Narrative:

FL210 after crossing kessel VOR, ZDC issued a clearance for us to cross druzz intersection at 11000 ft and 250 KTS. The first officer was flying with the autoplt engaged. He set the altitude and started the descent. I read back the clearance to washington. I quickly noted that we were only 20 NM from druzz so I started to call ZDC back to let them know that we were unable to accept the clearance. Before I could key the microphone, washington called back and asked if we would be able to make the restr. I told him that we were unable because the clearance was issued so late. He told us to do the best that we could and that he needed us out of 14000 ft as soon as possible. We made a maximum effort descent to help out the controller who expressed a sense of urgency. Approaching 11000 ft, I realized that the autoplt was not leveling off. I grabbed the control yoke and disconnected the autoplt, leveling the plane off at 11000 ft. Just prior to this ZDC gave us a frequency change to dulles approach. My first officer asked me what I was doing and said that we had been cleared to 10000 ft. I turned control of the aircraft back over to the first officer and he continued the descent towards 10000 ft. I tried to contact dulles approach and realized that I had set the wrong frequency. I returned to ZDC to get the correct frequency. ZDC gave me the correct frequency and said that he had cleared me to 11000 ft. I told the first officer to return to 11000 ft. I checked in with dulles approach, and he cleared us to 5000 ft. The rest of the flight was uneventful. My first officer was new to the company. He had been on the line less than a month. He was not familiar with the arrival into dulles and was not aware that the crossing altitude at druzz is always 11000 ft. The late clearance and the perceived sense of urgency compounded by a new first officer, all contributed in a breakdown of the xchks that help prevent such occurrences. Supplemental information from acn 464502: on the evening of feb/fri/00, I was flying as sic on an air carrier flight from chicago midway to washington dulles airport. We had been cleared into the dulles terminal area via the 'jasen two arrival.' approximately 20 NM from the 'druzz' intersection we were cleared from FL210, to what I heard as 10000 ft. I was the PF, and because the autoplt was in use it is standard procedure for the PF to enter in all altitude changes into the altitude selector. I rolled in 10000 ft, pointed at it and stated '10000.' the captain pointed and repeated, '10000.' the cockpit was very busy due to the delay in the descent. We typically require more than 20 NM to make an 11000 ft descent. We started down as rapidly as safety would allow. Just after a descent initiation the controller called back and asked us if we were going to be able to, 'make it down in time.' there was some discussion between the captain and the controller as to the feasibility of our descent. I was occupied with getting the airplane stabilized in a descent, therefore, I am not exactly sure what was said between the captain and the controller but this is the best of my recollection. I believe the captain stated something to the effect that, 'it would be difficult.' the controller then said that if we couldn't make it down we would have to make some kind of turn. He then changed his mind and said that it would be okay and to just do our best to get down in time. By this time, the airplane was in a stable descent about 4000 FPM and headed for 10000 ft. As we passed through 11000 ft the captain stated that the 'autoplt is not leveling off.' he assumed control of the aircraft and disengaged the autoplt and leveled us off at 11000 ft. I was confused. I told him that I thought that we were cleared to 10000 ft. He thought for a moment, looked at the altitude selector, saw it on 10000 ft, apologized for the confusion and gave the airplane controls back to me. We leveled off at 10000 ft. The captain then stated, (about 3 mins in fairly rapidly) 'druzz is 11 druzz is 11 druzz is 11.' again I was confused. It did not enter my mind that the controller wanted us at 11000 ft and 250 KTS at druzz. I heard 'druzz 10 and 250.' anyway, the controller contacted us and said 'you were given druzz at 11000 ft contact dulles approach on XXX.xx.' I immediately initiated a climb back to 11000 ft and we contacted the approach controller level at 11000 ft where we were immediately given a descent to 5000 ft and continued on to a normal landing. I feel there are a number of contributing factors that allowed a short window for error and we unfortunately made one. They are as follows: 1) the controller may have said druzz 10 and 250 I am not 100% sure but that is what I thought I heard. 2) the delay in the descent clearance made us have to rush to comply. It was not too rushed as to say it was an unsafe maneuver but it was certainly accelerated. 3) I am a new-hire with 50 hours in type. I'm sure that in some way that contributed to the mistake. 4) it was late and fatigue started to set in. This may have played a part for both the captain and I and the controller. Hindsight being 20/20, here is where the mistakes were made. Either the captain or I should have noted that the crossing restr at druzz is somewhat non-standard with the 11000 ft. When the captain stopped the descent at 11000 ft and was confused, one of us should have investigated further. I assumed he misread the altimeter when in fact he knew from memory that we should cross at 11000 ft. Being new to the area, I don't have that base of experience to draw from yet. Although I had the arrival right in front of me I still missed the printed note to expect 11000 ft. Even though we followed standard air carrier procedure in regards to an altitude change, extenuating circumstances still caused an altitude deviation. I have taken a few lessons away from this experience and hope it will serve to help others in some way.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW HAD ALT OVERSHOOT ON THE JASEN 2 INTO IAD.

