Narrative:

This was the 4TH leg (3RD airplane). It was a short flight from mdw-cvg, but with a newer autoplt (sp-177), which both I and the first officer were relatively inexperienced with. Although it was supposed to be the first officer's leg, she stated she was not very familiar with the autoplt (and had not flown much recently). Due to the low WX conditions at cvg, I flew the approach. The flight was relatively uneventful until the final turn onto the localizer for runway 36R at cvg. We were flying in the snow. The controller gave us a heading to join the localizer and to make a tight turn. As I turned, we went through the localizer centerline, but it appeared we would be able to remain on the localizer. We quickly crossed the localizer centerline again. After a couple of turns to try to capture and hold the centerline, it seemed as though we would have to execute a go around. As we were about to execute the go around, the tower directed us to go around as well. We executed the go around, and I hand flew the next approach to an uneventful landing. The biggest safety factor here is the lack of adequate training in the newer autoplt system. Capts were given 1 flight with a check airman, while first officer's were not given any specific training. Combined with a nonstandard fleet (3 versions of -200's, 2 autoplts, 2 engine variety, and varying cockpit configns), it is difficult (or impossible) to determine when some equipment is not functioning properly, or if operator error is involved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 PIC US UNABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL COUPLED APCH TO ILS RWY 36R AND HAS TO PERFORM A MISSED APCH AT CVG, OH.

Narrative: THIS WAS THE 4TH LEG (3RD AIRPLANE). IT WAS A SHORT FLT FROM MDW-CVG, BUT WITH A NEWER AUTOPLT (SP-177), WHICH BOTH I AND THE FO WERE RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED WITH. ALTHOUGH IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE THE FO'S LEG, SHE STATED SHE WAS NOT VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE AUTOPLT (AND HAD NOT FLOWN MUCH RECENTLY). DUE TO THE LOW WX CONDITIONS AT CVG, I FLEW THE APCH. THE FLT WAS RELATIVELY UNEVENTFUL UNTIL THE FINAL TURN ONTO THE LOC FOR RWY 36R AT CVG. WE WERE FLYING IN THE SNOW. THE CTLR GAVE US A HDG TO JOIN THE LOC AND TO MAKE A TIGHT TURN. AS I TURNED, WE WENT THROUGH THE LOC CTRLINE, BUT IT APPEARED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO REMAIN ON THE LOC. WE QUICKLY CROSSED THE LOC CTRLINE AGAIN. AFTER A COUPLE OF TURNS TO TRY TO CAPTURE AND HOLD THE CTRLINE, IT SEEMED AS THOUGH WE WOULD HAVE TO EXECUTE A GAR. AS WE WERE ABOUT TO EXECUTE THE GAR, THE TWR DIRECTED US TO GO AROUND AS WELL. WE EXECUTED THE GAR, AND I HAND FLEW THE NEXT APCH TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. THE BIGGEST SAFETY FACTOR HERE IS THE LACK OF ADEQUATE TRAINING IN THE NEWER AUTOPLT SYS. CAPTS WERE GIVEN 1 FLT WITH A CHK AIRMAN, WHILE FO'S WERE NOT GIVEN ANY SPECIFIC TRAINING. COMBINED WITH A NONSTANDARD FLEET (3 VERSIONS OF -200'S, 2 AUTOPLTS, 2 ENG VARIETY, AND VARYING COCKPIT CONFIGNS), IT IS DIFFICULT (OR IMPOSSIBLE) TO DETERMINE WHEN SOME EQUIP IS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, OR IF OPERATOR ERROR IS INVOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.