Narrative:

The flight was IFR from jan to tlh. Chain of events: flight proceeded normally until handed off by pns approach to eglin approach. We were level at 9000 ft MSL in mixed IMC and VMC. Thunderstorm cells were closing in and deviations were becoming more frequent and necessary. The following sequence of events occurred during the series of handoffs from eglin approach to cairns approach to tyndall approach. The actual sequence is accurate, as recalled within 1 hour after landing. Visual observation indicated that we would require a deviation to the north of 2 cells ahead. The course at the time was between 090 degrees and 110 degrees. Tyndall denied the request because of military activity in the area. I then requested a deviation to the south of the 2 cells. Request also denied because of military activity. I then requested lower to get under the clouds between the cells and in VMC. Request approved down to 7000 ft. Shortly after, the controller advised deviation to the south was possible since we were below 9000 ft, however, that was no longer an option because heavy rain was now falling from the south storm cell. Conditions at 7000 ft were not VMC. I requested lower and the controller approved a descent to 5000 ft. At this time there appeared to be some confusion at tyndall and a female voice told us to change the transponder code. We were then in solid IMC at 5000 ft. The clouds above were rapidly darkening and I asked the controller if we could get any information about the WX ahead even though another aircraft had just been told that information about cell intensity was not available. The male voice returned and asked where we were. By then, it was all I could do to keep the plane upright, but I managed to give him our distance from our next VOR. However, I cannot remember if it was mai or szw. For some reason the controller was unable to determine our position from that answer and requested our bearing off of the panama city VOR, pfn. By now 100% of my attention was focused on maintaining control in worsening turbulence and heading changes of +/-30 degrees and roll excursions of +/-45 degrees. I did not have pfn entered in the radios and it was impossible to read the chart. In fact, I could not even respond to the request. The controller repeated the request, and again, I could not answer. The clouds continued to darken and we were bordering on loss of control in the turbulence and heavy rain. I realized that tyndall was asking for the bearings because they had probably lost our radar signal and would no longer be able to help us. The controller then said something that sounded like our aircraft number and VFR, but it was not clear. I could not respond and the message was repeated. I believed tyndall had canceled our IFR, but again, I could not respond. I managed to make 1 radio call to tyndall saying we had to get out of this cell and that we were descending. I am not even certain that I idented our aircraft. We broke out into VMC at 3000 ft. I then called tyndall and asked them to verify that we were VFR. The controller said that we were, and told us to squawk 1200. Human performance considerations: throughout my IFR training and experience, which included 250 hours simulated dual IFR with cfii's and 12 hours actual IFR, the emphasis was always on working within the system and getting assistance from the many sources available. When the system was not able to help me, I did not have the mind set to cancel IFR. When the tyndall controller did not have the flexibility to approve my deviation requests, I should have canceled IFR and deviated as required. Perhaps more time should be spent teaching pilots about the 'need' to cancel IFR under certain difficult WX conditions. While this idea is not hidden from pilots, it is also not stressed in training. The expectation was always that you will complete the flight as planned, not that you can expect to cancel IFR. My training also did not really prepare me for the rapidity with which the conditions can change. I was always taught to keep 'a way out,' but the way out disappeared in an instant with the phrase 'deviation denied.' pilots get plenty of information about WX prediction and avoidance, but probably not enough about how volatile the WX can be and how quickly options can go away. My training and many hours of reading related material also did not prepare me for the amount of attention, which would be required by the turbulence we were in. While many WX flying articles suggested that it can get very busy in the cockpit, they did not emphasize enough that you may not even be able to press the push-to-talk button! The possibility that I could have declared an emergency was likewise a choice that I was not prepared to evaluate for the same reason. My training taught me that emergencys were for vacuum or gyro failures, fuel exhaustion, or other malfunctions. Deviation denied' was never discussed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA28 PLT FLEW INTO A TSTM AT PAM.