWR.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING A BFR WITH THE REVIEWEE WHO IS HIMSELF A CFI. WE WERE 10 MI N OF THE FIELD. I HAD NO ANSWER. I SWITCHED ON RADIO #2 WITH NO ANSWER. I TOLD HIM TO RADIO XYZ WITH HIS PUSH-TO-TALK. NO ANSWER. I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA. REVIEWEE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE FIELD AND THAT HE ALREADY HAD LANDED THERE. WE WERE ABOUT TO ENTER THE MAGENTA SHADED CONTOUR OF THE CLASS E AIRSPACE WHEN I DECIDED TO RADIO BOTH TWR AND TFC. WE DISCUSSED THE RADIO PROB AND I ASSUMED THAT THE CTAF WAS NOT OPERATING. REVIEWEE DIDN'T SUGGEST OR MENTION A DOUBT ABOUT MY DECISION. I THOUGHT HE KNEW THE FIELD AND THE CTAF OPS BETTER THAN I COULD SINCE I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH XYZ. HE TOLD ME THAT HE NEEDED TO PRACTICE LNDGS AND WE KEPT OUR HDG TOWARD XYZ AT 2500 FT. WE ENTERED THE BLUE DASHED LINE OF CLASS D AIRSPACE AND I BELIEVED IT WAS DOWNGRADED TO A CLASS E SINCE WE HAD NO ANSWER ON THE CTAF FREQ 124.0. WE KEPT RADIOING OUR POS, ALT AND INTENTIONS -- FULL STOP LNDG -- ON BOTH FREQS. WE RADIOED ON BOTH FREQS THAT WE WERE ENTERING L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 25, BASE RWY 25, CHKED FOR TFC IN FINAL AND CALLED IN FINAL FOR A FULL STOP LNDG. WE EXITED THE RWY ON THE TXWY FACING THE TWR, SEEMINGLY INOP. WE RADIOED THAT WE WERE TAXIING TO RWY 25. DURING THE TAXIING AND APCHING THE END OF THE TXWY, WE SAW A CESSNA ON SHORT FINAL. IT DID A TOUCH-AND-GO. WE WAITED OFF THE RWY UNTIL THE CESSNA WAS AIRBORNE WELL ABOVE THE GND (400 FT OR SO) AND STARTED ITS TURN OUTBOUND. WE TAXIED ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY 25 AFTER HAVING RADIOED OUR INTENTION TO TAKE OFF AND DEPART WBOUND ON BOTH FREQS. WE TOOK OFF AND LEFT FREQ 4-5 MI OUTBOUND. UPON ARR, GND CTL TOLD US TO CALL XYZ TWR. I CALLED AND I TALKED TO AN UNIDENTED PERSON WHO ASKED ME MY NAME, ADDRESS, PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL PHONE NUMBERS AND MY MEDICAL AND PLT CERTIFICATE NUMBERS. I FIRST TOLD HIM OUR TAIL NUMBER AND VOLUNTEERED THE REST OF THE INFO. HE ASKED ME IF I SAW A RED GUN LIGHT FROM THE TWR UPON TKOF AND IF WE HAD RADIO CONTACT PRIOR TO ENTERING CLASS D AIRSPACE. I SAID NO. I TOLD HIM THAT I RADIOED ON BOTH FREQS AND THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE TWR WAS INOP. HE TOLD ME THAT I WOULD HAVE HEARD SOMETHING ON 124.1 AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO CONTACT UNICOM SINCE THE TWR WAS OPERATING. I UNFOLDED MY CHART AND TOLD HIM THAT A CREASE HAD ERASED THE LAST DIGIT OF THE CTAF FREQ 124.1 AND THAT I DIALED IN 124.0. I CALLED TWR 10-15 MINS LATER TO ASK TO SPEAK WITH THE MGR. THE PERSON WITH WHOM I HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TOLD ME THAT HE WAS THE MGR. I ASKED HIM HIS NAME AND AGAIN OFFERED TO DRIVE TO AND SHOW HIM MY CHART WITH THE CREASE. HE DECLINED. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE 'PLT RPT' FOR DEV AND I ASKED HIM WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO MY JOB AND LICENSE. HE TOLD ME 'I RPT, THEY INVESTIGATE.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I TRUSTED REVIEWEE BECAUSE OF HIS CFI EXPERIENCE AND HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE AREA, TO PROCEED TOWARD XYZ ARPT. THE SKY WAS EMPTY, THE VISIBILITY WAS GREAT. THERE WAS NO CEILING. THESE FACTORS LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED. WE OPENED OUR EYES AND EARS AND SAW ONE PLANE DOING 1 TOUCH-AND-GO AT XYZ ARPT. WE HEARD THE AWOS AND HAD NO REASON TO THINK THAT OUR RADIOS WERE OTS. I DOUBLE- AND TRIPLECHKED MY READING OF THE CTAF FREQ, SEEING ONLY 124__ (BLANK). HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: OVER THE PHONE WITH MGR OF XYZ TWR. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: I DIALED BOTH FREQS 124.0 CTAF AND 123.05 UNICOM SO THAT WE COULD XMIT ON AND MONITOR BOTH FREQS. IN ACCORD WITH MY CHIEF PLT, I WILL TAKE AN EXAMINATION ON REGS (FAR PARTS 61 AND 91). I WILL TAKE A CLASS WITH AN FSDO REPRESENTATIVE ON THAT SUBJECT MATTER. PERCEPTIONS: BLURRED BY MY READING OF THE CTAF FREQ OVER THE CREASE (LAST DIGIT), FEELING OF BEING 'SAFE' WITH ANOTHER CFI WHO HAD PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF THE AREA THAT I DIDN'T HAVE AND WHO FLEW RECENTLY, FEELING OF DOING 'THE RIGHT THING' WHEN ENTERING A CLASS E AIRSPACE SINCE I/WE ASSUMED THE TWR WAS INOP, AND WHEN XMITTING ON BOTH FREQS TO INSURE BEING HEARD WHEN ENTERING THE AIRSPACE, I/WE DIDN'T SEE ANY ACTIVITY OR GUN LIGHT FROM THE TWR. WHEN WE TOOK OFF FROM RWY 25, WE WERE FACING A BRIGHT SUN, LOW ON THE HORIZON. JUDGEMENTS: POOR. DECISION: IMPAIRED BY PERCEPTIONS. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: NO EXPERIENCE OF THE AREA AND MISREADING OF THE FREQ ON THE MAP. ACTIONS OR INACTIONS: 1) ACTIONS: USE OF 2 FREQS AND SEE AND AVOID STRATEGY. 2) INACTIONS: NOT DIVERTING THE FLT TOWARD AN AIRSPACE I WAS MORE FAMILIAR WITH. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE: 1) PLTS: CHK ON DIFFERENT SOURCES (TERMINAL AND SECTIONAL CHARTS, AFD) OF THE INFO. 2) ATC: MONITOR UNICOM FREQ WHEN CTAF IS OPERATING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.