37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 482153 |
Time | |
Date | 200008 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : hai.airport |
State Reference | MI |
Altitude | msl single value : 1200 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : azo.tracon |
Operator | general aviation : instructional |
Make Model Name | Cessna 152 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other vortac |
Flight Phase | descent : vacating altitude landing : go around |
Route In Use | approach : instrument non precision arrival other |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Ultralight |
Operating Under FAR Part | other : 103 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial cruise : holding descent : intermediate altitude landing : roll |
Route In Use | approach : visual arrival : vfr departure : vfr |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | instruction : instructor |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 13000 flight time type : 400 |
ASRS Report | 482153 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | instruction : trainee |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : private |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne critical inflight encounter other non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 1000 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Airspace Structure FAA Flight Crew Human Performance Airport |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Situations | |
Airport | procedure or policy : hai.airport |
Airspace Structure | class g : hai.g |
Chart | approach : hai. vor/gps-a |
Publication | FALD |
Narrative:
The situation happened at sunset at three rivers airport (hai). The winds at the time were light and variable. There were pwred parachutes operating on the east side of the approach end of runway 5/23. There was not a NOTAM issued about these operations. Practice circle to land and engine out procedures over the airport (hai) in the C-150 while in safe proximity to powered parachutes operating seemed to have caused a misconception of the pwred parachutes, that a safe distance from them was not kept. If the pwred parachutes are operating next to an active runway at an airport, the pwred parachutes will have aircraft passing by them at various altitudes off the runway. During a low approach to runway 23, an aircraft that was on unicom stated he was going to use runway 5 to land. I communicated with the aircraft on unicom and stated we will do a left turn and circle back allowing him time to land on runway 5. At this time I turned left around the pwred parachute field maintaining a safe distance. The aircraft landg runway 5 told me 'he had me in sight' and I told them 'we had them in sight.' the pwred parachutes operate without communications on unicom 122.80. They do not communicate with the aircraft that are in the pattern, therefore they have no idea of aircraft intentions. The pwred parachutes operating at the airport next to an active runway also do not have any idea of the aircraft patterns or practice maneuvers. I think a different location on the airport if possible would be a better, safer, operation than next to an active runway without communications. Have a pattern for the pwred parachutes to follow. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that this operation has the potential for a conflict with aircraft making a circle to land approach off the runway 23 VOR approach using azo VOR. The missed approach procedure also calls for a left turn that, at about 500 ft AGL, would conflict with ultra light vehicles near that altitude. He understands the operators' attitude about operating there, but did not understand their attitude when they complained of GA aircraft operating within 'their airspace.' reporter suggests that their operation be moved to a different part of the airport so as not to conflict with the normal traffic pattern procedures and any related instrument approach procedures. He stated that the local airport manager had issued some local instructions for these operations that call for a departure to the northeast, impacting on traffic using the go around end of runway 23. One of the GA pilots did contact the local FSDO at sbn, who sent some forms to fill out. The michigan civil authorities were also notified. It isn't known what level of monitoring they are doing regarding the operations. The power parachutes have been operating since fall, last year.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A C150 INSTR PLT COMPLAINS OF PWR PARACHUTE ACTIVITY IN PROXIMITY OF GA OPS AT A NON TWR ARPT THAT MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO THE OPS OF PART 91 ACFT NEAR HAI, MI.
Narrative: THE SITUATION HAPPENED AT SUNSET AT THREE RIVERS ARPT (HAI). THE WINDS AT THE TIME WERE LIGHT AND VARIABLE. THERE WERE PWRED PARACHUTES OPERATING ON THE E SIDE OF THE APCH END OF RWY 5/23. THERE WAS NOT A NOTAM ISSUED ABOUT THESE OPS. PRACTICE CIRCLE TO LAND AND ENGINE OUT PROCEDURES OVER THE ARPT (HAI) IN THE C-150 WHILE IN SAFE PROXIMITY TO POWERED PARACHUTES OPERATING SEEMED TO HAVE CAUSED A MISCONCEPTION OF THE PWRED PARACHUTES, THAT A SAFE DISTANCE FROM THEM WAS NOT KEPT. IF THE PWRED PARACHUTES ARE OPERATING NEXT TO AN ACTIVE RWY AT AN ARPT, THE PWRED PARACHUTES WILL HAVE ACFT PASSING BY THEM AT VARIOUS ALTITUDES OFF THE RWY. DURING A LOW APCH TO RWY 23, AN ACFT THAT WAS ON UNICOM STATED HE WAS GOING TO USE RWY 5 TO LAND. I COMMUNICATED WITH THE ACFT ON UNICOM AND STATED WE WILL DO A LEFT TURN AND CIRCLE BACK ALLOWING HIM TIME TO LAND ON RWY 5. AT THIS TIME I TURNED LEFT AROUND THE PWRED PARACHUTE FIELD MAINTAINING A SAFE DISTANCE. THE ACFT LANDG RWY 5 TOLD ME 'HE HAD ME IN SIGHT' AND I TOLD THEM 'WE HAD THEM IN SIGHT.' THE PWRED PARACHUTES OPERATE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS ON UNICOM 122.80. THEY DO NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE ACFT THAT ARE IN THE PATTERN, THEREFORE THEY HAVE NO IDEA OF ACFT INTENTIONS. THE PWRED PARACHUTES OPERATING AT THE ARPT NEXT TO AN ACTIVE RWY ALSO DO NOT HAVE ANY IDEA OF THE ACFT PATTERNS OR PRACTICE MANEUVERS. I THINK A DIFFERENT LOCATION ON THE ARPT IF POSSIBLE WOULD BE A BETTER, SAFER, OPERATION THAN NEXT TO AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS. HAVE A PATTERN FOR THE PWRED PARACHUTES TO FOLLOW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THIS OPERATION HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR A CONFLICT WITH ACFT MAKING A CIRCLE TO LAND APCH OFF THE RWY 23 VOR APCH USING AZO VOR. THE MISSED APCH PROC ALSO CALLS FOR A LEFT TURN THAT, AT ABOUT 500 FT AGL, WOULD CONFLICT WITH ULTRA LIGHT VEHICLES NEAR THAT ALTITUDE. HE UNDERSTANDS THE OPERATORS' ATTITUDE ABOUT OPERATING THERE, BUT DID NOT UNDERSTAND THEIR ATTITUDE WHEN THEY COMPLAINED OF GA ACFT OPERATING WITHIN 'THEIR AIRSPACE.' RPTR SUGGESTS THAT THEIR OPERATION BE MOVED TO A DIFFERENT PART OF THE ARPT SO AS NOT TO CONFLICT WITH THE NORMAL TFC PATTERN PROCS AND ANY RELATED INSTRUMENT APCH PROCS. HE STATED THAT THE LOCAL ARPT MGR HAD ISSUED SOME LOCAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THESE OPS THAT CALL FOR A DEP TO THE NE, IMPACTING ON TFC USING THE GAR END OF RWY 23. ONE OF THE GA PLTS DID CONTACT THE LOCAL FSDO AT SBN, WHO SENT SOME FORMS TO FILL OUT. THE MICHIGAN CIVIL AUTHORITIES WERE ALSO NOTIFIED. IT ISN'T KNOWN WHAT LEVEL OF MONITORING THEY ARE DOING REGARDING THE OPERATIONS. THE PWR PARACHUTES HAVE BEEN OPERATING SINCE FALL, LAST YEAR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.