Narrative:

On approach to lax via pdz 4 and ILS runway 25L. At approximately 4000 ft AGL, tower asked us to change to runway 25R and we were cleared for a visual approach to runway 25R. When we changed to lax tower, voice traffic was heavy. Heard an air carrier Y cleared into position on runway 25R. An air carrier Z aircraft on approach to runway 25L had several xmissions attempting to confirm his landing clearance. We checked in with tower at the first opportunity. Tower told us to slow to minimum approach speed. Air carrier Y was cleared for takeoff. Situation already appeared marginal. (It seemed that air carrier Y had been cleared into position when we were quite close in, setting up a bad situation.) it was apparent in the cockpit a go around was imminent. Tower asked air carrier Y if he was rolling. He had either just begun or then began his takeoff roll. We were at about 200 ft AGL and began a go around while trying to maintain a visual on air carrier Y. Tower then commanded a go around, but gave no heading instructions. The first officer was maintaining a visual on air carrier X and directed a left turn as he was climbing into our flight path. Tower then gave us a 230 degree heading. The first officer directed a hard left to 210 degrees to avoid air carrier Y. After conflict was clear, we came back to 230 degrees and then flew vectors back around. Approach turned us in for runway 25L (changing a B767 over to runway 25R) and called his position to us. We acknowledged him in sight. Approach directed us to maintain visual and cleared us for a visual to runway 25L (we were at 3000 ft, 180 KTS and well above GS). There was a cloud deck between us and the airport (WX had worsened since previous approach). We declared that we were unable to maintain visual and requested ILS clearance. Approach told us to slow to 160 KTS and questioned our refusal of a visual (another aircraft had said they could only see the lights of the plane he was following through the clouds). Finally approach claimed to be unaware of deteriorating conditions, then said we didn't have adequate spacing if we wouldn't accept a visual and turned us off the approach. Overall poor performance and situational awareness by approach and tower was compounded by a slow takeoff roll by air carrier Y (first approach). Without crew initiatives and excellent input from first officer, who provided direction and left me free to execute, this could have been an accident investigation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BTWN A LOCKHEED L1011-500 DURING GAR AND AN ACR TURBOPROP ON INITIAL CLBOUT AFTER TKOF DUE TO TWR CTLR RELEASING THE TURBOPROP TOO LATE WHEN THE L1011 WAS ON SHORT FINAL.

Narrative: ON APCH TO LAX VIA PDZ 4 AND ILS RWY 25L. AT APPROX 4000 FT AGL, TWR ASKED US TO CHANGE TO RWY 25R AND WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25R. WHEN WE CHANGED TO LAX TWR, VOICE TFC WAS HVY. HEARD AN ACR Y CLRED INTO POS ON RWY 25R. AN ACR Z ACFT ON APCH TO RWY 25L HAD SEVERAL XMISSIONS ATTEMPTING TO CONFIRM HIS LNDG CLRNC. WE CHKED IN WITH TWR AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY. TWR TOLD US TO SLOW TO MINIMUM APCH SPD. ACR Y WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. SIT ALREADY APPEARED MARGINAL. (IT SEEMED THAT ACR Y HAD BEEN CLRED INTO POS WHEN WE WERE QUITE CLOSE IN, SETTING UP A BAD SIT.) IT WAS APPARENT IN THE COCKPIT A GAR WAS IMMINENT. TWR ASKED ACR Y IF HE WAS ROLLING. HE HAD EITHER JUST BEGUN OR THEN BEGAN HIS TKOF ROLL. WE WERE AT ABOUT 200 FT AGL AND BEGAN A GAR WHILE TRYING TO MAINTAIN A VISUAL ON ACR Y. TWR THEN COMMANDED A GAR, BUT GAVE NO HDG INSTRUCTIONS. THE FO WAS MAINTAINING A VISUAL ON ACR X AND DIRECTED A L TURN AS HE WAS CLBING INTO OUR FLT PATH. TWR THEN GAVE US A 230 DEG HDG. THE FO DIRECTED A HARD L TO 210 DEGS TO AVOID ACR Y. AFTER CONFLICT WAS CLR, WE CAME BACK TO 230 DEGS AND THEN FLEW VECTORS BACK AROUND. APCH TURNED US IN FOR RWY 25L (CHANGING A B767 OVER TO RWY 25R) AND CALLED HIS POS TO US. WE ACKNOWLEDGED HIM IN SIGHT. APCH DIRECTED US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL AND CLRED US FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 25L (WE WERE AT 3000 FT, 180 KTS AND WELL ABOVE GS). THERE WAS A CLOUD DECK BTWN US AND THE ARPT (WX HAD WORSENED SINCE PREVIOUS APCH). WE DECLARED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL AND REQUESTED ILS CLRNC. APCH TOLD US TO SLOW TO 160 KTS AND QUESTIONED OUR REFUSAL OF A VISUAL (ANOTHER ACFT HAD SAID THEY COULD ONLY SEE THE LIGHTS OF THE PLANE HE WAS FOLLOWING THROUGH THE CLOUDS). FINALLY APCH CLAIMED TO BE UNAWARE OF DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, THEN SAID WE DIDN'T HAVE ADEQUATE SPACING IF WE WOULDN'T ACCEPT A VISUAL AND TURNED US OFF THE APCH. OVERALL POOR PERFORMANCE AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BY APCH AND TWR WAS COMPOUNDED BY A SLOW TKOF ROLL BY ACR Y (FIRST APCH). WITHOUT CREW INITIATIVES AND EXCELLENT INPUT FROM FO, WHO PROVIDED DIRECTION AND LEFT ME FREE TO EXECUTE, THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.