Narrative:

This communication is in reference to the FAA reaction to a runway incursion that occurred at mke on jan/fri/00, a BA31, after acknowledging an instruction to hold short of runway 1L, crossed in front of a departing B727, who had to rotate early to avoid a collision. While this was a horrible incident, there was nothing more the ground controller could do. A recent change to ATC procedures requires a readback of the hold short instruction. This was given. At this intersection (taxiway M and runway 1L), there are recently installed wigwag lights to heighten awareness. In this case, they did not have the desired result. Bottom line is the BA31 pilot(south) screwed up. It happens. FAA response is to ban taxiing to runways east of runway 1L/19R when runway 1L/19R is active. In essence, you cannot trust an aircraft to hold short of the runway. It gets worse, but this is the crux of the issue. With delays around the country increasing thanks to the lahso mess and problems with flow control, we don't need any more ridiculous edicts delivered from on high. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that the original edict was changed from 'banning' taxiing when runways 19 were in use, to stopping aircraft on the ramp short of taxiway M, east of runway 19R when runways 19 are in use. The reporter advised that this restr still is a distraction for controller and pilot, impacting ramp operations for any aircraft trying to taxi via another route to another runway. The reporter stated that taxi instructions to runway 25L, with a hold short of runways 19, is authority/authorized with any of the other 6 txwys intersecting runway 19R. With this exemption for the other txwys, the reporter believes the restr for taxiway M is symbolic at best. The reporter believes a ucr has been filed. Supplemental information from acn 460843: B727 departing runway 1L at mke, aircraft X instructed to hold short runway 1L (read back hold short) crossed runway 1L at taxiway M, as B727 passing V1. B727 crossed over aircraft X by approximately 100 ft. A contributing factor to the near miss, or if the airplanes would have hit, is the procedure used by acrs of reduced power on takeoff. The distance from the departure end of runway 1L to the intersection of taxiway M is 5900 ft. The B727 departing had no passenger or cargo, and the outside air temperature was -18 degrees C. If the B727 didn't reach V1 speed until it traveled 5000 ft down the runway, evidence suggests a reduced power takeoff. I recommend a study to determine the safety/cost benefits of reduced power takeoffs versus full rated power takeoffs and how long a departing airplane remains on the runway. Supplemental information from acn 460845: after deicing, aircraft X was cleared to taxi to runway 25L via taxiway B and taxiway M 'hold short runway 1L.' after talking to the tower supervisor, the hold short was read back by first officer. I, the captain, did not hear the hold short instructions and proceeded to runway 25L. While crossing runway 1L, aircraft Y was on takeoff runway 1L and flew over or close to aircraft X. Crew was on a continuous duty overnight and the incident occurred at 12+ hours into the duty day. After deicing we had reduced visibility due to glycol on the windows. Supplemental information from acn 460786: the captain did not hear the readback instruction and proceeded to runway 25L.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MKE CTLR CONCERNED WITH MGMNT DECISION TO RESOLVE A PROB FROM A PLTDEV, WHEN A BA31 CROSSED RWY 1L IN FRONT OF A DEPARTING B727.

Narrative: THIS COM IS IN REF TO THE FAA REACTION TO A RWY INCURSION THAT OCCURRED AT MKE ON JAN/FRI/00, A BA31, AFTER ACKNOWLEDGING AN INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L, CROSSED IN FRONT OF A DEPARTING B727, WHO HAD TO ROTATE EARLY TO AVOID A COLLISION. WHILE THIS WAS A HORRIBLE INCIDENT, THERE WAS NOTHING MORE THE GND CTLR COULD DO. A RECENT CHANGE TO ATC PROCS REQUIRES A READBACK OF THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION. THIS WAS GIVEN. AT THIS INTXN (TXWY M AND RWY 1L), THERE ARE RECENTLY INSTALLED WIGWAG LIGHTS TO HEIGHTEN AWARENESS. IN THIS CASE, THEY DID NOT HAVE THE DESIRED RESULT. BOTTOM LINE IS THE BA31 PLT(S) SCREWED UP. IT HAPPENS. FAA RESPONSE IS TO BAN TAXIING TO RWYS E OF RWY 1L/19R WHEN RWY 1L/19R IS ACTIVE. IN ESSENCE, YOU CANNOT TRUST AN ACFT TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY. IT GETS WORSE, BUT THIS IS THE CRUX OF THE ISSUE. WITH DELAYS AROUND THE COUNTRY INCREASING THANKS TO THE LAHSO MESS AND PROBS WITH FLOW CTL, WE DON'T NEED ANY MORE RIDICULOUS EDICTS DELIVERED FROM ON HIGH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT THE ORIGINAL EDICT WAS CHANGED FROM 'BANNING' TAXIING WHEN RWYS 19 WERE IN USE, TO STOPPING ACFT ON THE RAMP SHORT OF TXWY M, E OF RWY 19R WHEN RWYS 19 ARE IN USE. THE RPTR ADVISED THAT THIS RESTR STILL IS A DISTR FOR CTLR AND PLT, IMPACTING RAMP OPS FOR ANY ACFT TRYING TO TAXI VIA ANOTHER RTE TO ANOTHER RWY. THE RPTR STATED THAT TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO RWY 25L, WITH A HOLD SHORT OF RWYS 19, IS AUTH WITH ANY OF THE OTHER 6 TXWYS INTERSECTING RWY 19R. WITH THIS EXEMPTION FOR THE OTHER TXWYS, THE RPTR BELIEVES THE RESTR FOR TXWY M IS SYMBOLIC AT BEST. THE RPTR BELIEVES A UCR HAS BEEN FILED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 460843: B727 DEPARTING RWY 1L AT MKE, ACFT X INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT RWY 1L (READ BACK HOLD SHORT) CROSSED RWY 1L AT TXWY M, AS B727 PASSING V1. B727 CROSSED OVER ACFT X BY APPROX 100 FT. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE NEAR MISS, OR IF THE AIRPLANES WOULD HAVE HIT, IS THE PROC USED BY ACRS OF REDUCED PWR ON TKOF. THE DISTANCE FROM THE DEP END OF RWY 1L TO THE INTXN OF TXWY M IS 5900 FT. THE B727 DEPARTING HAD NO PAX OR CARGO, AND THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP WAS -18 DEGS C. IF THE B727 DIDN'T REACH V1 SPD UNTIL IT TRAVELED 5000 FT DOWN THE RWY, EVIDENCE SUGGESTS A REDUCED PWR TKOF. I RECOMMEND A STUDY TO DETERMINE THE SAFETY/COST BENEFITS OF REDUCED PWR TKOFS VERSUS FULL RATED PWR TKOFS AND HOW LONG A DEPARTING AIRPLANE REMAINS ON THE RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 460845: AFTER DEICING, ACFT X WAS CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 25L VIA TXWY B AND TXWY M 'HOLD SHORT RWY 1L.' AFTER TALKING TO THE TWR SUPVR, THE HOLD SHORT WAS READ BACK BY FO. I, THE CAPT, DID NOT HEAR THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEEDED TO RWY 25L. WHILE XING RWY 1L, ACFT Y WAS ON TKOF RWY 1L AND FLEW OVER OR CLOSE TO ACFT X. CREW WAS ON A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT AND THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AT 12+ HRS INTO THE DUTY DAY. AFTER DEICING WE HAD REDUCED VISIBILITY DUE TO GLYCOL ON THE WINDOWS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 460786: THE CAPT DID NOT HEAR THE READBACK INSTRUCTION AND PROCEEDED TO RWY 25L.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.