Narrative:

From cruise we were cleared to cross somto intersection at 13000 ft. My first officer was talking on the second radio to company operations. I put a crossing restr on the FMS for 13000 ft at somto. Actually I had put the altitude restr on ard (yardley) when the first officer finished talking with company. I told him we were cleared to cross somto at 13000 ft. He verified the altitude, but did not check the FMS to see that the restr was on the correct fix. We allowed the aircraft to fly the VNAV profile only to cross somto at about 17000 ft. Center questioned our altitude at that point and that was when we realized my mistake. Had I verified the proper restr on the proper fix after setting it up this would have been avoided. If the first officer would have verified the correct altitude on the correct fix when I told him what the restrs were this would have been avoided. Supplemental information from acn 478458: contributing factors. Crew fatigue: about 10 hours into our second 12 hour day. Congested airspace with heavy radio traffic. 1 crew member distracted from monitoring PF at non flying related duties (arrival report, ATIS) how problem arose: 1 crew member performing duties usually divided among 2 crew members. How discovered: prompt by ARTCC controller. Corrective actions: none required at the time. In the future, I will try to be more attentive to communications to and actions taken by other crew members, particularly after I have been attending to other duties. Human performance considerations. Perceptions, judgements, decisions: I assumed the captain had put correct information into the FMC, unconsciously chose not to check it. Actions, inactions: failed to quality check information that another crew member entered into FMC that affected flight parameters of aircraft. Factors affecting the quality of human performance: fatigue, congested radio traffic, and distractions by other required duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: XING RESTR NOT MET ON MINKS ONE ARR TO LGA, NY.

Narrative: FROM CRUISE WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS SOMTO INTXN AT 13000 FT. MY FO WAS TALKING ON THE SECOND RADIO TO COMPANY OPS. I PUT A XING RESTR ON THE FMS FOR 13000 FT AT SOMTO. ACTUALLY I HAD PUT THE ALT RESTR ON ARD (YARDLEY) WHEN THE FO FINISHED TALKING WITH COMPANY. I TOLD HIM WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS SOMTO AT 13000 FT. HE VERIFIED THE ALT, BUT DID NOT CHK THE FMS TO SEE THAT THE RESTR WAS ON THE CORRECT FIX. WE ALLOWED THE ACFT TO FLY THE VNAV PROFILE ONLY TO CROSS SOMTO AT ABOUT 17000 FT. CTR QUESTIONED OUR ALT AT THAT POINT AND THAT WAS WHEN WE REALIZED MY MISTAKE. HAD I VERIFIED THE PROPER RESTR ON THE PROPER FIX AFTER SETTING IT UP THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. IF THE FO WOULD HAVE VERIFIED THE CORRECT ALT ON THE CORRECT FIX WHEN I TOLD HIM WHAT THE RESTRS WERE THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 478458: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. CREW FATIGUE: ABOUT 10 HRS INTO OUR SECOND 12 HR DAY. CONGESTED AIRSPACE WITH HVY RADIO TFC. 1 CREW MEMBER DISTRACTED FROM MONITORING PF AT NON FLYING RELATED DUTIES (ARR RPT, ATIS) HOW PROB AROSE: 1 CREW MEMBER PERFORMING DUTIES USUALLY DIVIDED AMONG 2 CREW MEMBERS. HOW DISCOVERED: PROMPT BY ARTCC CTLR. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: NONE REQUIRED AT THE TIME. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL TRY TO BE MORE ATTENTIVE TO COMS TO AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER CREW MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY AFTER I HAVE BEEN ATTENDING TO OTHER DUTIES. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: I ASSUMED THE CAPT HAD PUT CORRECT INFO INTO THE FMC, UNCONSCIOUSLY CHOSE NOT TO CHK IT. ACTIONS, INACTIONS: FAILED TO QUALITY CHK INFO THAT ANOTHER CREW MEMBER ENTERED INTO FMC THAT AFFECTED FLT PARAMETERS OF ACFT. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: FATIGUE, CONGESTED RADIO TFC, AND DISTRACTIONS BY OTHER REQUIRED DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.