37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 476213 |
Time | |
Date | 200006 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mry.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl single value : 300 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mry.tower |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : roll |
Route In Use | approach : traffic pattern |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mry.tower |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : position and hold |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 40.7 flight time total : 94.7 flight time type : 88.3 |
ASRS Report | 476213 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : local |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllerb other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | vertical : 250 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Monterey tower cleared me to land for runway 28L prior to entering the downwind leg. I was experiencing what seemed to be moderate to extremely turbulent conditions along the landing pattern. At the 45 degree position for turning base, the turbulence had put me at a lower than desirable altitude, I began my base leg turn. As I was turning base leg, I believe I heard the controller tower recommend an extended downwind. While in heavy concentration to get the first possible view of runway 28L and to fly an appropriate landing pattern, I did not understand why the tower was recommending an extended downwind leg when I was already on base leg setting up for final, and had already mentally decided to turn to final since I didn't want to overshoot the final approach. As I was on short final, approximately 350 ft above and approximately 150 ft behind runway 28L, I noticed a jet on runway 28L positioned at about the runway displaced threshold. At that moment the control tower said to land on runway 28R, and I immediately responded to the control tower 'I thought I was cleared for runway 28L. Am I cleared for runway 28R or runway 28L?' something to that effect. Consequently, as I waited for clarification, landing runway 28R quickly became a non option, in addition, I was not that totally comfortable performing this kind of a maneuver at this late moment because of my experiences of other faster planes coming out of blind spots next to me when landing on parallel runways. As I flew approximately 250 ft over the jet in the approximately position of the runway displacement threshold, I heard someone say on the radio 'why is this guy flying over me?' with this confirmation that the jet knew I was flying over him, and from my vantage point above the jet, that it had not begun it's acceleration for takeoff, I decided to report that I would still land runway 28L but that I would extend my touchdown point, and radio broadcasted accordingly. I then applied power to arrest my descent and allow time for anyone, ie, the control tower, to broadcast any new instructions to me. In the next few moments no further instructions were given so I proceeded with my landing on runway 28L and subsequently immediately removed myself from the active. Hence, my reasoning for telling the control tower that I would extend my touchdown was to allow time for the tower personnel to broadcast not to attempt a landing, if in fact, I totally misinterpreted the situation and was in eminent danger. After getting off the active the control tower requested I get in contact with them by phone, and they asked if I saw the jet on the active to which I replied yes. I also believe that I replied that I double-checked to make sure the jet wasn't applying power or I would have definitely taken more evasive action than to just simply extend my touchdown point. Therefore, my decision to land was based on the 3 following facts. The 1ST that the jet pilot acknowledged that he knew I was on top of him. The 2ND that the jet was remaining perfectly stationary and not applying power for takeoff from my vantage point and clear view below, which the cessna 152 high wing design provides. And 3RD that the control tower did not come back on the radio to clarify the situation of any real eminent danger after I requested clarification. In hindsight, a switch to runway 28R, and if needed, a subsequent go around would probably have been the safest action to take in this situation, and am very open to hearing any recommendations on how I could have more appropriately handled the situation for future reference.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: LOW TIME PVT PLT PASSES OVER THE TOP OF A CPR JET HOLDING FOR TKOF DURING LNDG APCH TO THE INCORRECT RWY.
