Narrative:

After approach and landing on runway 30R stl, I was unable to bring the aircraft to a stop on the runway. The landing was normal. Touchdown occurred well within the landing zone approximately 1500 ft down the 9003 ft runway. My reference speed was 129 KTS and my airspeed on touchdown was approximately 5-6 KTS higher than that, per SOP. With the nosewheel on the runway I applied 1.3 EPR reverse thrust. Just below 100 KTS I began to apply light braking. At 80 KTS I began to reduce my reverse thrust application while applying more brakes. The braking action was good. At 60 KTS, I brought the thrust levers fully out of reverse while continuing to apply brakes. The tower asked me to expedite to the end of the runway and exit onto runway 24. I proceeded toward the end of runway 30R but in no way did I expedite. Upon approaching the last 2000 ft to 1000 ft of runway 30R, the braking action became nil. I was unable to slow the aircraft at all and proceeded off the departure end of the runway. I believe that an excessive build-up of rubber on the runway surface, caused by landing traffic when runway 12L is in use, coupled with the wet conditions, caused the braking action of the runway to quickly go from good to nil. I had no expectations or intuition that I would experience different braking action in the last 1/3 of the runway than I had in the first 2/3. My speed approaching the last 1/3 of the runway was not excessive for the conditions I had encountered throughout the landing and deceleration phase -- well under 60 KTS in any case. However, with braking action nil in the landing area of runway 12L, plus an overrun area which is lower than the adjacent pavement filled with water, I was unable to stop the aircraft. The airport authority/authorized had began cleaning the rubber build-up from the runway surfaces but had yet to begin the removal from the landing area of runway 12L. A NOTAM or bulletin regarding the runway condition and how it might affect braking conditions on different parts of the runway would have been helpful. Supplemental information from acn 488935: normal braking was experienced. Due to the wet runway, the captain opted not to use the high speed exit (P1) and roll out to another farther down. Passing P1, tower advised us to 'expedite to the end' and exit on runway 24. At no time did the captain excessively delay braking or allow excessive speed to expedite exiting the runway. When the captain applied brakes, the aircraft showed no signs of brake effectiveness. The captain applied some reverse thrust and seeing that departure was a possibility, turned to the left in an attempt to miss structures straight ahead and to keep the aircraft on runway 24. I immediately prepared to run the emergency evacuate/evacuation checklist. The captain had the jump seater open the cockpit door and communication with the L1 flight attendant to assess the general situation and determine the need for an emergency evacuate/evacuation. Simultaneously, I communicated with ATC that the aircraft was off the prepared surface. I moved flaps to 28 degrees and ensured the spoilers were retracted in accordance with the emergency evacuate/evacuation checklist. A discrete frequency was coordinated with ground control to talk to the rescue teams if need be. The captain had to yell out his window to communicate with rescue as they do not have headsets to plug into the aircraft and talk with the crew. Once the captain determined with crew members in back and rescue outside, that an emergency evacuate/evacuation was not required, the people were calm and seated, and there was no danger, the APU was started and engines shut down. At captain's direction, I coordinated with company and ATC to have the passenger bussed back to the terminal. A normal egress through the rear airstair door was performed with the aid of rescue. Supplemental information from acn 488780: during rollout, only minimal reverse thrust was used. I believe the situation could have been avoided 2 ways: 1) had the captain used normal reverse thrust and braking, we could have made the high speed taxiway or taxiway B. 2) I felt that the tower controller contributed to the problem by asking the captain to expedite to the end. I don't think it is a good idea to go quickly toward the end of a runway. Stl crash fire rescue equipment does not carry any headsets. This really needs to be changed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD82 FLT SLIDES OFF THE DEP END OF RWY 30R WHEN THE PIC IS UNABLE TO STOP THE ACFT DURING THE LAST 2000 FT OF ROLLOUT DUE TO RUBBER DEPOSITS ON A SET RWY AT STL, MO.

