Narrative:

I was working oma 'rw.' the SF34 (aircraft Y) was a departure off lnk nebound climbing over the oma area. The BA46B (aircraft X) was an arrival to oma from the southwest, moving northeast. ZMP allowed the BA46 to descend to 11000 ft, above the SF34. Lnk called oma 'rw' requesting a pointout on the SF34. At the time, lnk indicated that they were watching the BA46 that 'rw' would be descending into oma, and that the SF34 was stopped at 10000 ft for the traffic. 'Rw' approved the pointout, assuming that 'rw' could descend the BA46 when separation was assured. When the BA46 was clear of the SF34, 'rw' descended the aircraft. 'Rw' then realized that lnk had not used the words 'pointout approved,' and immediately coordinated to ensure that it was approved. The BA46 had already incurred lnk's airspace by the time the pointout was completed. The airspace incursion was declared an operational deviation. No loss of separation between aircraft occurred. I should have clarified the pointout during the initial coordination for the BA46. I had limited knowledge of what ZMP intended to do with these aircraft as I had just assumed the position. 3 facilities were working the aircraft making it a coordination nightmare, and the 2 aircraft should have at least been laterally separated before I talked to them. Significantly better airspace procedures are necessary to reduce the coordination of this common situation. I was not relieved from the position for at least 30 mins after the supervisor was made aware of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: R90 CTLR ENTERS LNK AIRSPACE WITHOUT PROPER COORD. R90 CTLR CONCERNED WITH ZMP LNK R90 AIRSPACE DELEGATION PROCS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING OMA 'RW.' THE SF34 (ACFT Y) WAS A DEP OFF LNK NEBOUND CLBING OVER THE OMA AREA. THE BA46B (ACFT X) WAS AN ARR TO OMA FROM THE SW, MOVING NE. ZMP ALLOWED THE BA46 TO DSND TO 11000 FT, ABOVE THE SF34. LNK CALLED OMA 'RW' REQUESTING A POINTOUT ON THE SF34. AT THE TIME, LNK INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WATCHING THE BA46 THAT 'RW' WOULD BE DSNDING INTO OMA, AND THAT THE SF34 WAS STOPPED AT 10000 FT FOR THE TFC. 'RW' APPROVED THE POINTOUT, ASSUMING THAT 'RW' COULD DSND THE BA46 WHEN SEPARATION WAS ASSURED. WHEN THE BA46 WAS CLR OF THE SF34, 'RW' DSNDED THE ACFT. 'RW' THEN REALIZED THAT LNK HAD NOT USED THE WORDS 'POINTOUT APPROVED,' AND IMMEDIATELY COORDINATED TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS APPROVED. THE BA46 HAD ALREADY INCURRED LNK'S AIRSPACE BY THE TIME THE POINTOUT WAS COMPLETED. THE AIRSPACE INCURSION WAS DECLARED AN OPDEV. NO LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN ACFT OCCURRED. I SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED THE POINTOUT DURING THE INITIAL COORD FOR THE BA46. I HAD LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT ZMP INTENDED TO DO WITH THESE ACFT AS I HAD JUST ASSUMED THE POS. 3 FACILITIES WERE WORKING THE ACFT MAKING IT A COORD NIGHTMARE, AND THE 2 ACFT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST BEEN LATERALLY SEPARATED BEFORE I TALKED TO THEM. SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER AIRSPACE PROCS ARE NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE COORD OF THIS COMMON SIT. I WAS NOT RELIEVED FROM THE POS FOR AT LEAST 30 MINS AFTER THE SUPVR WAS MADE AWARE OF THE SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.