Narrative:

B747-400. The aircraft was dispatched with the #2 main tank fuel quantity indicator inoperative. Procedure requires that the tank be emptied and refilled with a known quantity. Maintenance crews in ams performed this procedure. Dispatch fuel required was 228000 pounds. The approximately loading was: main tanks #1 and #4 = 8800 pounds. Main tank #3 = approximately 75000 pounds. Main tank #2 (inoperative gauge) varied and indicated well less than 75000 pounds required, sometimes indicating as low as approximately 61000 pounds to my best recollection. Fuel slip figures were checked by 2 separate crew members and agreed with total fuel required. It was concluded that the main tank #2 indication was still in error and the required 75000 pounds was on board. During the en route portion, fuel management was based on the quantity indicated in tank #3 and quantity in tank #2 should have been equal to #3. The possibility that the quantity in main tank #2 was incorrect was discussed by the crew, and it was concluded there was no potential to flameout the #2 engine because the xfeed manifold was open and fuel was available from main tank #3 via the xfeed. When the fuel indication in main tank #2 got near zero, the fuel pumps began to cavitate. (No power interruption due to xfeed). Fuel was recomputed based on new information that tank #2 was now empty. Fuel on arrival estimated to be in excess of 30000 pounds. Good WX in dtw, so arrival fuel was still well within legal limits and safety margins. The flight continued to dtw for an uneventful landing. The fueling procedure on the ground in ams appeared to have followed company guidelines. My concern is that all fueling documentation seemed to indicate we had the required amount of fuel on board using the procedure of emptying the tank and filling it with a known quantity. Somewhere in the process, an error by the fuelers was undetected and we departed with approximately 10000-15000 pounds less fuel on board than we thought we had. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter called back and stated that the xfeed manifold is normally open during a refueling procedure, but was not certain that this would allow distribution first officer fuel to the other tanks as well as tank #2. He has turned this information over to the union safety representatives and the company. He has not heard back from the company. He is sure that the fuel slip contained the total number of pounds required per the flight release.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 FLT DEPARTS AFTER BEING REFUELED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MEL REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO AN INOP #2 MAIN FUEL GAUGE. ENRTE, THE CREW FINDS THAT THEY WERE SHORTED APPROX 15000 LBS OF FUEL. INOP GAUGE WAS READING THE CORRECT SHORTED FUEL LOAD OUT OF EHAM, FO.

Narrative: B747-400. THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE #2 MAIN TANK FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR INOP. PROC REQUIRES THAT THE TANK BE EMPTIED AND REFILLED WITH A KNOWN QUANTITY. MAINT CREWS IN AMS PERFORMED THIS PROC. DISPATCH FUEL REQUIRED WAS 228000 LBS. THE APPROX LOADING WAS: MAIN TANKS #1 AND #4 = 8800 LBS. MAIN TANK #3 = APPROX 75000 LBS. MAIN TANK #2 (INOP GAUGE) VARIED AND INDICATED WELL LESS THAN 75000 LBS REQUIRED, SOMETIMES INDICATING AS LOW AS APPROX 61000 LBS TO MY BEST RECOLLECTION. FUEL SLIP FIGURES WERE CHKED BY 2 SEPARATE CREW MEMBERS AND AGREED WITH TOTAL FUEL REQUIRED. IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE MAIN TANK #2 INDICATION WAS STILL IN ERROR AND THE REQUIRED 75000 LBS WAS ON BOARD. DURING THE ENRTE PORTION, FUEL MGMNT WAS BASED ON THE QUANTITY INDICATED IN TANK #3 AND QUANTITY IN TANK #2 SHOULD HAVE BEEN EQUAL TO #3. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE QUANTITY IN MAIN TANK #2 WAS INCORRECT WAS DISCUSSED BY THE CREW, AND IT WAS CONCLUDED THERE WAS NO POTENTIAL TO FLAMEOUT THE #2 ENG BECAUSE THE XFEED MANIFOLD WAS OPEN AND FUEL WAS AVAILABLE FROM MAIN TANK #3 VIA THE XFEED. WHEN THE FUEL INDICATION IN MAIN TANK #2 GOT NEAR ZERO, THE FUEL PUMPS BEGAN TO CAVITATE. (NO PWR INTERRUPTION DUE TO XFEED). FUEL WAS RECOMPUTED BASED ON NEW INFO THAT TANK #2 WAS NOW EMPTY. FUEL ON ARR ESTIMATED TO BE IN EXCESS OF 30000 LBS. GOOD WX IN DTW, SO ARR FUEL WAS STILL WELL WITHIN LEGAL LIMITS AND SAFETY MARGINS. THE FLT CONTINUED TO DTW FOR AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. THE FUELING PROC ON THE GND IN AMS APPEARED TO HAVE FOLLOWED COMPANY GUIDELINES. MY CONCERN IS THAT ALL FUELING DOCUMENTATION SEEMED TO INDICATE WE HAD THE REQUIRED AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD USING THE PROC OF EMPTYING THE TANK AND FILLING IT WITH A KNOWN QUANTITY. SOMEWHERE IN THE PROCESS, AN ERROR BY THE FUELERS WAS UNDETECTED AND WE DEPARTED WITH APPROX 10000-15000 LBS LESS FUEL ON BOARD THAN WE THOUGHT WE HAD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CALLED BACK AND STATED THAT THE XFEED MANIFOLD IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING A REFUELING PROC, BUT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW DISTRIBUTION FO FUEL TO THE OTHER TANKS AS WELL AS TANK #2. HE HAS TURNED THIS INFO OVER TO THE UNION SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES AND THE COMPANY. HE HAS NOT HEARD BACK FROM THE COMPANY. HE IS SURE THAT THE FUEL SLIP CONTAINED THE TOTAL NUMBER OF LBS REQUIRED PER THE FLT RELEASE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.