Narrative:

On the flight from tulsa, ok, to fayetteville, ar, we failed to lower the landing gear and ended landing gear up. Prior to arriving at fyv the ATIS stated that the runway plowed only 100 ft wide and that all txwys were closed except taxiway D and taxiway B due to snow accumulation. We had also been given a message that we were to park at a different location on the airfield. The PF briefed the localizer DME runway 16 approach but stated that we would 'expect the visual' with the high ceilings. Our descent was initiated at a later than normal distance and the power was reduced to a level that caused the gear warning horn to go off since the horn was going off during a large portion of our descent and it became part of the backgnd noise for me. I picked up the VASI lights and asked tower to turn up the approach lights and runway lights, which they did. During most of this approach, the PF had to repeat many of his commands due to the intercom system not functioning properly. Once the runway was in sight, I told the PF that we could continue visually since we had the runway in sight. He said 'no, I'm going to continue flying the approach' -- which was different than briefed. Approaching the FAF, I asked the tower if they could turn down the lights to medium intensity. When they did, the lights went out. I asked them to turn them back up to full intensity. At the same time my first officer asked for 1/2 degree flaps then commanded 'gear down sync off speeds high' which I did not hear because I was talking to the tower. From the time we saw the VASI to the FAF was approximately 3 NM and our airspeed was approximately 180-160 KIAS. I failed to hear his command and I did not do it nor did I do the checklist which always follows. The next comment from the first officer was that we were fast, which should have alerted us to the problem. The next thing we heard were the propellers coming in contact with the runway, which we scraped down approximately 2500 ft and ended up on the left side almost 160 degrees to our landing heading. Fatigue also had a part in this since the last few months I think this crew averaged around 110-115 hours per month. The week before we flew 32 hours with most duty days in excess of 13.5 hours and one of 16 hours. There was a long chain of events which caused this and we had many opportunities to break it but we did not.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX CREW LANDS GEAR UP AT FYV, AR, AFTER BECOMING DISTR AND NOT FINISHING CHKLISTS WHEN FATIGUED.

Narrative: ON THE FLT FROM TULSA, OK, TO FAYETTEVILLE, AR, WE FAILED TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR AND ENDED LNDG GEAR UP. PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT FYV THE ATIS STATED THAT THE RWY PLOWED ONLY 100 FT WIDE AND THAT ALL TXWYS WERE CLOSED EXCEPT TXWY D AND TXWY B DUE TO SNOW ACCUMULATION. WE HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN A MESSAGE THAT WE WERE TO PARK AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION ON THE AIRFIELD. THE PF BRIEFED THE LOC DME RWY 16 APCH BUT STATED THAT WE WOULD 'EXPECT THE VISUAL' WITH THE HIGH CEILINGS. OUR DSCNT WAS INITIATED AT A LATER THAN NORMAL DISTANCE AND THE PWR WAS REDUCED TO A LEVEL THAT CAUSED THE GEAR WARNING HORN TO GO OFF SINCE THE HORN WAS GOING OFF DURING A LARGE PORTION OF OUR DSCNT AND IT BECAME PART OF THE BACKGND NOISE FOR ME. I PICKED UP THE VASI LIGHTS AND ASKED TWR TO TURN UP THE APCH LIGHTS AND RWY LIGHTS, WHICH THEY DID. DURING MOST OF THIS APCH, THE PF HAD TO REPEAT MANY OF HIS COMMANDS DUE TO THE INTERCOM SYS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. ONCE THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT, I TOLD THE PF THAT WE COULD CONTINUE VISUALLY SINCE WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. HE SAID 'NO, I'M GOING TO CONTINUE FLYING THE APCH' -- WHICH WAS DIFFERENT THAN BRIEFED. APCHING THE FAF, I ASKED THE TWR IF THEY COULD TURN DOWN THE LIGHTS TO MEDIUM INTENSITY. WHEN THEY DID, THE LIGHTS WENT OUT. I ASKED THEM TO TURN THEM BACK UP TO FULL INTENSITY. AT THE SAME TIME MY FO ASKED FOR 1/2 DEG FLAPS THEN COMMANDED 'GEAR DOWN SYNC OFF SPDS HIGH' WHICH I DID NOT HEAR BECAUSE I WAS TALKING TO THE TWR. FROM THE TIME WE SAW THE VASI TO THE FAF WAS APPROX 3 NM AND OUR AIRSPD WAS APPROX 180-160 KIAS. I FAILED TO HEAR HIS COMMAND AND I DID NOT DO IT NOR DID I DO THE CHKLIST WHICH ALWAYS FOLLOWS. THE NEXT COMMENT FROM THE FO WAS THAT WE WERE FAST, WHICH SHOULD HAVE ALERTED US TO THE PROB. THE NEXT THING WE HEARD WERE THE PROPS COMING IN CONTACT WITH THE RWY, WHICH WE SCRAPED DOWN APPROX 2500 FT AND ENDED UP ON THE L SIDE ALMOST 160 DEGS TO OUR LNDG HDG. FATIGUE ALSO HAD A PART IN THIS SINCE THE LAST FEW MONTHS I THINK THIS CREW AVERAGED AROUND 110-115 HRS PER MONTH. THE WK BEFORE WE FLEW 32 HRS WITH MOST DUTY DAYS IN EXCESS OF 13.5 HRS AND ONE OF 16 HRS. THERE WAS A LONG CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH CAUSED THIS AND WE HAD MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO BREAK IT BUT WE DID NOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.