Narrative:

Departing dtw airport in a B757 act, all checklist items were accomplished normally before takeoff. On takeoff roll after the EPR was engaged and throttle hold was annunciated at 80 KIAS, I noticed louder than normal wind noise on the captain's side window. The window was found overctred in the track, but the lever lock was in the unlock position. An abort was initiated by the first officer (PF) between 80-100 KIAS. I took control of the aircraft, applying full reverse thrust and rolling the aircraft to the next taxiway, applying minimal brakes to exit the active runway uneventfully. The roller part of the window was overctr just barely off the stop and the window lever lock was in the unlock position. After verifying the roller full forward and lever lock in the localizer position, the flight attendants were briefed about the abort but we were unable to communicate with the passenger because the PA was inoperative. We referenced the brake chart, reaccomplished checklists, and taxied to the active runway again with fuel and everything being ok. An uneventful takeoff was made and we proceeded on to the destination. Some of my observations from a human factors point of view: 1) on our before start check, an 'overctr and locked' reply to side windows on the checklist -- I usually confirm the first officer's side window lever lock in 'locked position' before I check mine. When I check mine, I look to see the rollers overctred, but you cannot see all the way to the stop. Normally, I physically check the lever in the locked position. This time I probably glanced at the lever lock after looking at the rollers overctred. There are no lights in the flight deck to indicate an unlocked lever. There are no EICAS messages to indicate this either. 2) with an inoperative PA, it made for difficult communications to the passenger. The only information they got was from flight attendants who knew that something was not right and the flight was aborted to check it out. This really stresses the need for operative PA's and not a 3 calendar day fix on them. 3) there might be a better way to ensure the lever locking mechanism is recognized in the locked position using a simple light or even red mark in the unlocked position on the B757. Also, a casual glance can't confirm the rollers in the full forward position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 CREW REJECTS TKOF WHEN COCKPIT WINDOW IS NOT CLOSED.

Narrative: DEPARTING DTW ARPT IN A B757 ACT, ALL CHKLIST ITEMS WERE ACCOMPLISHED NORMALLY BEFORE TKOF. ON TKOF ROLL AFTER THE EPR WAS ENGAGED AND THROTTLE HOLD WAS ANNUNCIATED AT 80 KIAS, I NOTICED LOUDER THAN NORMAL WIND NOISE ON THE CAPT'S SIDE WINDOW. THE WINDOW WAS FOUND OVERCTRED IN THE TRACK, BUT THE LEVER LOCK WAS IN THE UNLOCK POS. AN ABORT WAS INITIATED BY THE FO (PF) BTWN 80-100 KIAS. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT, APPLYING FULL REVERSE THRUST AND ROLLING THE ACFT TO THE NEXT TXWY, APPLYING MINIMAL BRAKES TO EXIT THE ACTIVE RWY UNEVENTFULLY. THE ROLLER PART OF THE WINDOW WAS OVERCTR JUST BARELY OFF THE STOP AND THE WINDOW LEVER LOCK WAS IN THE UNLOCK POS. AFTER VERIFYING THE ROLLER FULL FORWARD AND LEVER LOCK IN THE LOC POS, THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE BRIEFED ABOUT THE ABORT BUT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PAX BECAUSE THE PA WAS INOP. WE REFED THE BRAKE CHART, REACCOMPLISHED CHKLISTS, AND TAXIED TO THE ACTIVE RWY AGAIN WITH FUEL AND EVERYTHING BEING OK. AN UNEVENTFUL TKOF WAS MADE AND WE PROCEEDED ON TO THE DEST. SOME OF MY OBSERVATIONS FROM A HUMAN FACTORS POINT OF VIEW: 1) ON OUR BEFORE START CHK, AN 'OVERCTR AND LOCKED' REPLY TO SIDE WINDOWS ON THE CHKLIST -- I USUALLY CONFIRM THE FO'S SIDE WINDOW LEVER LOCK IN 'LOCKED POS' BEFORE I CHK MINE. WHEN I CHK MINE, I LOOK TO SEE THE ROLLERS OVERCTRED, BUT YOU CANNOT SEE ALL THE WAY TO THE STOP. NORMALLY, I PHYSICALLY CHK THE LEVER IN THE LOCKED POS. THIS TIME I PROBABLY GLANCED AT THE LEVER LOCK AFTER LOOKING AT THE ROLLERS OVERCTRED. THERE ARE NO LIGHTS IN THE FLT DECK TO INDICATE AN UNLOCKED LEVER. THERE ARE NO EICAS MESSAGES TO INDICATE THIS EITHER. 2) WITH AN INOP PA, IT MADE FOR DIFFICULT COMS TO THE PAX. THE ONLY INFO THEY GOT WAS FROM FLT ATTENDANTS WHO KNEW THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT AND THE FLT WAS ABORTED TO CHK IT OUT. THIS REALLY STRESSES THE NEED FOR OPERATIVE PA'S AND NOT A 3 CALENDAR DAY FIX ON THEM. 3) THERE MIGHT BE A BETTER WAY TO ENSURE THE LEVER LOCKING MECHANISM IS RECOGNIZED IN THE LOCKED POS USING A SIMPLE LIGHT OR EVEN RED MARK IN THE UNLOCKED POS ON THE B757. ALSO, A CASUAL GLANCE CAN'T CONFIRM THE ROLLERS IN THE FULL FORWARD POS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.