Narrative:

On approach to white plains, we were instructed to join the localizer to runway 16 at 5000 ft. The controller also informed us that we would be overtaking a cessna ahead at 3000 ft that was already on the approach. With this in mind, I kept our speed at 250 KTS in order to expedite the overtake. At approximately 10 mi out and past the cessna, we were cleared to 3000 ft and told to call the field, when able, for a visual approach. Noticing that we were within 5 mi of the OM (ILS runway 16 has a published crossing altitude of 2000 ft MSL at the OM), I deployed the flight spoilers and selected a 2500 FPM descent in order to hustle down. While still in the descent to 3000 ft and as we approached the OM, the controller asked if we had the field in sight yet and, after we answered negatively, he cleared us to 2000 ft and told us to slow to our final approach speed. At some point inside the OM, leveling at 2000 ft and showing high on the GS, the controller again asked if we had the field in sight, as he was going to have to break us off for another approach if we didn't have it. As the first officer was in mid transmission with a negative response, the runway came into sight so we called it. After inquiring as to whether we would be able to get down ok (I responded affirmatively as I felt it was safe since we were configuring and slowing), the controller cleared us for a visual approach to runway 16 stating that there were numerous VFR targets in the pattern at white plains and told us to contact tower. Just as my first officer was checking in with the tower, and as we were passing through 1200 ft, I saw what appeared to be a single engine, low wing piper at our 12 - 12:30 O'clock position, less than 1 mi away flying slightly from our right to left either joining final or flying the localizer. Not knowing the aircraft's intentions, I made an immediate right turn while telling the first officer to inform the tower that we were in a turn to the west. While in the turn and level at 1200 ft, we passed 300 ft below another single engine aircraft that I presume was on a left downwind to runway 11. We cleaned up the aircraft, were given vectors back around for an ILS runway 16 and informed the passenger as to the reason for the go around. Incidentally, on the repeat approach we did not visually see the field until 3.5 DME on the ILS and, while on the GS, we passed 300 ft below and slightly behind another single engine aircraft on a left downwind to runway 11. In hindsight, my contributions to this event were: 1) staying too fast for too long. 2) not accepting the controller's offer to break it off when he offered as we were high and fast which dropped us right into the VFR traffic in the pattern for runway 11. I feel the controller's contributions to this event were: 1) continually fishing for us to call the field when the visibility was marginal. 2) continually fishing for a visual approach because, in my opinion, he knew he was going to have separation problems if he cleared us for the ILS. (Problems that later materialized for us!) 3) not specifically notifying us of the aircraft ahead, whether he knew its intentions or not. In closing, I feel it is necessary to say that if ATC and this airport continue to run hpn in this manner, it is an accident waiting to happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A REGIONAL JET FLC HAD 2 NMACS ON APCH TO HPN.

Narrative: ON APCH TO WHITE PLAINS, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO JOIN THE LOC TO RWY 16 AT 5000 FT. THE CTLR ALSO INFORMED US THAT WE WOULD BE OVERTAKING A CESSNA AHEAD AT 3000 FT THAT WAS ALREADY ON THE APCH. WITH THIS IN MIND, I KEPT OUR SPD AT 250 KTS IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE OVERTAKE. AT APPROX 10 MI OUT AND PAST THE CESSNA, WE WERE CLRED TO 3000 FT AND TOLD TO CALL THE FIELD, WHEN ABLE, FOR A VISUAL APCH. NOTICING THAT WE WERE WITHIN 5 MI OF THE OM (ILS RWY 16 HAS A PUBLISHED XING ALT OF 2000 FT MSL AT THE OM), I DEPLOYED THE FLT SPOILERS AND SELECTED A 2500 FPM DSCNT IN ORDER TO HUSTLE DOWN. WHILE STILL IN THE DSCNT TO 3000 FT AND AS WE APCHED THE OM, THE CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT YET AND, AFTER WE ANSWERED NEGATIVELY, HE CLRED US TO 2000 FT AND TOLD US TO SLOW TO OUR FINAL APCH SPD. AT SOME POINT INSIDE THE OM, LEVELING AT 2000 FT AND SHOWING HIGH ON THE GS, THE CTLR AGAIN ASKED IF WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT, AS HE WAS GOING TO HAVE TO BREAK US OFF FOR ANOTHER APCH IF WE DIDN'T HAVE IT. AS THE FO WAS IN MID XMISSION WITH A NEGATIVE RESPONSE, THE RWY CAME INTO SIGHT SO WE CALLED IT. AFTER INQUIRING AS TO WHETHER WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET DOWN OK (I RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY AS I FELT IT WAS SAFE SINCE WE WERE CONFIGURING AND SLOWING), THE CTLR CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16 STATING THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS VFR TARGETS IN THE PATTERN AT WHITE PLAINS AND TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR. JUST AS MY FO WAS CHKING IN WITH THE TWR, AND AS WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 1200 FT, I SAW WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SINGLE ENG, LOW WING PIPER AT OUR 12 - 12:30 O'CLOCK POS, LESS THAN 1 MI AWAY FLYING SLIGHTLY FROM OUR R TO L EITHER JOINING FINAL OR FLYING THE LOC. NOT KNOWING THE ACFT'S INTENTIONS, I MADE AN IMMEDIATE R TURN WHILE TELLING THE FO TO INFORM THE TWR THAT WE WERE IN A TURN TO THE W. WHILE IN THE TURN AND LEVEL AT 1200 FT, WE PASSED 300 FT BELOW ANOTHER SINGLE ENG ACFT THAT I PRESUME WAS ON A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 11. WE CLEANED UP THE ACFT, WERE GIVEN VECTORS BACK AROUND FOR AN ILS RWY 16 AND INFORMED THE PAX AS TO THE REASON FOR THE GAR. INCIDENTALLY, ON THE REPEAT APCH WE DID NOT VISUALLY SEE THE FIELD UNTIL 3.5 DME ON THE ILS AND, WHILE ON THE GS, WE PASSED 300 FT BELOW AND SLIGHTLY BEHIND ANOTHER SINGLE ENG ACFT ON A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 11. IN HINDSIGHT, MY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS EVENT WERE: 1) STAYING TOO FAST FOR TOO LONG. 2) NOT ACCEPTING THE CTLR'S OFFER TO BREAK IT OFF WHEN HE OFFERED AS WE WERE HIGH AND FAST WHICH DROPPED US RIGHT INTO THE VFR TFC IN THE PATTERN FOR RWY 11. I FEEL THE CTLR'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS EVENT WERE: 1) CONTINUALLY FISHING FOR US TO CALL THE FIELD WHEN THE VISIBILITY WAS MARGINAL. 2) CONTINUALLY FISHING FOR A VISUAL APCH BECAUSE, IN MY OPINION, HE KNEW HE WAS GOING TO HAVE SEPARATION PROBS IF HE CLRED US FOR THE ILS. (PROBS THAT LATER MATERIALIZED FOR US!) 3) NOT SPECIFICALLY NOTIFYING US OF THE ACFT AHEAD, WHETHER HE KNEW ITS INTENTIONS OR NOT. IN CLOSING, I FEEL IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT IF ATC AND THIS ARPT CONTINUE TO RUN HPN IN THIS MANNER, IT IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.