Narrative:

I was returning to nevada county airport. 10 mi from nevada county airport, I heard a garbled transmission from beechcraft skipper stating his position as entering downwind for runway 25 and his intention to land. I broadcast my intention to enter on a 4 mi upwind leg to land on runway 7. At 3 mi west of nevada county (grass valley) airport, I announced my position as follows: 'air carrier X entering on a 3 mi upwind leg for left overhead traffic, runway 7, turning left crosswind, end of field.' I observed skipper lifting off runway 25 after a touch-and-go at a distance of between 1/4 - 1/2 mi. I made the following radio transmission: 'skipper departing nevada county, I have you in sight and will pass well above you.' my report that I had visual contact was not acknowledged by skipper but was heard by our base personnel on the advisory frequency. After landing, the PIC of beechcraft skipper drove up the taxiway to the base facility, entered the dispatch office, idented himself as a flight instructor. He inquired about our procedures and our need to land on runway 7. He further stated that we had nearly had a midair collision that required him to take evasive action. I explained to him that our policy required us to depart on runway 25 and land on runway 7 because of the runway gradient and rising terrain to the east as outlined by the NOAA AFD, the state airport directory and flight guide. These pubs also include a warning to watch for air tankers during the period from july through october. I did not consider this incident to be a near miss because I had established visual contact and maintained what I considered to be adequate separation. The PIC of skipper did not agree. Contributing factors to this incident were: special operating procedures at nevada county. Inadequate dissemination of information to GA pilots regarding those procedures. The flight instructor serving as PIC of skipper failed to familiarize himself with all the necessary information about nevada county airport before selecting it to conduct flight training. The flight instructor serving as PIC on skipper failed to maintain a good listening watch on the advisory frequency. Recommendations: pilots and base personnel need to establish communications with local flight instructors and GA operations to keep them informed on procedures and possible wake turbulence hazards. Ask the GA operation charged with operating the unicom to include a caution about aerial firefighting operations when giving an airport advisory.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GS2T TANKER ACFT FLYING AT NEVADA COUNTY ARPT RPTS A CONFLICT DURING LNDG WITH A SINGLE ENG BEECHCRAFT DEPARTING THE OPPOSITE RWY.

Narrative: I WAS RETURNING TO NEVADA COUNTY ARPT. 10 MI FROM NEVADA COUNTY ARPT, I HEARD A GARBLED XMISSION FROM BEECHCRAFT SKIPPER STATING HIS POS AS ENTERING DOWNWIND FOR RWY 25 AND HIS INTENTION TO LAND. I BROADCAST MY INTENTION TO ENTER ON A 4 MI UPWIND LEG TO LAND ON RWY 7. AT 3 MI W OF NEVADA COUNTY (GRASS VALLEY) ARPT, I ANNOUNCED MY POS AS FOLLOWS: 'ACR X ENTERING ON A 3 MI UPWIND LEG FOR L OVERHEAD TFC, RWY 7, TURNING L XWIND, END OF FIELD.' I OBSERVED SKIPPER LIFTING OFF RWY 25 AFTER A TOUCH-AND-GO AT A DISTANCE OF BTWN 1/4 - 1/2 MI. I MADE THE FOLLOWING RADIO XMISSION: 'SKIPPER DEPARTING NEVADA COUNTY, I HAVE YOU IN SIGHT AND WILL PASS WELL ABOVE YOU.' MY RPT THAT I HAD VISUAL CONTACT WAS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY SKIPPER BUT WAS HEARD BY OUR BASE PERSONNEL ON THE ADVISORY FREQ. AFTER LNDG, THE PIC OF BEECHCRAFT SKIPPER DROVE UP THE TXWY TO THE BASE FACILITY, ENTERED THE DISPATCH OFFICE, IDENTED HIMSELF AS A FLT INSTRUCTOR. HE INQUIRED ABOUT OUR PROCS AND OUR NEED TO LAND ON RWY 7. HE FURTHER STATED THAT WE HAD NEARLY HAD A MIDAIR COLLISION THAT REQUIRED HIM TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT OUR POLICY REQUIRED US TO DEPART ON RWY 25 AND LAND ON RWY 7 BECAUSE OF THE RWY GRADIENT AND RISING TERRAIN TO THE E AS OUTLINED BY THE NOAA AFD, THE STATE ARPT DIRECTORY AND FLT GUIDE. THESE PUBS ALSO INCLUDE A WARNING TO WATCH FOR AIR TANKERS DURING THE PERIOD FROM JULY THROUGH OCTOBER. I DID NOT CONSIDER THIS INCIDENT TO BE A NEAR MISS BECAUSE I HAD ESTABLISHED VISUAL CONTACT AND MAINTAINED WHAT I CONSIDERED TO BE ADEQUATE SEPARATION. THE PIC OF SKIPPER DID NOT AGREE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: SPECIAL OPERATING PROCS AT NEVADA COUNTY. INADEQUATE DISSEMINATION OF INFO TO GA PLTS REGARDING THOSE PROCS. THE FLT INSTRUCTOR SERVING AS PIC OF SKIPPER FAILED TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH ALL THE NECESSARY INFO ABOUT NEVADA COUNTY ARPT BEFORE SELECTING IT TO CONDUCT FLT TRAINING. THE FLT INSTRUCTOR SERVING AS PIC ON SKIPPER FAILED TO MAINTAIN A GOOD LISTENING WATCH ON THE ADVISORY FREQ. RECOMMENDATIONS: PLTS AND BASE PERSONNEL NEED TO ESTABLISH COMS WITH LCL FLT INSTRUCTORS AND GA OPS TO KEEP THEM INFORMED ON PROCS AND POSSIBLE WAKE TURB HAZARDS. ASK THE GA OP CHARGED WITH OPERATING THE UNICOM TO INCLUDE A CAUTION ABOUT AERIAL FIREFIGHTING OPS WHEN GIVING AN ARPT ADVISORY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.