Narrative:

There were thunderstorms all around the dallas/fort worth area with more intense WX to the west of dallas. My first officer informed me that there was a back up on clearance and that we were #3 and to expect a rerte to the north. The operations agent arrived with the load sheet and closed the main cabin door at the same time the clearance came through. We pushed from the gate and taxied to runway 13R. At the completion of the pretkof checklist, the first officer and I discussed the rerte. This entailed flying north on the texoma 7 departure with the irw transition. We were stopped at the runway end and I pulled the SID and started to review the procedure. But I was concerned with the additional fuel burn and put in a call to dispatch. We initially had an alternate of abq and an additional fuel burn calculation of 3800 pounds because of the rerte. Dispatch came on immediately and after a short discussion, we came to the consensus that ama could serve best as our new alternate because of a much less alternate fuel burn. This would permit us to leave with fuel on board. The tower called our flight giving us clearance for immediate takeoff, as there was company traffic on a 3 mi final. I glanced quickly again at the SID and my eyes focused on the procedure for runway 31L/right instead of runway 13L/right which required a right turn at 5.5 DME. The WX radar was operating on the takeoff roll with a number of cells 6-8 mi off the end of the runway. A normal takeoff and climb through 1000 ft was executed. We contacted departure and were cleared to 8000 ft. At 5.5 DME I initiated a right 30 degree bank turn toward 360 degrees. I turned with haste because of WX at 12-1 O'clock position that I wanted to get inside of. At this point, my first officer and I asked the same question -- 'why are we turning to the right?' I immediately stopped the turn when I realized that a runway heading was to be maintained, and came back to the left around the cell without hesitation. As we were almost back to runway heading, the controller directed us left to a heading of 350 degrees. In the same breath he asked, 'what are you guys doing?' we immediately apologized for the deviation and advised him of the WX avoidance. He was extremely agitated and told us that he should clear any deviation for WX first. We again apologized. Upon the turn we were able to avoid the cell, which was directly in our path anyway and was a contributing factor in reinforcing my thinking that a right turn on the SID was going to help me avoid the WX. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. I can only surmise that the changing flight plan, fuel considerations, WX and the expeditious manner in which we departed dallas contributed to my mental errors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 FLC TURNS THE WRONG DIRECTION WHEN THE PIC, PF, MISREADS THE SID CHART SE OF DAL, TX.

Narrative: THERE WERE TSTMS ALL AROUND THE DALLAS/FORT WORTH AREA WITH MORE INTENSE WX TO THE W OF DALLAS. MY FO INFORMED ME THAT THERE WAS A BACK UP ON CLRNC AND THAT WE WERE #3 AND TO EXPECT A RERTE TO THE N. THE OPS AGENT ARRIVED WITH THE LOAD SHEET AND CLOSED THE MAIN CABIN DOOR AT THE SAME TIME THE CLRNC CAME THROUGH. WE PUSHED FROM THE GATE AND TAXIED TO RWY 13R. AT THE COMPLETION OF THE PRETKOF CHKLIST, THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE RERTE. THIS ENTAILED FLYING N ON THE TEXOMA 7 DEP WITH THE IRW TRANSITION. WE WERE STOPPED AT THE RWY END AND I PULLED THE SID AND STARTED TO REVIEW THE PROC. BUT I WAS CONCERNED WITH THE ADDITIONAL FUEL BURN AND PUT IN A CALL TO DISPATCH. WE INITIALLY HAD AN ALTERNATE OF ABQ AND AN ADDITIONAL FUEL BURN CALCULATION OF 3800 LBS BECAUSE OF THE RERTE. DISPATCH CAME ON IMMEDIATELY AND AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION, WE CAME TO THE CONSENSUS THAT AMA COULD SERVE BEST AS OUR NEW ALTERNATE BECAUSE OF A MUCH LESS ALTERNATE FUEL BURN. THIS WOULD PERMIT US TO LEAVE WITH FUEL ON BOARD. THE TWR CALLED OUR FLT GIVING US CLRNC FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF, AS THERE WAS COMPANY TFC ON A 3 MI FINAL. I GLANCED QUICKLY AGAIN AT THE SID AND MY EYES FOCUSED ON THE PROC FOR RWY 31L/R INSTEAD OF RWY 13L/R WHICH REQUIRED A R TURN AT 5.5 DME. THE WX RADAR WAS OPERATING ON THE TKOF ROLL WITH A NUMBER OF CELLS 6-8 MI OFF THE END OF THE RWY. A NORMAL TKOF AND CLB THROUGH 1000 FT WAS EXECUTED. WE CONTACTED DEP AND WERE CLRED TO 8000 FT. AT 5.5 DME I INITIATED A R 30 DEG BANK TURN TOWARD 360 DEGS. I TURNED WITH HASTE BECAUSE OF WX AT 12-1 O'CLOCK POS THAT I WANTED TO GET INSIDE OF. AT THIS POINT, MY FO AND I ASKED THE SAME QUESTION -- 'WHY ARE WE TURNING TO THE R?' I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE TURN WHEN I REALIZED THAT A RWY HDG WAS TO BE MAINTAINED, AND CAME BACK TO THE L AROUND THE CELL WITHOUT HESITATION. AS WE WERE ALMOST BACK TO RWY HDG, THE CTLR DIRECTED US L TO A HDG OF 350 DEGS. IN THE SAME BREATH HE ASKED, 'WHAT ARE YOU GUYS DOING?' WE IMMEDIATELY APOLOGIZED FOR THE DEV AND ADVISED HIM OF THE WX AVOIDANCE. HE WAS EXTREMELY AGITATED AND TOLD US THAT HE SHOULD CLR ANY DEV FOR WX FIRST. WE AGAIN APOLOGIZED. UPON THE TURN WE WERE ABLE TO AVOID THE CELL, WHICH WAS DIRECTLY IN OUR PATH ANYWAY AND WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN REINFORCING MY THINKING THAT A R TURN ON THE SID WAS GOING TO HELP ME AVOID THE WX. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. I CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT THE CHANGING FLT PLAN, FUEL CONSIDERATIONS, WX AND THE EXPEDITIOUS MANNER IN WHICH WE DEPARTED DALLAS CONTRIBUTED TO MY MENTAL ERRORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.