Narrative:

As a very current and experienced skydiving pilot for commercial skydiving operations, my biggest fear is a midair collision, and on this day it almost happened. It was a typical beautiful florida morning with scattered cumulus clouds with bases at about 3000 ft. After a normal climb, jump run, and beginning of descent, I asked for a frequency change from dab approach as I descended through about 9000 ft. By the time the communication was completed and I hit the switch, I was through about 7000 ft. A normal climb to 13500 ft takes me about 11-12 mins, and a normal descent from 13500 ft takes me 3-4 mins to touch down. I had started my descent directly above ded and then turned just slightly north of the airport to stay clear of my jumpers and enter left traffic for runway 12 at deland. On all my normal dscnts, I do 1 big left turn to keep an eye on my jumpers and look for traffic, and then enter the pattern and land. As I went through about 3000 ft I saw an MD80, who obviously saw me to, at very close range. I was indicating 140 KTS and he was probably indicating 180-200 KTS, and the rate of closure was the fastest I have seen in my career. He was rolling out of a left turn probably through about a 130 degree heading, and I was rolling out of a left turn through about a 300 degree heading. We both increased our turns to the left and I pushed my nose down while he pulled his nose up and appeared to add full power. I later learned that he actually added too much power and may have damaged an engine. It is certainly possible that both of our evasive maneuvers were required to avoid a collision, because we still came extremely close! A friend of mine, who is a professional skydiver but not a pilot, reported that the MD80 maneuvered very aggressively (he happened to be a passenger on that flight). The biggest causes of this near disaster were that ATC vectored the MD80 practically through an active drop zone, which they are allowed to do and sometimes have done in the past, and then failing to notify either aircraft that this had been done. According to someone at dab approach, the controller working me made a judgement call when he gave me the frequency change that there was no need to inform me of the MD80. Dab apparently tried in vain to talk to the air carrier pilot as I descended toward him, but the frequency he was on was being tied up by a long transmission from a lost training aircraft. Always a combination of factors, right? All sorts of nonproductive finger-pointing could be done, including that the air carrier pilot should have checked NOTAMS and been aware of the drop zone, but on the positive side, a combination of TCASII and the see and avoid concept saved us. I would venture to say that the MD80's working TCASII system gets the most credit for breaking the chain of events. How to prevent this problem: there is no reason to ever vector an IFR flight, especially an air carrier flight, through our legally open and notamed drop zone. If ever a flight is going to be vectored through, then both the jump aircraft and the IFR aircraft should be notified well in advance. I bet there is not a captain out there who would even consider accepting a heading that would take him anywhere near an active drop zone. We need to work with ATC to increase safety by developing procedures to avoid overflts of ded by IFR aircraft in VFR conditions while skydiving is in progress.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF A SKYDIVER DEHAVILLAND TWIN OTTER, DHC6, TOOK EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID AN ONCOMING MD80 WHILE DSNDING THROUGH 3000 FT MSL OVER DED UNCTLED ARPT. THE MD80 FLC ALSO TOOK EVASIVE ACTION AFTER BEING ALERTED BY TCASII AND VISUAL SIGHTING OF THE SKYDIVER ACFT.