Narrative: AFTER APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 30R STL, I WAS UNABLE TO BRING THE ACFT TO A STOP ON THE RWY. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL. TOUCHDOWN OCCURRED WELL WITHIN THE LNDG ZONE APPROX 1500 FT DOWN THE 9003 FT RWY. MY REF SPD WAS 129 KTS AND MY AIRSPD ON TOUCHDOWN WAS APPROX 5-6 KTS HIGHER THAN THAT, PER SOP. WITH THE NOSEWHEEL ON THE RWY I APPLIED 1.3 EPR REVERSE THRUST. JUST BELOW 100 KTS I BEGAN TO APPLY LIGHT BRAKING. AT 80 KTS I BEGAN TO REDUCE MY REVERSE THRUST APPLICATION WHILE APPLYING MORE BRAKES. THE BRAKING ACTION WAS GOOD. AT 60 KTS, I BROUGHT THE THRUST LEVERS FULLY OUT OF REVERSE WHILE CONTINUING TO APPLY BRAKES. THE TWR ASKED ME TO EXPEDITE TO THE END OF THE RWY AND EXIT ONTO RWY 24. I PROCEEDED TOWARD THE END OF RWY 30R BUT IN NO WAY DID I EXPEDITE. UPON APCHING THE LAST 2000 FT TO 1000 FT OF RWY 30R, THE BRAKING ACTION BECAME NIL. I WAS UNABLE TO SLOW THE ACFT AT ALL AND PROCEEDED OFF THE DEP END OF THE RWY. I BELIEVE THAT AN EXCESSIVE BUILD-UP OF RUBBER ON THE RWY SURFACE, CAUSED BY LNDG TFC WHEN RWY 12L IS IN USE, COUPLED WITH THE WET CONDITIONS, CAUSED THE BRAKING ACTION OF THE RWY TO QUICKLY GO FROM GOOD TO NIL. I HAD NO EXPECTATIONS OR INTUITION THAT I WOULD EXPERIENCE DIFFERENT BRAKING ACTION IN THE LAST 1/3 OF THE RWY THAN I HAD IN THE FIRST 2/3. MY SPD APCHING THE LAST 1/3 OF THE RWY WAS NOT EXCESSIVE FOR THE CONDITIONS I HAD ENCOUNTERED THROUGHOUT THE LNDG AND DECELERATION PHASE -- WELL UNDER 60 KTS IN ANY CASE. HOWEVER, WITH BRAKING ACTION NIL IN THE LNDG AREA OF RWY 12L, PLUS AN OVERRUN AREA WHICH IS LOWER THAN THE ADJACENT PAVEMENT FILLED WITH WATER, I WAS UNABLE TO STOP THE ACFT. THE ARPT AUTH HAD BEGAN CLEANING THE RUBBER BUILD-UP FROM THE RWY SURFACES BUT HAD YET TO BEGIN THE REMOVAL FROM THE LNDG AREA OF RWY 12L. A NOTAM OR BULLETIN REGARDING THE RWY CONDITION AND HOW IT MIGHT AFFECT BRAKING CONDITIONS ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE RWY WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 488935: NORMAL BRAKING WAS EXPERIENCED. DUE TO THE WET RWY, THE CAPT OPTED NOT TO USE THE HIGH SPD EXIT (P1) AND ROLL OUT TO ANOTHER FARTHER DOWN. PASSING P1, TWR ADVISED US TO 'EXPEDITE TO THE END' AND EXIT ON RWY 24. AT NO TIME DID THE CAPT EXCESSIVELY DELAY BRAKING OR ALLOW EXCESSIVE SPD TO EXPEDITE EXITING THE RWY. WHEN THE CAPT APPLIED BRAKES, THE ACFT SHOWED NO SIGNS OF BRAKE EFFECTIVENESS. THE CAPT APPLIED SOME REVERSE THRUST AND SEEING THAT DEP WAS A POSSIBILITY, TURNED TO THE L IN AN ATTEMPT TO MISS STRUCTURES STRAIGHT AHEAD AND TO KEEP THE ACFT ON RWY 24. I IMMEDIATELY PREPARED TO RUN THE EMER EVAC CHKLIST. THE CAPT HAD THE JUMP SEATER OPEN THE COCKPIT DOOR AND COM WITH THE L1 FLT ATTENDANT TO ASSESS THE GENERAL SIT AND DETERMINE THE NEED FOR AN EMER EVAC. SIMULTANEOUSLY, I COMMUNICATED WITH ATC THAT THE ACFT WAS OFF THE PREPARED SURFACE. I MOVED FLAPS TO 28 DEGS AND ENSURED THE SPOILERS WERE RETRACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EMER EVAC CHKLIST. A DISCRETE FREQ WAS COORDINATED WITH GND CTL TO TALK TO THE RESCUE TEAMS IF NEED BE. THE CAPT HAD TO YELL OUT HIS WINDOW TO COMMUNICATE WITH RESCUE AS THEY DO NOT HAVE HEADSETS TO PLUG INTO THE ACFT AND TALK WITH THE CREW. ONCE THE CAPT DETERMINED WITH CREW MEMBERS IN BACK AND RESCUE OUTSIDE, THAT AN EMER EVAC WAS NOT REQUIRED, THE PEOPLE WERE CALM AND SEATED, AND THERE WAS NO DANGER, THE APU WAS STARTED AND ENGS SHUT DOWN. AT CAPT'S DIRECTION, I COORDINATED WITH COMPANY AND ATC TO HAVE THE PAX BUSSED BACK TO THE TERMINAL. A NORMAL EGRESS THROUGH THE REAR AIRSTAIR DOOR WAS PERFORMED WITH THE AID OF RESCUE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 488780: DURING ROLLOUT, ONLY MINIMAL REVERSE THRUST WAS USED. I BELIEVE THE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED 2 WAYS: 1) HAD THE CAPT USED NORMAL REVERSE THRUST AND BRAKING, WE COULD HAVE MADE THE HIGH SPD TXWY OR TXWY B. 2) I FELT THAT THE TWR CTLR CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB BY ASKING THE CAPT TO EXPEDITE TO THE END. I DON'T THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO GO QUICKLY TOWARD THE END OF A RWY. STL CFR DOES NOT CARRY ANY HEADSETS. THIS REALLY NEEDS TO BE CHANGED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.