Narrative:

I (captain) was en route from roc to phl, arriving over bunts intersection on the arrival path. We had encountered several layers of clouds in our descent and engine anti-ice had been used off and on several times. First officer was performing flying duties, phl approach had given us several vectors and speed adjustments being vectored into approach sequence for runway 27R. First officer was a new hire and informed me that she had just completed 100 hours in the airplane. I found myself extremely busy with observing her flying performance, trying to comply with all the ATC instructions, and assist her with information she needed to know. On downwind, we extended flaps to 1 degree -- preliminary checklist had been completed. We were trying to keep the speed up for ATC -- turning on base, flaps were moved to 5 degrees and gear extended. Airplane speed was not decreasing, flaps were extended to 15 degrees, and then I noticed flap indicator gauge was stuck on 1 degree. Flaps were not extending beyond 1 degree. We were now on final, gear down, flaps 1 degree, at about 1800 ft. I asked to sidestep and land on runway 27L for extra landing length and was cleared to land. I took over PF duties at this point and landed uneventfully, taxied clear of runway and then realized that when we were turning onto base leg, I had inadvertently reached up and turned off 'B' hydraulic system pumps instead of engine anti-ice switches which are located directly above both 'B' system hydraulic pumps, which rendered flaps inoperative. After clearing runway, immediately recognized problem, turned pumps on, taxied to gate. We had landed in a non standard landing confign with flaps at 1 degree, and performed improper landing checklist. A go around should have been performed and a complete checklist from our QRH for trailing edge flap not extended and 'B' hydraulic system inoperative. Our mistake would have then been discovered and normal flap landing been completed. Supplemental information from acn 460084: in range to phl, we experienced light to moderate chop and the captain chose to turn on the engine anti-ice in case of possible icing from previous temperatures/flight condition's remnants. On downwind vectors to visual approach, and once we were clear of icing and turbulence, he switched engine anti-ice off. In doing so, inadvertently 'B' hydraulic pumps were switched off instead, without our realization. During approach sequence, we attempted to lower flaps after having been required by ATC to keep speed up till reaching the OM. On short final, we realized the flaps would not extend beyond 1 degree. Due to the proximity to the field and the availability of sufficient runway (+10000 ft) we opted to switch to the longer runway and proceed to land. ATC approved the switch, cleared us to land, and we uneventfully landed with flaps selected to 1 degree, as opposed to the standard confign of flaps 30 degrees. At no time were limitations exceeded. At all times we were established on glide path. Trailing edge flaps up checklist had been accomplished, but I felt that a go around would have, in retrospect, been the wiser option to allow for a closer analysis of the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT MISHANDLED THE ACFT HYD SYS AND LANDED WITH FLAPS 1 DEG.

Narrative: I (CAPT) WAS ENRTE FROM ROC TO PHL, ARRIVING OVER BUNTS INTXN ON THE ARR PATH. WE HAD ENCOUNTERED SEVERAL LAYERS OF CLOUDS IN OUR DSCNT AND ENG ANTI-ICE HAD BEEN USED OFF AND ON SEVERAL TIMES. FO WAS PERFORMING FLYING DUTIES, PHL APCH HAD GIVEN US SEVERAL VECTORS AND SPD ADJUSTMENTS BEING VECTORED INTO APCH SEQUENCE FOR RWY 27R. FO WAS A NEW HIRE AND INFORMED ME THAT SHE HAD JUST COMPLETED 100 HRS IN THE AIRPLANE. I FOUND MYSELF EXTREMELY BUSY WITH OBSERVING HER FLYING PERFORMANCE, TRYING TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE ATC INSTRUCTIONS, AND ASSIST HER WITH INFO SHE NEEDED TO KNOW. ON DOWNWIND, WE EXTENDED FLAPS TO 1 DEG -- PRELIMINARY CHKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED. WE WERE TRYING TO KEEP THE SPD UP FOR ATC -- TURNING ON BASE, FLAPS WERE MOVED TO 5 DEGS AND GEAR EXTENDED. AIRPLANE SPD WAS NOT DECREASING, FLAPS WERE EXTENDED TO 15 DEGS, AND THEN I NOTICED FLAP INDICATOR GAUGE WAS STUCK ON 1 DEG. FLAPS WERE NOT EXTENDING BEYOND 1 DEG. WE WERE NOW ON FINAL, GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 1 DEG, AT ABOUT 1800 FT. I ASKED TO SIDESTEP AND LAND ON RWY 27L FOR EXTRA LNDG LENGTH AND WAS CLRED TO LAND. I TOOK OVER PF DUTIES AT THIS POINT AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY, TAXIED CLR OF RWY AND THEN REALIZED THAT WHEN WE WERE TURNING ONTO BASE LEG, I HAD INADVERTENTLY REACHED UP AND TURNED OFF 'B' HYD SYS PUMPS INSTEAD OF ENG ANTI-ICE SWITCHES WHICH ARE LOCATED DIRECTLY ABOVE BOTH 'B' SYS HYD PUMPS, WHICH RENDERED FLAPS INOP. AFTER CLRING RWY, IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED PROB, TURNED PUMPS ON, TAXIED TO GATE. WE HAD LANDED IN A NON STANDARD LNDG CONFIGN WITH FLAPS AT 1 DEG, AND PERFORMED IMPROPER LNDG CHKLIST. A GAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED AND A COMPLETE CHKLIST FROM OUR QRH FOR TRAILING EDGE FLAP NOT EXTENDED AND 'B' HYD SYS INOP. OUR MISTAKE WOULD HAVE THEN BEEN DISCOVERED AND NORMAL FLAP LNDG BEEN COMPLETED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 460084: IN RANGE TO PHL, WE EXPERIENCED LIGHT TO MODERATE CHOP AND THE CAPT CHOSE TO TURN ON THE ENG ANTI-ICE IN CASE OF POSSIBLE ICING FROM PREVIOUS TEMPS/FLT CONDITION'S REMNANTS. ON DOWNWIND VECTORS TO VISUAL APCH, AND ONCE WE WERE CLR OF ICING AND TURB, HE SWITCHED ENG ANTI-ICE OFF. IN DOING SO, INADVERTENTLY 'B' HYD PUMPS WERE SWITCHED OFF INSTEAD, WITHOUT OUR REALIZATION. DURING APCH SEQUENCE, WE ATTEMPTED TO LOWER FLAPS AFTER HAVING BEEN REQUIRED BY ATC TO KEEP SPD UP TILL REACHING THE OM. ON SHORT FINAL, WE REALIZED THE FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND BEYOND 1 DEG. DUE TO THE PROX TO THE FIELD AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SUFFICIENT RWY (+10000 FT) WE OPTED TO SWITCH TO THE LONGER RWY AND PROCEED TO LAND. ATC APPROVED THE SWITCH, CLRED US TO LAND, AND WE UNEVENTFULLY LANDED WITH FLAPS SELECTED TO 1 DEG, AS OPPOSED TO THE STANDARD CONFIGN OF FLAPS 30 DEGS. AT NO TIME WERE LIMITATIONS EXCEEDED. AT ALL TIMES WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON GLIDE PATH. TRAILING EDGE FLAPS UP CHKLIST HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, BUT I FELT THAT A GAR WOULD HAVE, IN RETROSPECT, BEEN THE WISER OPTION TO ALLOW FOR A CLOSER ANALYSIS OF THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.