Narrative:

After the completion of the closeout checklist, the captain told me to plan on starting 1 engine for a single engine taxi, in order to save fuel. After receiving the signal from the marshall that it was all clear to start, the captain commanded the start. I started the right engine after I completed the before start checklist. Then, along with captain, we completed the after start checklist. I explained to the captain that the right engine was started. He acknowledged and advised me to still plan on a single engine taxi. The marshall cleared us to taxi away from the gate on the ramp. Captain called 'cleared left,' then asked, 'cleared right?' I turned my head to the right and visually confirmed that the aircraft was clear of all obstacles and personnel and called out 'cleared right.' throughout the entire turn, I kept my eyes and attention outside of the aircraft in order to be in a continuous position to keep the aircraft cleared right. After the completion of the turn to the right, I contacted ground and received a clearance to taxi to runway 23. During the entire taxi from the gate to the runway we were never given any signals, nor was it ever communicated to the crew that there had been a situation. This situation could have been avoided if the aircraft was pushed off the gate by a tug, rather than being required taxi from the gate under its own power. The proximity of the engine to the jetbridge is too close to ensure enough clearance from the jetblast even with 2 engines.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PIC OF A CL65 PERFORMS A R TURNOUT FROM THE GATE WITH ONLY #2 ENG RUNNING AND DAMAGES THE JETWAY BRIDGE WITH JETBLAST AT BUF, NY.

Narrative: AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE CLOSEOUT CHKLIST, THE CAPT TOLD ME TO PLAN ON STARTING 1 ENG FOR A SINGLE ENG TAXI, IN ORDER TO SAVE FUEL. AFTER RECEIVING THE SIGNAL FROM THE MARSHALL THAT IT WAS ALL CLR TO START, THE CAPT COMMANDED THE START. I STARTED THE R ENG AFTER I COMPLETED THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. THEN, ALONG WITH CAPT, WE COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHKLIST. I EXPLAINED TO THE CAPT THAT THE R ENG WAS STARTED. HE ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADVISED ME TO STILL PLAN ON A SINGLE ENG TAXI. THE MARSHALL CLRED US TO TAXI AWAY FROM THE GATE ON THE RAMP. CAPT CALLED 'CLRED L,' THEN ASKED, 'CLRED R?' I TURNED MY HEAD TO THE R AND VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE ACFT WAS CLR OF ALL OBSTACLES AND PERSONNEL AND CALLED OUT 'CLRED R.' THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE TURN, I KEPT MY EYES AND ATTN OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT IN ORDER TO BE IN A CONTINUOUS POS TO KEEP THE ACFT CLRED R. AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE TURN TO THE R, I CONTACTED GND AND RECEIVED A CLRNC TO TAXI TO RWY 23. DURING THE ENTIRE TAXI FROM THE GATE TO THE RWY WE WERE NEVER GIVEN ANY SIGNALS, NOR WAS IT EVER COMMUNICATED TO THE CREW THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SIT. THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE ACFT WAS PUSHED OFF THE GATE BY A TUG, RATHER THAN BEING REQUIRED TAXI FROM THE GATE UNDER ITS OWN PWR. THE PROX OF THE ENG TO THE JETBRIDGE IS TOO CLOSE TO ENSURE ENOUGH CLRNC FROM THE JETBLAST EVEN WITH 2 ENGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.