Narrative:

On mar/wed/00, our challenger 601-3R was received from maintenance at the factory maintenance center location in ZZZ (ZZZ, us). I and a first officer under the authority/authorized of a special flight permit had flown the aircraft there on mar/mon/00. The r-hand thrust reverser was pinned during that flight. At the time of our arrival at the airport (approximately XA00 local time on mar/wed/00) the aircraft was being returned to the hangar due to reported hail in the area. In order to meet the scheduled departure time out of our next location, a departure time for our 'no passenger' leg from ZZZ of approximately XF20 local was required. Maintenance personnel informed us that necessary parts to repair the aircraft had not been received and that both thrust reversers were inoperative. Although I questioned the fact that both were inoperative since only the right side had been pinned on our inbound flight, it was my understanding that both thrust reversers were now pinned and had also been disabled (by collaring the appropriate circuit breakers). Other discrepancies at the time of arrival had been corrected. In addition, the item being operated under the scope of the MEL is then entered on an additional record maintained in the aircraft. This documentation is then faxed to our office where it is reviewed by our internal maintenance technicians. After their review and approval, the aircraft is designated as operationally ready. This information is then made available to our flight control operation so that they can know and issue an appropriate release when the crew calls in prior to departure. After being advised that both reversers were pinned and not operational the crew discussed operational requirements to make sure that adequate runway was available for the intended operations. It was determined that without reversers (even if wet runways were encountered) adequate runway lengths were available for our planned trip. When I called to get the release, they promptly issued a release and also indicated that we had an additional leg repositioning the aircraft in order that they could complete necessary maintenance on the reversers. At that time I informed them that I was unfamiliar with the new destination but since both reversers were now pinned, additional information would have to be looked at for that airport. Our internal maintenance office was also contacted in order to inform them of the location in the aircraft of tubing that ZZZ maintenance had sent for use in reactivating the thrust reversers. Since this trip completed our rotation, the crew airlined home. 2 days later I was contacted by my supervisor indicating that flying the aircraft with both thrust reversers pinned was not covered by the MEL. Intended maintenance at our last destination had not corrected the problem, and the pilot assigned to pick up the aircraft there had noted both a paperwork error and the fact that both thrust reversers pinned was not covered by the MEL. My review of the paperwork had not discovered that reference was made to only one side being pinned (instead of both). And, relying on the appropriateness of the release from both ZZZ maintenance and our dispatch, I had not reviewed the MEL regarding both thrust reversers being pinned. Operation of the aircraft had been within the performance ranges specified for operation without thrust reversers. But an additional fact now surfaced. Although it was my understanding that both thrust reversers had been pinned, in reality only the right side remained pinned, the left side had only been disabled electrically inside the cockpit. The significance of the fact is that had the non-mechanically pinned reverser extended in-flight, the crew would have had no way to stow it. Resulting handling problems could have resulted in loss of control. (Note: a visual confirmation of the pinned status is not possible during a normal crew member preflight.)

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CHALLENGER 601-3R WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH BOTH REVERSERS DEFERRED AS INOP IN CONFLICT WITH THE MEL.

