Narrative:

After holding for more than 2 1/2 hours at the runway 32L pad for takeoff, we were issued a clearance to taxi and hold short of runway 32L. We started to taxi towards the runway thinking that instead we had been issued a clearance to taxi into position and hold. After crossing the hold short line off the runway (approximately 5 ft) the first officer and myself questioned each other about that clearance, and asked the ground controller whether we had been cleared to taxi into position or not. He answered, 'no.' he then asked us if we had crossed the line and we told him yes. We were told to hold short and contact tower. On tower frequency the tower controller ordered another aircraft to go around. He was approximately 3 mi to 4 mi final to runway 32L. We were then cleared for takeoff. Later that night we had to return to oma as the WX in ord deteriorated, and after parking the aircraft I called the tower and spoke to one of the controllers. We discussed the mater for several mins and we both agreed on being more careful, and above all to pay close attention to ground and tower clrncs in the future. The first officer and myself also talked about this matter extensively and agreed to work better as a team and put into practice our CRM. Supplemental information from acn 469105: our flight had been released from oma to ord after a 1 hour 45 mins ground hold delay. We were given clearance from oma ground control to taxi to runway 32L. After receiving clearance from ground control to taxi to the runway, the captain and I were busy doing our taxi checklist and because of the short taxi to runway 32L from our parked position (runway 32L holding area) we were still completing our checklist upon arrival at the runway. Because of this the captain and I had not communicated effectively about ground control's original taxi clearance. Because I was busy completing taxi checklist items I was not positively aware of our position relative to the runway when we crossed the hold short line. Contributing factors: communication between myself and the captain regarding the taxi clearance. Failure on my part to remain positively aware of our position relative to the runway. Failure of the captain to confirm (with me) our taxi clearance upon issue. Nighttime dark environment. I can personally help prevent future such sits by ensuring the captain knows exactly what the ATC clearance is.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 FLC CROSSES THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 32L WITHOUT CLRNC TO DO SO AT OMA, NE.

Narrative: AFTER HOLDING FOR MORE THAN 2 1/2 HRS AT THE RWY 32L PAD FOR TKOF, WE WERE ISSUED A CLRNC TO TAXI AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L. WE STARTED TO TAXI TOWARDS THE RWY THINKING THAT INSTEAD WE HAD BEEN ISSUED A CLRNC TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. AFTER XING THE HOLD SHORT LINE OFF THE RWY (APPROX 5 FT) THE FO AND MYSELF QUESTIONED EACH OTHER ABOUT THAT CLRNC, AND ASKED THE GND CTLR WHETHER WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO TAXI INTO POS OR NOT. HE ANSWERED, 'NO.' HE THEN ASKED US IF WE HAD CROSSED THE LINE AND WE TOLD HIM YES. WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT AND CONTACT TWR. ON TWR FREQ THE TWR CTLR ORDERED ANOTHER ACFT TO GO AROUND. HE WAS APPROX 3 MI TO 4 MI FINAL TO RWY 32L. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF. LATER THAT NIGHT WE HAD TO RETURN TO OMA AS THE WX IN ORD DETERIORATED, AND AFTER PARKING THE ACFT I CALLED THE TWR AND SPOKE TO ONE OF THE CTLRS. WE DISCUSSED THE MATER FOR SEVERAL MINS AND WE BOTH AGREED ON BEING MORE CAREFUL, AND ABOVE ALL TO PAY CLOSE ATTN TO GND AND TWR CLRNCS IN THE FUTURE. THE FO AND MYSELF ALSO TALKED ABOUT THIS MATTER EXTENSIVELY AND AGREED TO WORK BETTER AS A TEAM AND PUT INTO PRACTICE OUR CRM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 469105: OUR FLT HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM OMA TO ORD AFTER A 1 HR 45 MINS GND HOLD DELAY. WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC FROM OMA GND CTL TO TAXI TO RWY 32L. AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC FROM GND CTL TO TAXI TO THE RWY, THE CAPT AND I WERE BUSY DOING OUR TAXI CHKLIST AND BECAUSE OF THE SHORT TAXI TO RWY 32L FROM OUR PARKED POS (RWY 32L HOLDING AREA) WE WERE STILL COMPLETING OUR CHKLIST UPON ARR AT THE RWY. BECAUSE OF THIS THE CAPT AND I HAD NOT COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY ABOUT GND CTL'S ORIGINAL TAXI CLRNC. BECAUSE I WAS BUSY COMPLETING TAXI CHKLIST ITEMS I WAS NOT POSITIVELY AWARE OF OUR POS RELATIVE TO THE RWY WHEN WE CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: COM BTWN MYSELF AND THE CAPT REGARDING THE TAXI CLRNC. FAILURE ON MY PART TO REMAIN POSITIVELY AWARE OF OUR POS RELATIVE TO THE RWY. FAILURE OF THE CAPT TO CONFIRM (WITH ME) OUR TAXI CLRNC UPON ISSUE. NIGHTTIME DARK ENVIRONMENT. I CAN PERSONALLY HELP PREVENT FUTURE SUCH SITS BY ENSURING THE CAPT KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT THE ATC CLRNC IS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.