Narrative:

On preflight, the captain didn't load the 'maintain 250 KTS until advised' speed restr into the FMS. As it was not my leg, I asked him about it before making the correction. He paused, then said I could put it in if I wanted to. When I asked him, he said he didn't usually load it, so I let it go at that, thinking it was kind of foolish, but he's the captain. After takeoff, departure cleared us to climb to FL230. As we were cleared to turn right on course, our climb clearance was changed from FL230 to 13000 ft. This all happened at about 10000 ft in the climb. After I'd made the appropriate changes to the flight director, I realized he was passing 280-290 KIAS and approaching 11000 ft. When I asked if we were cleared to accelerate, he said no, and pulled the nose of the airplane up to bleed off the extra speed, establishing a high rate of climb. I quickly called '1000 ft to go,' then because of the high rate of climb, added a '500 ft to go' call, but he still couldn't stop the climb until 13300 ft. Shortly after that the controller cleared us to accelerate to normal speed and later, clearance to continue to climb. The controller never mentioned the altitude deviation. In hindsight, I would go ahead and make the change to the FMS during preflight without asking. I asked out of courtesy, then regretted not just doing it when he didn't want it loaded. Common practice is to put the airspeed restr into the FMS, precluding just what happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ALT OVERSHOOT AND SPD DEV RESULT FROM A LAST MIN ALT CLRNC CHANGE AND PREVIOUS DISREGARD OF FLT MGMNT SYS STANDARD OPERATING PROC.

Narrative: ON PREFLT, THE CAPT DIDN'T LOAD THE 'MAINTAIN 250 KTS UNTIL ADVISED' SPD RESTR INTO THE FMS. AS IT WAS NOT MY LEG, I ASKED HIM ABOUT IT BEFORE MAKING THE CORRECTION. HE PAUSED, THEN SAID I COULD PUT IT IN IF I WANTED TO. WHEN I ASKED HIM, HE SAID HE DIDN'T USUALLY LOAD IT, SO I LET IT GO AT THAT, THINKING IT WAS KIND OF FOOLISH, BUT HE'S THE CAPT. AFTER TKOF, DEP CLRED US TO CLB TO FL230. AS WE WERE CLRED TO TURN R ON COURSE, OUR CLB CLRNC WAS CHANGED FROM FL230 TO 13000 FT. THIS ALL HAPPENED AT ABOUT 10000 FT IN THE CLB. AFTER I'D MADE THE APPROPRIATE CHANGES TO THE FLT DIRECTOR, I REALIZED HE WAS PASSING 280-290 KIAS AND APCHING 11000 FT. WHEN I ASKED IF WE WERE CLRED TO ACCELERATE, HE SAID NO, AND PULLED THE NOSE OF THE AIRPLANE UP TO BLEED OFF THE EXTRA SPD, ESTABLISHING A HIGH RATE OF CLB. I QUICKLY CALLED '1000 FT TO GO,' THEN BECAUSE OF THE HIGH RATE OF CLB, ADDED A '500 FT TO GO' CALL, BUT HE STILL COULDN'T STOP THE CLB UNTIL 13300 FT. SHORTLY AFTER THAT THE CTLR CLRED US TO ACCELERATE TO NORMAL SPD AND LATER, CLRNC TO CONTINUE TO CLB. THE CTLR NEVER MENTIONED THE ALTDEV. IN HINDSIGHT, I WOULD GO AHEAD AND MAKE THE CHANGE TO THE FMS DURING PREFLT WITHOUT ASKING. I ASKED OUT OF COURTESY, THEN REGRETTED NOT JUST DOING IT WHEN HE DIDN'T WANT IT LOADED. COMMON PRACTICE IS TO PUT THE AIRSPD RESTR INTO THE FMS, PRECLUDING JUST WHAT HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.