Narrative:

On the approach to mht we were advised that the approach in use was the ILS runway 35 to mht. According to the ATIS the glide slope was out of service as well as the DME. During the approach clearance we were cleared for just the ILS runway 35. On the handoff to the tower we were told the DME was OTS and the glide slope unusable. After picking up the field visually we descended without incident to the airport. After landing we discussed the approach. The final approach fix (greni) has only 2 means of identification, either DME or altitude on the glide slope. This means we were issued an incorrect approach clearance, 1) for the ILS runway 35 and not ILS runway 35 glide slope OTS and 2) no means to shoot a timed localizer approach because the final approach fix was not identifiable. This approach can't be shot with both the glide slope and DME inoperative. A call was placed to the tower and they were advised of our conclusion and agreed with our findings and the problem was discussed. The WX for the approach at that time was 3000 ft broken and good visibility. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: during his telephone conversation with the controllers at mht, there seemed to be some embarrassment on their part. The controllers stated that they were aware that DME and glide slope information were required for the ILS runway 35 approach. Though they would not admit to having made a mistake, the reporter was satisfied that this was a one time event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRLINE FO RPTED THAT, AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 35 AT MHT, HE WAS NOTIFIED THAT BOTH THE GLIDE SLOPE AND DME WERE OTS. GIVEN THESE CONDITIONS, THE RPTR CORRECTLY POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS ISSUED AN INCORRECT APCH.

Narrative: ON THE APCH TO MHT WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE APCH IN USE WAS THE ILS RWY 35 TO MHT. ACCORDING TO THE ATIS THE GLIDE SLOPE WAS OUT OF SVC AS WELL AS THE DME. DURING THE APCH CLRNC WE WERE CLRED FOR JUST THE ILS RWY 35. ON THE HANDOFF TO THE TWR WE WERE TOLD THE DME WAS OTS AND THE GLIDE SLOPE UNUSABLE. AFTER PICKING UP THE FIELD VISUALLY WE DSNDED WITHOUT INCIDENT TO THE ARPT. AFTER LNDG WE DISCUSSED THE APCH. THE FINAL APCH FIX (GRENI) HAS ONLY 2 MEANS OF ID, EITHER DME OR ALT ON THE GLIDE SLOPE. THIS MEANS WE WERE ISSUED AN INCORRECT APCH CLRNC, 1) FOR THE ILS RWY 35 AND NOT ILS RWY 35 GLIDE SLOPE OTS AND 2) NO MEANS TO SHOOT A TIMED LOCALIZER APCH BECAUSE THE FINAL APCH FIX WAS NOT IDENTIFIABLE. THIS APCH CAN'T BE SHOT WITH BOTH THE GLIDE SLOPE AND DME INOP. A CALL WAS PLACED TO THE TWR AND THEY WERE ADVISED OF OUR CONCLUSION AND AGREED WITH OUR FINDINGS AND THE PROB WAS DISCUSSED. THE WX FOR THE APCH AT THAT TIME WAS 3000 FT BROKEN AND GOOD VISIBILITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: DURING HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE CTLRS AT MHT, THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME EMBARRASSMENT ON THEIR PART. THE CTLRS STATED THAT THEY WERE AWARE THAT DME AND GLIDE SLOPE INFO WERE REQUIRED FOR THE ILS RWY 35 APCH. THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT ADMIT TO HAVING MADE A MISTAKE, THE RPTR WAS SATISFIED THAT THIS WAS A ONE TIME EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.