Narrative: ON MAR/WED/00, OUR CHALLENGER 601-3R WAS RECEIVED FROM MAINT AT THE FACTORY MAINT CTR LOCATION IN ZZZ (ZZZ, US). I AND A FO UNDER THE AUTH OF A SPECIAL FLT PERMIT HAD FLOWN THE ACFT THERE ON MAR/MON/00. THE R-HAND THRUST REVERSER WAS PINNED DURING THAT FLT. AT THE TIME OF OUR ARR AT THE ARPT (APPROX XA00 LCL TIME ON MAR/WED/00) THE ACFT WAS BEING RETURNED TO THE HANGAR DUE TO RPTED HAIL IN THE AREA. IN ORDER TO MEET THE SCHEDULED DEP TIME OUT OF OUR NEXT LOCATION, A DEP TIME FOR OUR 'NO PAX' LEG FROM ZZZ OF APPROX XF20 LCL WAS REQUIRED. MAINT PERSONNEL INFORMED US THAT NECESSARY PARTS TO REPAIR THE ACFT HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AND THAT BOTH THRUST REVERSERS WERE INOP. ALTHOUGH I QUESTIONED THE FACT THAT BOTH WERE INOP SINCE ONLY THE R SIDE HAD BEEN PINNED ON OUR INBOUND FLT, IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT BOTH THRUST REVERSERS WERE NOW PINNED AND HAD ALSO BEEN DISABLED (BY COLLARING THE APPROPRIATE CIRCUIT BREAKERS). OTHER DISCREPANCIES AT THE TIME OF ARR HAD BEEN CORRECTED. IN ADDITION, THE ITEM BEING OPERATED UNDER THE SCOPE OF THE MEL IS THEN ENTERED ON AN ADDITIONAL RECORD MAINTAINED IN THE ACFT. THIS DOCUMENTATION IS THEN FAXED TO OUR OFFICE WHERE IT IS REVIEWED BY OUR INTERNAL MAINT TECHNICIANS. AFTER THEIR REVIEW AND APPROVAL, THE ACFT IS DESIGNATED AS OPERATIONALLY READY. THIS INFO IS THEN MADE AVAILABLE TO OUR FLT CTL OP SO THAT THEY CAN KNOW AND ISSUE AN APPROPRIATE RELEASE WHEN THE CREW CALLS IN PRIOR TO DEP. AFTER BEING ADVISED THAT BOTH REVERSERS WERE PINNED AND NOT OPERATIONAL THE CREW DISCUSSED OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO MAKE SURE THAT ADEQUATE RWY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE INTENDED OPS. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WITHOUT REVERSERS (EVEN IF WET RWYS WERE ENCOUNTERED) ADEQUATE RWY LENGTHS WERE AVAILABLE FOR OUR PLANNED TRIP. WHEN I CALLED TO GET THE RELEASE, THEY PROMPTLY ISSUED A RELEASE AND ALSO INDICATED THAT WE HAD AN ADDITIONAL LEG REPOSITIONING THE ACFT IN ORDER THAT THEY COULD COMPLETE NECESSARY MAINT ON THE REVERSERS. AT THAT TIME I INFORMED THEM THAT I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE NEW DEST BUT SINCE BOTH REVERSERS WERE NOW PINNED, ADDITIONAL INFO WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT FOR THAT ARPT. OUR INTERNAL MAINT OFFICE WAS ALSO CONTACTED IN ORDER TO INFORM THEM OF THE LOCATION IN THE ACFT OF TUBING THAT ZZZ MAINT HAD SENT FOR USE IN REACTIVATING THE THRUST REVERSERS. SINCE THIS TRIP COMPLETED OUR ROTATION, THE CREW AIRLINED HOME. 2 DAYS LATER I WAS CONTACTED BY MY SUPVR INDICATING THAT FLYING THE ACFT WITH BOTH THRUST REVERSERS PINNED WAS NOT COVERED BY THE MEL. INTENDED MAINT AT OUR LAST DEST HAD NOT CORRECTED THE PROB, AND THE PLT ASSIGNED TO PICK UP THE ACFT THERE HAD NOTED BOTH A PAPERWORK ERROR AND THE FACT THAT BOTH THRUST REVERSERS PINNED WAS NOT COVERED BY THE MEL. MY REVIEW OF THE PAPERWORK HAD NOT DISCOVERED THAT REF WAS MADE TO ONLY ONE SIDE BEING PINNED (INSTEAD OF BOTH). AND, RELYING ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE RELEASE FROM BOTH ZZZ MAINT AND OUR DISPATCH, I HAD NOT REVIEWED THE MEL REGARDING BOTH THRUST REVERSERS BEING PINNED. OP OF THE ACFT HAD BEEN WITHIN THE PERFORMANCE RANGES SPECIFIED FOR OP WITHOUT THRUST REVERSERS. BUT AN ADDITIONAL FACT NOW SURFACED. ALTHOUGH IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT BOTH THRUST REVERSERS HAD BEEN PINNED, IN REALITY ONLY THE R SIDE REMAINED PINNED, THE L SIDE HAD ONLY BEEN DISABLED ELECTRICALLY INSIDE THE COCKPIT. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FACT IS THAT HAD THE NON-MECHANICALLY PINNED REVERSER EXTENDED INFLT, THE CREW WOULD HAVE HAD NO WAY TO STOW IT. RESULTING HANDLING PROBS COULD HAVE RESULTED IN LOSS OF CTL. (NOTE: A VISUAL CONFIRMATION OF THE PINNED STATUS IS NOT POSSIBLE DURING A NORMAL CREW MEMBER PREFLT.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.