Narrative: FL210 AFTER XING KESSEL VOR, ZDC ISSUED A CLRNC FOR US TO CROSS DRUZZ INTXN AT 11000 FT AND 250 KTS. THE FO WAS FLYING WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. HE SET THE ALT AND STARTED THE DSCNT. I READ BACK THE CLRNC TO WASHINGTON. I QUICKLY NOTED THAT WE WERE ONLY 20 NM FROM DRUZZ SO I STARTED TO CALL ZDC BACK TO LET THEM KNOW THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE CLRNC. BEFORE I COULD KEY THE MIKE, WASHINGTON CALLED BACK AND ASKED IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE RESTR. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE UNABLE BECAUSE THE CLRNC WAS ISSUED SO LATE. HE TOLD US TO DO THE BEST THAT WE COULD AND THAT HE NEEDED US OUT OF 14000 FT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE MADE A MAX EFFORT DSCNT TO HELP OUT THE CTLR WHO EXPRESSED A SENSE OF URGENCY. APCHING 11000 FT, I REALIZED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT LEVELING OFF. I GRABBED THE CTL YOKE AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, LEVELING THE PLANE OFF AT 11000 FT. JUST PRIOR TO THIS ZDC GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE TO DULLES APCH. MY FO ASKED ME WHAT I WAS DOING AND SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 10000 FT. I TURNED CTL OF THE ACFT BACK OVER TO THE FO AND HE CONTINUED THE DSCNT TOWARDS 10000 FT. I TRIED TO CONTACT DULLES APCH AND REALIZED THAT I HAD SET THE WRONG FREQ. I RETURNED TO ZDC TO GET THE CORRECT FREQ. ZDC GAVE ME THE CORRECT FREQ AND SAID THAT HE HAD CLRED ME TO 11000 FT. I TOLD THE FO TO RETURN TO 11000 FT. I CHKED IN WITH DULLES APCH, AND HE CLRED US TO 5000 FT. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. MY FO WAS NEW TO THE COMPANY. HE HAD BEEN ON THE LINE LESS THAN A MONTH. HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE ARR INTO DULLES AND WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE XING ALT AT DRUZZ IS ALWAYS 11000 FT. THE LATE CLRNC AND THE PERCEIVED SENSE OF URGENCY COMPOUNDED BY A NEW FO, ALL CONTRIBUTED IN A BREAKDOWN OF THE XCHKS THAT HELP PREVENT SUCH OCCURRENCES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 464502: ON THE EVENING OF FEB/FRI/00, I WAS FLYING AS SIC ON AN ACR FLT FROM CHICAGO MIDWAY TO WASHINGTON DULLES ARPT. WE HAD BEEN CLRED INTO THE DULLES TERMINAL AREA VIA THE 'JASEN TWO ARR.' APPROX 20 NM FROM THE 'DRUZZ' INTXN WE WERE CLRED FROM FL210, TO WHAT I HEARD AS 10000 FT. I WAS THE PF, AND BECAUSE THE AUTOPLT WAS IN USE IT IS STANDARD PROC FOR THE PF TO ENTER IN ALL ALT CHANGES INTO THE ALT SELECTOR. I ROLLED IN 10000 FT, POINTED AT IT AND STATED '10000.' THE CAPT POINTED AND REPEATED, '10000.' THE COCKPIT WAS VERY BUSY DUE TO THE DELAY IN THE DSCNT. WE TYPICALLY REQUIRE MORE THAN 20 NM TO MAKE AN 11000 FT DSCNT. WE STARTED DOWN AS RAPIDLY AS SAFETY WOULD ALLOW. JUST AFTER A DSCNT INITIATION THE CTLR CALLED BACK AND ASKED US IF WE WERE GOING TO BE ABLE TO, 'MAKE IT DOWN IN TIME.' THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION BTWN THE CAPT AND THE CTLR AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF OUR DSCNT. I WAS OCCUPIED WITH GETTING THE AIRPLANE STABILIZED IN A DSCNT, THEREFORE, I AM NOT EXACTLY SURE WHAT WAS SAID BTWN THE CAPT