Narrative:

On jun/xa/00, staffing at ind ATCT reached critical levels. A shift meant to be staffed with 12 controllers and 2 supervisors was left with far less. As numbers continued down below acceptable levels, management at ind ATCT ignored what was happening. When all was said and done, a supervisor stayed in the facility for more than 10 hours (violating crash fire rescue equipment's) although logs will not show this, VFR services were curtailed, and safety was unnecessarily compromised. At XA00, staffing dictates that 2 controllers start. Only 1 made it in. At XB00, 5 more are to join them, bringing the total to 7. At XB00 only 3 controllers were in the building. Typically, at XB00, at least 5 operating position are open. The intent is to have a body on break in the tower operation (normally 4 of the 7 people upstairs), and 1 in the radar room (where 1 or 2 radar position can be open, and a data controller as an option). With only 3 controllers in the building, all 3 were assigned to the tower operation. A supervisor who had been on duty for the previous shift worked traffic until further relief came in at XC00. The intent of the controllers that come in at XC00 is to add position that seem to get busier as pilots begin to take to the air. The contract for controllers strongly suggests that controllers in the last 2 hours of their shift should be assigned only data (non control) functions if they are available. This is to prevent someone who has been awake for (potentially) many hours to stay away from having to make split-second decisions while very tired. Having a supervisor do this contradicts common sense. As bodies continued to come into the facility at XE00 and XF00, position were opened properly (albeit late). A facility mandate by the air traffic manager requires a supervisory position in the control tower for daylight hours. Supervisors rarely perform supervisory functions in the tower because supervisory staffing is also inadequate for ind's operation, thus leaving controller in charge's in the tower. The controller in charge position mandate was ignored since no bodies were available to open it. At ind, unless there is a high profile event occurring (such as the indianapolis 500), when the word 'overtime' is mentioned, the word 'safety' is ignored. The function of this controller in charge position is to be another set of eyes in the tower cabin attendant to help reduce the chance of runway incursions, etc. Since its inception after several runway incursions at this tower, runway incursions have all but disappeared. In the TRACON operation, the supervisory function is similar. To observe the operation, coordinate between position, and even to do mundane tasks as answer the phone. This function was also left out this saturday since everybody had to be used to move airplanes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR AT IND TWR AND APCH CLAIMS MGMNT DOES NOT CALL CTLRS TO OVERTIME WHEN STAFFING IS SHORT.

Narrative: ON JUN/XA/00, STAFFING AT IND ATCT REACHED CRITICAL LEVELS. A SHIFT MEANT TO BE STAFFED WITH 12 CTLRS AND 2 SUPVRS WAS LEFT WITH FAR LESS. AS NUMBERS CONTINUED DOWN BELOW ACCEPTABLE LEVELS, MGMNT AT IND ATCT IGNORED WHAT WAS HAPPENING. WHEN ALL WAS SAID AND DONE, A SUPVR STAYED IN THE FACILITY FOR MORE THAN 10 HRS (VIOLATING CFR'S) ALTHOUGH LOGS WILL NOT SHOW THIS, VFR SVCS WERE CURTAILED, AND SAFETY WAS UNNECESSARILY COMPROMISED. AT XA00, STAFFING DICTATES THAT 2 CTLRS START. ONLY 1 MADE IT IN. AT XB00, 5 MORE ARE TO JOIN THEM, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 7. AT XB00 ONLY 3 CTLRS WERE IN THE BUILDING. TYPICALLY, AT XB00, AT LEAST 5 OPERATING POS ARE OPEN. THE INTENT IS TO HAVE A BODY ON BREAK IN THE TWR OP (NORMALLY 4 OF THE 7 PEOPLE UPSTAIRS), AND 1 IN THE RADAR ROOM (WHERE 1 OR 2 RADAR POS CAN BE OPEN, AND A DATA CTLR AS AN OPTION). WITH ONLY 3 CTLRS IN THE BUILDING, ALL 3 WERE ASSIGNED TO THE TWR OP. A SUPVR WHO HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR THE PREVIOUS SHIFT WORKED TFC UNTIL FURTHER RELIEF CAME IN AT XC00. THE INTENT OF THE CTLRS THAT COME IN AT XC00 IS TO ADD POS THAT SEEM TO GET BUSIER AS PLTS BEGIN TO TAKE TO THE AIR. THE CONTRACT FOR CTLRS STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT CTLRS IN THE LAST 2 HRS OF THEIR SHIFT SHOULD BE ASSIGNED ONLY DATA (NON CTL) FUNCTIONS IF THEY ARE AVAILABLE. THIS IS TO PREVENT SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN AWAKE FOR (POTENTIALLY) MANY HOURS TO STAY AWAY FROM HAVING TO MAKE SPLIT-SECOND DECISIONS WHILE VERY TIRED. HAVING A SUPVR DO THIS CONTRADICTS COMMON SENSE. AS BODIES CONTINUED TO COME INTO THE FACILITY AT XE00 AND XF00, POS WERE OPENED PROPERLY (ALBEIT LATE). A FACILITY MANDATE BY THE AIR TFC MGR REQUIRES A SUPERVISORY POS IN THE CTL TWR FOR DAYLIGHT HRS. SUPVRS RARELY PERFORM SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS IN THE TWR BECAUSE SUPERVISORY STAFFING IS ALSO INADEQUATE FOR IND'S OP, THUS LEAVING CIC'S IN THE TWR. THE CIC POS MANDATE WAS IGNORED SINCE NO BODIES WERE AVAILABLE TO OPEN IT. AT IND, UNLESS THERE IS A HIGH PROFILE EVENT OCCURRING (SUCH AS THE INDIANAPOLIS 500), WHEN THE WORD 'OVERTIME' IS MENTIONED, THE WORD 'SAFETY' IS IGNORED. THE FUNCTION OF THIS CIC POS IS TO BE ANOTHER SET OF EYES IN THE TWR CAB TO HELP REDUCE THE CHANCE OF RWY INCURSIONS, ETC. SINCE ITS INCEPTION AFTER SEVERAL RWY INCURSIONS AT THIS TOWER, RWY INCURSIONS HAVE ALL BUT DISAPPEARED. IN THE TRACON OP, THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTION IS SIMILAR. TO OBSERVE THE OP, COORDINATE BTWN POS, AND EVEN TO DO MUNDANE TASKS AS ANSWER THE PHONE. THIS FUNCTION WAS ALSO LEFT OUT THIS SATURDAY SINCE EVERYBODY HAD TO BE USED TO MOVE AIRPLANES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.