Narrative: AS A VERY CURRENT AND EXPERIENCED SKYDIVING PLT FOR COMMERCIAL SKYDIVING OPS, MY BIGGEST FEAR IS A MIDAIR COLLISION, AND ON THIS DAY IT ALMOST HAPPENED. IT WAS A TYPICAL BEAUTIFUL FLORIDA MORNING WITH SCATTERED CUMULUS CLOUDS WITH BASES AT ABOUT 3000 FT. AFTER A NORMAL CLB, JUMP RUN, AND BEGINNING OF DSCNT, I ASKED FOR A FREQ CHANGE FROM DAB APCH AS I DSNDED THROUGH ABOUT 9000 FT. BY THE TIME THE COM WAS COMPLETED AND I HIT THE SWITCH, I WAS THROUGH ABOUT 7000 FT. A NORMAL CLB TO 13500 FT TAKES ME ABOUT 11-12 MINS, AND A NORMAL DSCNT FROM 13500 FT TAKES ME 3-4 MINS TO TOUCH DOWN. I HAD STARTED MY DSCNT DIRECTLY ABOVE DED AND THEN TURNED JUST SLIGHTLY N OF THE ARPT TO STAY CLR OF MY JUMPERS AND ENTER L TFC FOR RWY 12 AT DELAND. ON ALL MY NORMAL DSCNTS, I DO 1 BIG L TURN TO KEEP AN EYE ON MY JUMPERS AND LOOK FOR TFC, AND THEN ENTER THE PATTERN AND LAND. AS I WENT THROUGH ABOUT 3000 FT I SAW AN MD80, WHO OBVIOUSLY SAW ME TO, AT VERY CLOSE RANGE. I WAS INDICATING 140 KTS AND HE WAS PROBABLY INDICATING 180-200 KTS, AND THE RATE OF CLOSURE WAS THE FASTEST I HAVE SEEN IN MY CAREER. HE WAS ROLLING OUT OF A L TURN PROBABLY THROUGH ABOUT A 130 DEG HDG, AND I WAS ROLLING OUT OF A L TURN THROUGH ABOUT A 300 DEG HDG. WE BOTH INCREASED OUR TURNS TO THE L AND I PUSHED MY NOSE DOWN WHILE HE PULLED HIS NOSE UP AND APPEARED TO ADD FULL PWR. I LATER LEARNED THAT HE ACTUALLY ADDED TOO MUCH PWR AND MAY HAVE DAMAGED AN ENG. IT IS CERTAINLY POSSIBLE THAT BOTH OF OUR EVASIVE MANEUVERS WERE REQUIRED TO AVOID A COLLISION, BECAUSE WE STILL CAME EXTREMELY CLOSE! A FRIEND OF MINE, WHO IS A PROFESSIONAL SKYDIVER BUT NOT A PLT, RPTED THAT THE MD80 MANEUVERED VERY AGGRESSIVELY (HE HAPPENED TO BE A PAX ON THAT FLT). THE BIGGEST CAUSES OF THIS NEAR DISASTER WERE THAT ATC VECTORED THE MD80 PRACTICALLY THROUGH AN ACTIVE DROP ZONE, WHICH THEY ARE ALLOWED TO DO AND SOMETIMES HAVE DONE IN THE PAST, AND THEN FAILING TO NOTIFY EITHER ACFT THAT THIS HAD BEEN DONE. ACCORDING TO SOMEONE AT DAB APCH, THE CTLR WORKING ME MADE A JUDGEMENT CALL WHEN HE GAVE ME THE FREQ CHANGE THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO INFORM ME OF THE MD80. DAB APPARENTLY TRIED IN VAIN TO TALK TO THE ACR PLT AS I DSNDED TOWARD HIM, BUT THE FREQ HE WAS ON WAS BEING TIED UP BY A LONG XMISSION FROM A LOST TRAINING ACFT. ALWAYS A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, RIGHT? ALL SORTS OF NONPRODUCTIVE FINGER-POINTING COULD BE DONE, INCLUDING THAT THE ACR PLT SHOULD HAVE CHKED NOTAMS AND BEEN AWARE OF THE DROP ZONE, BUT ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, A COMBINATION OF TCASII AND THE SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT SAVED US. I WOULD VENTURE TO SAY THAT THE MD80'S WORKING TCASII SYS GETS THE MOST CREDIT FOR BREAKING THE CHAIN OF EVENTS. HOW TO PREVENT THIS PROB: THERE IS NO REASON TO EVER VECTOR AN IFR FLT, ESPECIALLY AN ACR FLT, THROUGH OUR LEGALLY OPEN AND NOTAMED DROP ZONE. IF EVER A FLT IS GOING TO BE VECTORED THROUGH, THEN BOTH THE JUMP ACFT AND THE IFR ACFT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED WELL IN ADVANCE. I BET THERE IS NOT A CAPT OUT THERE WHO WOULD EVEN CONSIDER ACCEPTING A HDG THAT WOULD TAKE HIM ANYWHERE NEAR AN ACTIVE DROP ZONE. WE NEED TO WORK WITH ATC TO INCREASE SAFETY BY DEVELOPING PROCS TO AVOID OVERFLTS OF DED BY IFR ACFT IN VFR CONDITIONS WHILE SKYDIVING IS IN PROGRESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.