Narrative:

After determining what pallets were to go in what position, I notified the head ground personnel as to how the aircraft was to be loaded...both verbally and I gave him a written copy of the load distribution. I even spoke with the actual aircraft loaders to verify everyone understood. They acknowledged me correctly several times. I personally observed 3/4 of the loading process at which time I had to go into the ATC facility to file our flight plan. Upon leaving the aircraft, I told the engineer to make sure the 'bear traps' were up. When I returned to the aircraft it was already loaded. The irregularity report says what happened with the takeoff. After the aborted takeoff and upon returning to the ramp I double-checked our weight and balance form and found that all of our calculations were correct. I then inspected the loading of the aircraft with the help of the ground loading crew and saw that the aircraft was not loaded according to the given instructions. The aircraft was then reloaded properly and we departed without incident. In my opinion there is a lot going on during the loading process and it is almost impossible to observe the loading every step of the way with just the 3 crew members. We have a lot of other tasks that have to be done as well. There is a small element of trust when we tell the ground personnel very specifically how the aircraft is to be loaded. I believe the only way to ensure that on every flight the load is 100% observed is to have a load-master present and or come up with better company policy ensuring there are checks and balances in place. This situation has always been on my mind and after verifying that the ground crew understood the instructions, I felt confident that the aircraft would be loaded properly, especially after supervising 3/4 of the process and verbally telling the loaders that position #2 was to be filled and 12+R3 empty. When P-2 was being brought out to the aircraft I even told the loader specifically that this was to be in position #2. At that point I went to file the flight plan and asked that the engineer see that all of the 'bear traps' were up and loaded. Supplemental information from acn 477645: we began the takeoff roll on runway 11 and at 80 KTS the captain performed the elevator check. As airspeed increased the nose of the aircraft wanted to raise off the ground prior to vr and V1. At approximately 110 KTS (6 KTS prior to V1) the captain had full nose down elevator pressure on the yoke and the nose gear continued to come off the ground. The captain aborted the takeoff and we returned to the ramp. Supplemental information from acn 477749: the rejected takeoff brake cooling chart was referred to and complied with. Crew duties prevented one of the crew from directly supervising the loading. The company was informed of the incident immediately after the abort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PIC OF A DC8-62 FREIGHTER ABORTS THE TKOF 6 KTS BELOW V1 WHEN HE STARTS TO LOSE PITCH CTL OF THE ACFT DUE TO A CARGO LOADING PROB AT TNCF, FO.

Narrative: AFTER DETERMINING WHAT PALLETS WERE TO GO IN WHAT POS, I NOTIFIED THE HEAD GND PERSONNEL AS TO HOW THE ACFT WAS TO BE LOADED...BOTH VERBALLY AND I GAVE HIM A WRITTEN COPY OF THE LOAD DISTRIBUTION. I EVEN SPOKE WITH THE ACTUAL ACFT LOADERS TO VERIFY EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED ME CORRECTLY SEVERAL TIMES. I PERSONALLY OBSERVED 3/4 OF THE LOADING PROCESS AT WHICH TIME I HAD TO GO INTO THE ATC FACILITY TO FILE OUR FLT PLAN. UPON LEAVING THE ACFT, I TOLD THE ENGINEER TO MAKE SURE THE 'BEAR TRAPS' WERE UP. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE ACFT IT WAS ALREADY LOADED. THE IRREGULARITY RPT SAYS WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE TKOF. AFTER THE ABORTED TKOF AND UPON RETURNING TO THE RAMP I DOUBLE-CHKED OUR WT AND BAL FORM AND FOUND THAT ALL OF OUR CALCULATIONS WERE CORRECT. I THEN INSPECTED THE LOADING OF THE ACFT WITH THE HELP OF THE GND LOADING CREW AND SAW THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT LOADED ACCORDING TO THE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS. THE ACFT WAS THEN RELOADED PROPERLY AND WE DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN MY OPINION THERE IS A LOT GOING ON DURING THE LOADING PROCESS AND IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO OBSERVE THE LOADING EVERY STEP OF THE WAY WITH JUST THE 3 CREW MEMBERS. WE HAVE A LOT OF OTHER TASKS THAT HAVE TO BE DONE AS WELL. THERE IS A SMALL ELEMENT OF TRUST WHEN WE TELL THE GND PERSONNEL VERY SPECIFICALLY HOW THE ACFT IS TO BE LOADED. I BELIEVE THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE THAT ON EVERY FLT THE LOAD IS 100% OBSERVED IS TO HAVE A LOAD-MASTER PRESENT AND OR COME UP WITH BETTER COMPANY POLICY ENSURING THERE ARE CHKS AND BALS IN PLACE. THIS SIT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ON MY MIND AND AFTER VERIFYING THAT THE GND CREW UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCTIONS, I FELT CONFIDENT THAT THE ACFT WOULD BE LOADED PROPERLY, ESPECIALLY AFTER SUPERVISING 3/4 OF THE PROCESS AND VERBALLY TELLING THE LOADERS THAT POS #2 WAS TO BE FILLED AND 12+R3 EMPTY. WHEN P-2 WAS BEING BROUGHT OUT TO THE ACFT I EVEN TOLD THE LOADER SPECIFICALLY THAT THIS WAS TO BE IN POS #2. AT THAT POINT I WENT TO FILE THE FLT PLAN AND ASKED THAT THE ENGINEER SEE THAT ALL OF THE 'BEAR TRAPS' WERE UP AND LOADED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 477645: WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL ON RWY 11 AND AT 80 KTS THE CAPT PERFORMED THE ELEVATOR CHK. AS AIRSPD INCREASED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WANTED TO RAISE OFF THE GND PRIOR TO VR AND V1. AT APPROX 110 KTS (6 KTS PRIOR TO V1) THE CAPT HAD FULL NOSE DOWN ELEVATOR PRESSURE ON THE YOKE AND THE NOSE GEAR CONTINUED TO COME OFF THE GND. THE CAPT ABORTED THE TKOF AND WE RETURNED TO THE RAMP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 477749: THE REJECTED TKOF BRAKE COOLING CHART WAS REFERRED TO AND COMPLIED WITH. CREW DUTIES PREVENTED ONE OF THE CREW FROM DIRECTLY SUPERVISING THE LOADING. THE COMPANY WAS INFORMED OF THE INCIDENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ABORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.