Narrative:

Agc has been experiencing tower BRITE radar outages numerous times during the last 3 months. Working without a radar increases controller workload at agc and pit tower (they run our IFR approachs). At the time of the incident, agc radar was OTS. Pit is required to call IFR inbound aircraft. They called in a learjet on a visual approach from the southwest of the airport. Meanwhile, I had a C414 on left downwind runway 28 and a BE35 on right downwind runway 2 sequenced #2 behind the C414. The learjet reported on my frequency and I instructed him to report a midfield left downwind. The learjet informed me that would be hard to do since he was due east of the airport. I asked how far out. He replied 4 mi. I immediately told him to reduce speed and sequenced him #3 behind a BE35 now on about a 2 1/2 mi final. The learjet did not see the BE35 and I observed out the window that this was not going to work. I immediately coordinated with pit to break the learjet out to the north and put the learjet back on pit's frequency to bring him back for another approach. At this point, I estimate the jet less than 1 mi behind the BE35. Contributing factors: 1) tower BRITE radar OTS. Believe it or not, VFR towers use our radar displays to aid sequencing and for safety advisories. If radar was working, I would have known exactly where the learjet was and could have sequenced the BE35 #3 behind the learjet. 2) pit approach erroneously calling in the direction of the visual approach. If I had known the lear's position, once again I could have changed the sequence by not allowing the BE35 to turn base. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that one known problem was resolved within the last 2 weeks. The BRITE microwave link was repaired and the equipment was returned to service. Another problem, yet to be validated due to the microwave resolution, is one associated due to power fluctuations. It was reported to the work force, that a potential problem exists when a load is applied through the electrical power system when the local shopping mall, on the adjoining property, utilizes full electrical capability -- basically all air conditioners are on. The reporter states that the BRITE, and associated equipment, becomes unreliable because of a lack of uniform power. The reporter is aware of multiple submitted ucr's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AGC CTLR CONCERNED WITH BRITE RADAR OUTAGE WHEN ENCOUNTERING ACFT SEQUENCING PROBS FROM PIT TRACON.

Narrative: AGC HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING TWR BRITE RADAR OUTAGES NUMEROUS TIMES DURING THE LAST 3 MONTHS. WORKING WITHOUT A RADAR INCREASES CTLR WORKLOAD AT AGC AND PIT TWR (THEY RUN OUR IFR APCHS). AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, AGC RADAR WAS OTS. PIT IS REQUIRED TO CALL IFR INBOUND ACFT. THEY CALLED IN A LEARJET ON A VISUAL APCH FROM THE SW OF THE ARPT. MEANWHILE, I HAD A C414 ON L DOWNWIND RWY 28 AND A BE35 ON R DOWNWIND RWY 2 SEQUENCED #2 BEHIND THE C414. THE LEARJET RPTED ON MY FREQ AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO RPT A MIDFIELD L DOWNWIND. THE LEARJET INFORMED ME THAT WOULD BE HARD TO DO SINCE HE WAS DUE E OF THE ARPT. I ASKED HOW FAR OUT. HE REPLIED 4 MI. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD HIM TO REDUCE SPD AND SEQUENCED HIM #3 BEHIND A BE35 NOW ON ABOUT A 2 1/2 MI FINAL. THE LEARJET DID NOT SEE THE BE35 AND I OBSERVED OUT THE WINDOW THAT THIS WAS NOT GOING TO WORK. I IMMEDIATELY COORDINATED WITH PIT TO BREAK THE LEARJET OUT TO THE N AND PUT THE LEARJET BACK ON PIT'S FREQ TO BRING HIM BACK FOR ANOTHER APCH. AT THIS POINT, I ESTIMATE THE JET LESS THAN 1 MI BEHIND THE BE35. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) TWR BRITE RADAR OTS. BELIEVE IT OR NOT, VFR TWRS USE OUR RADAR DISPLAYS TO AID SEQUENCING AND FOR SAFETY ADVISORIES. IF RADAR WAS WORKING, I WOULD HAVE KNOWN EXACTLY WHERE THE LEARJET WAS AND COULD HAVE SEQUENCED THE BE35 #3 BEHIND THE LEARJET. 2) PIT APCH ERRONEOUSLY CALLING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE VISUAL APCH. IF I HAD KNOWN THE LEAR'S POS, ONCE AGAIN I COULD HAVE CHANGED THE SEQUENCE BY NOT ALLOWING THE BE35 TO TURN BASE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT ONE KNOWN PROB WAS RESOLVED WITHIN THE LAST 2 WKS. THE BRITE MICROWAVE LINK WAS REPAIRED AND THE EQUIP WAS RETURNED TO SVC. ANOTHER PROB, YET TO BE VALIDATED DUE TO THE MICROWAVE RESOLUTION, IS ONE ASSOCIATED DUE TO PWR FLUCTUATIONS. IT WAS RPTED TO THE WORK FORCE, THAT A POTENTIAL PROB EXISTS WHEN A LOAD IS APPLIED THROUGH THE ELECTRICAL PWR SYS WHEN THE LCL SHOPPING MALL, ON THE ADJOINING PROPERTY, UTILIZES FULL ELECTRICAL CAPABILITY -- BASICALLY ALL AIR CONDITIONERS ARE ON. THE RPTR STATES THAT THE BRITE, AND ASSOCIATED EQUIP, BECOMES UNRELIABLE BECAUSE OF A LACK OF UNIFORM PWR. THE RPTR IS AWARE OF MULTIPLE SUBMITTED UCR'S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.