Narrative: MONTEREY TWR CLRED ME TO LAND FOR RWY 28L PRIOR TO ENTERING THE DOWNWIND LEG. I WAS EXPERIENCING WHAT SEEMED TO BE MODERATE TO EXTREMELY TURBULENT CONDITIONS ALONG THE LNDG PATTERN. AT THE 45 DEG POS FOR TURNING BASE, THE TURB HAD PUT ME AT A LOWER THAN DESIRABLE ALT, I BEGAN MY BASE LEG TURN. AS I WAS TURNING BASE LEG, I BELIEVE I HEARD THE CTLR TWR RECOMMEND AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND. WHILE IN HVY CONCENTRATION TO GET THE FIRST POSSIBLE VIEW OF RWY 28L AND TO FLY AN APPROPRIATE LNDG PATTERN, I DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE TWR WAS RECOMMENDING AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND LEG WHEN I WAS ALREADY ON BASE LEG SETTING UP FOR FINAL, AND HAD ALREADY MENTALLY DECIDED TO TURN TO FINAL SINCE I DIDN'T WANT TO OVERSHOOT THE FINAL APCH. AS I WAS ON SHORT FINAL, APPROX 350 FT ABOVE AND APPROX 150 FT BEHIND RWY 28L, I NOTICED A JET ON RWY 28L POSITIONED AT ABOUT THE RWY DISPLACED THRESHOLD. AT THAT MOMENT THE CTL TWR SAID TO LAND ON RWY 28R, AND I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO THE CTL TWR 'I THOUGHT I WAS CLRED FOR RWY 28L. AM I CLRED FOR RWY 28R OR RWY 28L?' SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. CONSEQUENTLY, AS I WAITED FOR CLARIFICATION, LNDG RWY 28R QUICKLY BECAME A NON OPTION, IN ADDITION, I WAS NOT THAT TOTALLY COMFORTABLE PERFORMING THIS KIND OF A MANEUVER AT THIS LATE MOMENT BECAUSE OF MY EXPERIENCES OF OTHER FASTER PLANES COMING OUT OF BLIND SPOTS NEXT TO ME WHEN LNDG ON PARALLEL RWYS. AS I FLEW APPROX 250 FT OVER THE JET IN THE APPROX POS OF THE RWY DISPLACEMENT THRESHOLD, I HEARD SOMEONE SAY ON THE RADIO 'WHY IS THIS GUY FLYING OVER ME?' WITH THIS CONFIRMATION THAT THE JET KNEW I WAS FLYING OVER HIM, AND FROM MY VANTAGE POINT ABOVE THE JET, THAT IT HAD NOT BEGUN IT'S ACCELERATION FOR TKOF, I DECIDED TO RPT THAT I WOULD STILL LAND RWY 28L BUT THAT I WOULD EXTEND MY TOUCHDOWN POINT, AND RADIO BROADCASTED ACCORDINGLY. I THEN APPLIED PWR TO ARREST MY DSCNT AND ALLOW TIME FOR ANYONE, IE, THE CTL TWR, TO BROADCAST ANY NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO ME. IN THE NEXT FEW MOMENTS NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN SO I PROCEEDED WITH MY LNDG ON RWY 28L AND SUBSEQUENTLY IMMEDIATELY REMOVED MYSELF FROM THE ACTIVE. HENCE, MY REASONING FOR TELLING THE CTL TWR THAT I WOULD EXTEND MY TOUCHDOWN WAS TO ALLOW TIME FOR THE TWR PERSONNEL TO BROADCAST NOT TO ATTEMPT A LNDG, IF IN FACT, I TOTALLY MISINTERPRETED THE SIT AND WAS IN EMINENT DANGER. AFTER GETTING OFF THE ACTIVE THE CTL TWR REQUESTED I GET IN CONTACT WITH THEM BY PHONE, AND THEY ASKED IF I SAW THE JET ON THE ACTIVE TO WHICH I REPLIED YES. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT I REPLIED THAT I DOUBLE-CHKED TO MAKE SURE THE JET WASN'T APPLYING PWR OR I WOULD HAVE DEFINITELY TAKEN MORE EVASIVE ACTION THAN TO JUST SIMPLY EXTEND MY TOUCHDOWN POINT. THEREFORE, MY DECISION TO LAND WAS BASED ON THE 3 FOLLOWING FACTS. THE 1ST THAT THE JET PLT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE KNEW I WAS ON TOP OF HIM. THE 2ND THAT THE JET WAS REMAINING PERFECTLY STATIONARY AND NOT APPLYING PWR FOR TKOF FROM MY VANTAGE POINT AND CLR VIEW BELOW, WHICH THE CESSNA 152 HIGH WING DESIGN PROVIDES. AND 3RD THAT THE CTL TWR DID NOT COME BACK ON THE RADIO TO CLARIFY THE SIT OF ANY REAL EMINENT DANGER AFTER I REQUESTED CLARIFICATION. IN HINDSIGHT, A SWITCH TO RWY 28R, AND IF NEEDED, A SUBSEQUENT GAR WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN THE SAFEST ACTION TO TAKE IN THIS SIT, AND AM VERY OPEN TO HEARING ANY RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW I COULD HAVE MORE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED THE SIT FOR FUTURE REF.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.