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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 490080 |
Time | |
Date | 200010 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : stl.airport |
State Reference | MO |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Super 80 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : pushback |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 490080 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
ASRS Report | 490079 |
Events | |
Anomaly | excursion : taxiway non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : pers 3 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted none taken : detected after the fact other |
Consequence | other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
On power back in stl I was momentarily distracted with setting power causing us to go back farther than normal. The first officer and myself were confident we remained on pavement and out of taxi lights. On power back the guideman had his arms to his side twirling with wrist action only at mid chest level. On the come forward signal he had his arms to his side waving with wrist action only at mid chest level. If he would have used more of a full arm motion on the come forward signal it may have helped me realize a little sooner that I missed his transition from power back to come forward. From now on I will make sure I monitor the guideman continuously never looking away per procedure. I will make sure I set power by sound, feel, and outside motion and not by looking inside at EPR gauges. Supplemental information from acn 490312: I was notified by the center manager of a possible taxiway excursion in stl. Apparently in the view of push crew in stl this aircraft left the paved surface on powerback. The issue I'm concerned about is the lack of timely information to the dispatcher and the direction of information flow as it became available. Stl station personnel advised the center manager of this possible situation. Stl station never advised dispatch of this, only soc. The soc manager advised dispatch approximately 10-15 mins prior to scheduled arrival. Safety may have been compromised with this flight if the investigation reveals that his aircraft did indeed leave the paved surface. Without this information until late in the flight left the dispatcher with inadequate information if for instance the captain had called back with an engine indication problem. This would have indicated to the dispatcher if he had the full picture that there very well could be a problem and special attention to an immediate landing would likely have been considered. As of this report time this aircraft has been called OTS for an inspection of the aircraft.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PWR BACK FROM GATE PROC RESULTS IN AN AFTER THE FACT RPT THAT THE ACFT LEFT THE PAVED SURFACE.
Narrative: ON PWR BACK IN STL I WAS MOMENTARILY DISTRACTED WITH SETTING PWR CAUSING US TO GO BACK FARTHER THAN NORMAL. THE FO AND MYSELF WERE CONFIDENT WE REMAINED ON PAVEMENT AND OUT OF TAXI LIGHTS. ON PWR BACK THE GUIDEMAN HAD HIS ARMS TO HIS SIDE TWIRLING WITH WRIST ACTION ONLY AT MID CHEST LEVEL. ON THE COME FORWARD SIGNAL HE HAD HIS ARMS TO HIS SIDE WAVING WITH WRIST ACTION ONLY AT MID CHEST LEVEL. IF HE WOULD HAVE USED MORE OF A FULL ARM MOTION ON THE COME FORWARD SIGNAL IT MAY HAVE HELPED ME REALIZE A LITTLE SOONER THAT I MISSED HIS TRANSITION FROM PWR BACK TO COME FORWARD. FROM NOW ON I WILL MAKE SURE I MONITOR THE GUIDEMAN CONTINUOUSLY NEVER LOOKING AWAY PER PROC. I WILL MAKE SURE I SET PWR BY SOUND, FEEL, AND OUTSIDE MOTION AND NOT BY LOOKING INSIDE AT EPR GAUGES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 490312: I WAS NOTIFIED BY THE CTR MGR OF A POSSIBLE TXWY EXCURSION IN STL. APPARENTLY IN THE VIEW OF PUSH CREW IN STL THIS ACFT LEFT THE PAVED SURFACE ON POWERBACK. THE ISSUE I'M CONCERNED ABOUT IS THE LACK OF TIMELY INFO TO THE DISPATCHER AND THE DIRECTION OF INFO FLOW AS IT BECAME AVAILABLE. STL STATION PERSONNEL ADVISED THE CTR MGR OF THIS POSSIBLE SIT. STL STATION NEVER ADVISED DISPATCH OF THIS, ONLY SOC. THE SOC MGR ADVISED DISPATCH APPROX 10-15 MINS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED ARR. SAFETY MAY HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED WITH THIS FLT IF THE INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT HIS ACFT DID INDEED LEAVE THE PAVED SURFACE. WITHOUT THIS INFO UNTIL LATE IN THE FLT LEFT THE DISPATCHER WITH INADEQUATE INFO IF FOR INSTANCE THE CAPT HAD CALLED BACK WITH AN ENG INDICATION PROB. THIS WOULD HAVE INDICATED TO THE DISPATCHER IF HE HAD THE FULL PICTURE THAT THERE VERY WELL COULD BE A PROB AND SPECIAL ATTN TO AN IMMEDIATE LNDG WOULD LIKELY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. AS OF THIS RPT TIME THIS ACFT HAS BEEN CALLED OTS FOR AN INSPECTION OF THE ACFT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.