A B727 first officer report on an emergency descent due to loss of cabin pressure. There was a crew ...

Attributes
ACN	455769
Time
Date	199911
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
State Reference	WI
Altitude	msl bound lower : 10000 msl bound upper : 20000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zau.artcc
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	climbout : vacating altitude descent : vacating altitude
Route In Use	enroute : direct
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : cfi
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 7500 flight time type : 1500
ASRS Report	455769
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far non adherence : clearance other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	flight crew : overcame equipment problem
Consequence	other other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Environmental Factor Company Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Evening flight, captain and myself were scheduled crew. The flight engineer was called at AB00 as reserve. Flight departure delayed 3 hours, but I was informed by AE30, so able to rest at home. Normal taxi until ess power warning light on front panel began flashing -- reminded flight engineer to guard essential, as did the captain (B727). Flight engineer asked us if we wanted him to open ground interconnect -- it appeared he thought he had a loss of all generators on taxi. Captain turned to flight engineer and again pointed out to put essential power on generator #3 -- flight engineer had not checked essential or moved it to generator #3. Continued with normal checklists for before takeoff. Flight appeared normal. My leg (first officer) climbing out through FL200 and cleared direct dll VOR, noticeable popping in our ears. I looked over at captain as he had same ear discomfort and he looked back at flight engineer panel. Discussion: as I informed ATC we'd like to level at FL200, ATC approved. I donned oxygen mask as captain and first officer were discussing and trying to stop the cabin from climbing. We confirmed that we needed to descend. We discussed need to descend. Then captain also had oxygen mask on, but captain and I had a problem hearing each other. Flight engineer was not in the loop of communication at all. I pulled power to idle, pulled full speed brakes and began rapid descent. Captain cut in to ATC. I'm not sure if he meant to say only to crew, but said to us and ATC 'we just need to get down to 10000 ft then we'll talk (about what's next).' emergency descent fine. Continued flight at 10000 ft. I requested local altimeter setting. As captain and flight engineer then started the checklist for uncontrollable cabin, captain noticed that #1 and #3 bleeds were off (in addition to #2 APU bleeds). Flight engineer reinstated bleeds, per checklist. Captain said that is the problem, and we got clearance to and climb to FL230 for duration of flight to dtw. Once on ground at dtw (normal landing) and at gate, I reminded flight engineer that he was probably distraction on the ground at msp. He realized then that is when he turned off the bleeds -- thinking that he was downloading and had turned off the packs. In hindsight, we should have called for rapid descent checklist on the descent. Some things were missed on that checklist. More simulator practice with oxygen masks on would make the communication flow more smoothly.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 FO RPT ON AN EMER DSCNT DUE TO LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE. THERE WAS A CREW FAILURE TO COORDINATE WITH EACH OTHER AND RUN CHKLISTS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIMES DURING TAXI AND CLB WITH ZAU, IL.

Narrative: EVENING FLT, CAPT AND MYSELF WERE SCHEDULED CREW. THE FE WAS CALLED AT AB00 AS RESERVE. FLT DEP DELAYED 3 HRS, BUT I WAS INFORMED BY AE30, SO ABLE TO REST AT HOME. NORMAL TAXI UNTIL ESS PWR WARNING LIGHT ON FRONT PANEL BEGAN FLASHING -- REMINDED FE TO GUARD ESSENTIAL, AS DID THE CAPT (B727). FE ASKED US IF WE WANTED HIM TO OPEN GND INTERCONNECT -- IT APPEARED HE THOUGHT HE HAD A LOSS OF ALL GENERATORS ON TAXI. CAPT TURNED TO FE AND AGAIN POINTED OUT TO PUT ESSENTIAL PWR ON GENERATOR #3 -- FE HAD NOT CHKED ESSENTIAL OR MOVED IT TO GENERATOR #3. CONTINUED WITH NORMAL CHKLISTS FOR BEFORE TKOF. FLT APPEARED NORMAL. MY LEG (FO) CLBING OUT THROUGH FL200 AND CLRED DIRECT DLL VOR, NOTICEABLE POPPING IN OUR EARS. I LOOKED OVER AT CAPT AS HE HAD SAME EAR DISCOMFORT AND HE LOOKED BACK AT FE PANEL. DISCUSSION: AS I INFORMED ATC WE'D LIKE TO LEVEL AT FL200, ATC APPROVED. I DONNED OXYGEN MASK AS CAPT AND FO WERE DISCUSSING AND TRYING TO STOP THE CABIN FROM CLBING. WE CONFIRMED THAT WE NEEDED TO DSND. WE DISCUSSED NEED TO DSND. THEN CAPT ALSO HAD OXYGEN MASK ON, BUT CAPT AND I HAD A PROB HEARING EACH OTHER. FE WAS NOT IN THE LOOP OF COM AT ALL. I PULLED PWR TO IDLE, PULLED FULL SPD BRAKES AND BEGAN RAPID DSCNT. CAPT CUT IN TO ATC. I'M NOT SURE IF HE MEANT TO SAY ONLY TO CREW, BUT SAID TO US AND ATC 'WE JUST NEED TO GET DOWN TO 10000 FT THEN WE'LL TALK (ABOUT WHAT'S NEXT).' EMER DSCNT FINE. CONTINUED FLT AT 10000 FT. I REQUESTED LCL ALTIMETER SETTING. AS CAPT AND FE THEN STARTED THE CHKLIST FOR UNCTLABLE CABIN, CAPT NOTICED THAT #1 AND #3 BLEEDS WERE OFF (IN ADDITION TO #2 APU BLEEDS). FE REINSTATED BLEEDS, PER CHKLIST. CAPT SAID THAT IS THE PROB, AND WE GOT CLRNC TO AND CLB TO FL230 FOR DURATION OF FLT TO DTW. ONCE ON GND AT DTW (NORMAL LNDG) AND AT GATE, I REMINDED FE THAT HE WAS PROBABLY DISTR ON THE GND AT MSP. HE REALIZED THEN THAT IS WHEN HE TURNED OFF THE BLEEDS -- THINKING THAT HE WAS DOWNLOADING AND HAD TURNED OFF THE PACKS. IN HINDSIGHT, WE SHOULD HAVE CALLED FOR RAPID DSCNT CHKLIST ON THE DSCNT. SOME THINGS WERE MISSED ON THAT CHKLIST. MORE SIMULATOR PRACTICE WITH OXYGEN MASKS ON WOULD MAKE THE COM FLOW MORE SMOOTHLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B727 first officer report on an emergency descent due to loss of cabin pressure. There was a crew failure to coordinate with each other and run checklists at the appropriate times during taxi and climb with ZAU, il.