AND THE CTLR BUT THIS IS THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION. I BELIEVE THE CAPT STATED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT, 'IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT.' THE CTLR THEN SAID THAT IF WE COULDN'T MAKE IT DOWN WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME KIND OF TURN. HE THEN CHANGED HIS MIND AND SAID THAT IT WOULD BE OKAY AND TO JUST DO OUR BEST TO GET DOWN IN TIME. BY THIS TIME, THE AIRPLANE WAS IN A STABLE DSCNT ABOUT 4000 FPM AND HEADED FOR 10000 FT. AS WE PASSED THROUGH 11000 FT THE CAPT STATED THAT THE 'AUTOPLT IS NOT LEVELING OFF.' HE ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT AND DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND LEVELED US OFF AT 11000 FT. I WAS CONFUSED. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT THAT WE WERE CLRED TO 10000 FT. HE THOUGHT FOR A MOMENT, LOOKED AT THE ALT SELECTOR, SAW IT ON 10000 FT, APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION AND GAVE THE AIRPLANE CTLS BACK TO ME. WE LEVELED OFF AT 10000 FT. THE CAPT THEN STATED, (ABOUT 3 MINS IN FAIRLY RAPIDLY) 'DRUZZ IS 11 DRUZZ IS 11 DRUZZ IS 11.' AGAIN I WAS CONFUSED. IT DID NOT ENTER MY MIND THAT THE CTLR WANTED US AT 11000 FT AND 250 KTS AT DRUZZ. I HEARD 'DRUZZ 10 AND 250.' ANYWAY, THE CTLR CONTACTED US AND SAID 'YOU WERE GIVEN DRUZZ AT 11000 FT CONTACT DULLES APCH ON XXX.XX.' I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A CLB BACK TO 11000 FT AND WE CONTACTED THE APCH CTLR LEVEL AT 11000 FT WHERE WE WERE IMMEDIATELY GIVEN A DSCNT TO 5000 FT AND CONTINUED ON TO A NORMAL LNDG. I FEEL THERE ARE A NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT ALLOWED A SHORT WINDOW FOR ERROR AND WE UNFORTUNATELY MADE ONE. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE CTLR MAY HAVE SAID DRUZZ 10 AND 250 I AM NOT 100% SURE BUT THAT IS WHAT I THOUGHT I HEARD. 2) THE DELAY IN THE DSCNT CLRNC MADE US HAVE TO RUSH TO COMPLY. IT WAS NOT TOO RUSHED AS TO SAY IT WAS AN UNSAFE MANEUVER BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED. 3) I AM A NEW-HIRE WITH 50 HRS IN TYPE. I'M SURE THAT IN SOME WAY THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE MISTAKE. 4) IT WAS LATE AND FATIGUE STARTED TO SET IN. THIS MAY HAVE PLAYED A PART FOR BOTH THE CAPT AND I AND THE CTLR. HINDSIGHT BEING 20/20, HERE IS WHERE THE MISTAKES WERE MADE. EITHER THE CAPT OR I SHOULD HAVE NOTED THAT THE XING RESTR AT DRUZZ IS SOMEWHAT NON-STANDARD WITH THE 11000 FT. WHEN THE CAPT STOPPED THE DSCNT AT 11000 FT AND WAS CONFUSED, ONE OF US SHOULD HAVE INVESTIGATED FURTHER. I ASSUMED HE MISREAD THE ALTIMETER WHEN IN FACT HE KNEW FROM MEMORY THAT WE SHOULD CROSS AT 11000 FT. BEING NEW TO THE AREA, I DON'T HAVE THAT BASE OF EXPERIENCE TO DRAW FROM YET. ALTHOUGH I HAD THE ARR RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME I STILL MISSED THE PRINTED NOTE TO EXPECT 11000 FT. EVEN THOUGH WE FOLLOWED STANDARD ACR PROC IN REGARDS TO AN ALT CHANGE, EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES STILL CAUSED AN ALTDEV. I HAVE TAKEN A FEW LESSONS AWAY FROM THIS EXPERIENCE AND HOPE IT WILL SERVE TO HELP OTHERS IN SOME WAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.