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS IFR FROM JAN TO TLH. CHAIN OF EVENTS: FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL HANDED OFF BY PNS APCH TO EGLIN APCH. WE WERE LEVEL AT 9000 FT MSL IN MIXED IMC AND VMC. TSTM CELLS WERE CLOSING IN AND DEVS WERE BECOMING MORE FREQUENT AND NECESSARY. THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OCCURRED DURING THE SERIES OF HDOFS FROM EGLIN APCH TO CAIRNS APCH TO TYNDALL APCH. THE ACTUAL SEQUENCE IS ACCURATE, AS RECALLED WITHIN 1 HR AFTER LNDG. VISUAL OBSERVATION INDICATED THAT WE WOULD REQUIRE A DEV TO THE N OF 2 CELLS AHEAD. THE COURSE AT THE TIME WAS BTWN 090 DEGS AND 110 DEGS. TYNDALL DENIED THE REQUEST BECAUSE OF MIL ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. I THEN REQUESTED A DEV TO THE S OF THE 2 CELLS. REQUEST ALSO DENIED BECAUSE OF MIL ACTIVITY. I THEN REQUESTED LOWER TO GET UNDER THE CLOUDS BTWN THE CELLS AND IN VMC. REQUEST APPROVED DOWN TO 7000 FT. SHORTLY AFTER, THE CTLR ADVISED DEV TO THE S WAS POSSIBLE SINCE WE WERE BELOW 9000 FT, HOWEVER, THAT WAS NO LONGER AN OPTION BECAUSE HVY RAIN WAS NOW FALLING FROM THE S STORM CELL. CONDITIONS AT 7000 FT WERE NOT VMC. I REQUESTED LOWER AND THE CTLR APPROVED A DSCNT TO 5000 FT. AT THIS TIME THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME CONFUSION AT TYNDALL AND A FEMALE VOICE TOLD US TO CHANGE THE XPONDER CODE. WE WERE THEN IN SOLID IMC AT 5000 FT. THE CLOUDS ABOVE WERE RAPIDLY DARKENING AND I ASKED THE CTLR IF WE COULD GET ANY INFO ABOUT THE WX AHEAD EVEN THOUGH ANOTHER ACFT HAD JUST BEEN TOLD THAT INFO ABOUT CELL INTENSITY WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE MALE VOICE RETURNED AND ASKED WHERE WE WERE. BY THEN, IT WAS ALL I COULD DO TO KEEP THE PLANE UPRIGHT, BUT I MANAGED TO GIVE HIM OUR DISTANCE FROM OUR NEXT VOR. HOWEVER, I CANNOT REMEMBER IF IT WAS MAI OR SZW. FOR SOME REASON THE CTLR WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE OUR POS FROM THAT ANSWER AND REQUESTED OUR BEARING OFF OF THE PANAMA CITY VOR, PFN. BY NOW 100% OF MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON MAINTAINING CTL IN WORSENING TURB AND HDG CHANGES OF +/-30 DEGS AND ROLL EXCURSIONS OF +/-45 DEGS. I DID NOT HAVE PFN ENTERED IN THE RADIOS AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO READ THE CHART. IN FACT, I COULD NOT EVEN RESPOND TO THE REQUEST. THE CTLR REPEATED THE REQUEST, AND AGAIN, I COULD NOT ANSWER. THE CLOUDS CONTINUED TO DARKEN AND WE WERE BORDERING ON LOSS OF CTL IN THE TURB AND HVY RAIN. I REALIZED THAT TYNDALL WAS ASKING FOR THE BEARINGS BECAUSE THEY HAD PROBABLY LOST OUR RADAR SIGNAL AND WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO HELP US. THE CTLR THEN SAID SOMETHING THAT SOUNDED LIKE OUR ACFT NUMBER AND VFR, BUT IT WAS NOT CLR. I COULD NOT RESPOND AND THE MESSAGE WAS REPEATED. I BELIEVED TYNDALL HAD CANCELED OUR IFR, BUT AGAIN, I COULD NOT RESPOND. I MANAGED TO MAKE 1 RADIO CALL TO TYNDALL SAYING WE HAD TO GET OUT OF THIS CELL AND THAT WE WERE DSNDING. I AM NOT EVEN CERTAIN THAT I IDENTED OUR ACFT. WE BROKE OUT INTO VMC AT 3000 FT. I THEN CALLED TYNDALL AND ASKED THEM TO VERIFY THAT WE WERE VFR. THE CTLR SAID THAT WE WERE, AND TOLD US TO SQUAWK 1200. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: THROUGHOUT MY IFR TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE, WHICH INCLUDED 250 HRS SIMULATED DUAL IFR WITH CFII'S AND 12 HRS ACTUAL IFR, THE EMPHASIS WAS ALWAYS ON WORKING WITHIN THE SYS AND GETTING ASSISTANCE FROM THE MANY SOURCES AVAILABLE. WHEN THE SYS WAS NOT ABLE TO HELP ME, I DID NOT HAVE THE MIND SET TO CANCEL IFR. WHEN THE TYNDALL CTLR DID NOT HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO APPROVE MY DEV REQUESTS, I SHOULD HAVE CANCELED IFR AND DEVIATED AS REQUIRED. PERHAPS MORE TIME SHOULD BE SPENT TEACHING PLTS ABOUT THE 'NEED' TO CANCEL IFR UNDER CERTAIN DIFFICULT WX CONDITIONS. WHILE THIS IDEA IS NOT HIDDEN FROM PLTS, IT IS ALSO NOT STRESSED IN TRAINING. THE EXPECTATION WAS ALWAYS THAT YOU WILL COMPLETE THE FLT AS PLANNED, NOT THAT YOU CAN EXPECT TO CANCEL IFR. MY TRAINING ALSO DID NOT REALLY PREPARE ME FOR THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE CONDITIONS CAN CHANGE. I WAS ALWAYS TAUGHT TO KEEP 'A WAY OUT,' BUT THE WAY OUT DISAPPEARED IN AN INSTANT WITH THE PHRASE 'DEV DENIED.' PLTS GET PLENTY OF INFO ABOUT WX PREDICTION AND AVOIDANCE, BUT PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH ABOUT HOW VOLATILE THE WX CAN BE AND HOW QUICKLY OPTIONS CAN GO AWAY. MY TRAINING AND MANY HRS OF READING RELATED MATERIAL ALSO DID NOT PREPARE ME FOR THE AMOUNT OF ATTN, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE TURB WE WERE IN. WHILE MANY WX FLYING ARTICLES SUGGESTED THAT IT CAN GET VERY BUSY IN THE COCKPIT, THEY DID NOT EMPHASIZE ENOUGH THAT YOU MAY NOT EVEN BE ABLE TO PRESS THE PUSH-TO-TALK BUTTON! THE POSSIBILITY THAT I COULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER WAS LIKEWISE A CHOICE THAT I WAS NOT PREPARED TO EVALUATE FOR THE SAME REASON. MY TRAINING TAUGHT ME THAT EMERS WERE FOR VACUUM OR GYRO FAILURES, FUEL EXHAUSTION, OR OTHER MALFUNCTIONS. DEV DENIED' WAS NEVER DISCUSSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.