Narrative:

I was captain on a B747 cargo flight from anc to lax. Flight conditions were night VMC with 8 mi visibility and few clouds at 1000 ft. Lax ATIS reported ILS approachs to runways 25L and 24R were in use. We started a descent from FL370 on the sadde 6 STAR, with a clearance to cross the fim VOR at 250 KTS and symon intersection at 12000 ft. Subsequently, we were cleared to depart the smo VOR on a 060 degree heading and a descent to 4000 ft after smo. We were told to expect an ILS approach to runway 24R. Prior to the top of descent, we asked ZLA to coordinate with socal approach control for an ILS to runway 25L. This request was made due to our landing weight. Our aircraft was very close to our maximum landing weight, and while not too heavy for runway 24R, the much longer runway 25L was desirable to minimize brake overheating. Upon initial contact with socal approach the request for runway 25L was reiterated. We were informed that socal was unable runway 25L due to heavy traffic. We again expressed our concern about our landing weight and using runway 24R. Socal approach said they would keep our request in mind. After departing smo VOR on a heading of 060 degrees, socal said this will be vectors for an ILS to runway 24R and that they were unable runway 25L due to traffic. We set up and briefed for the ILS to runway 24R. When we were about 8 mi east of the smo VOR on downwind, socal approach asked if we could accept a visual approach to runway 24R. I instructed the first officer to accept the visual approach as we could see the airport when over the smo VOR. We were given a 160 degree heading from socal approach and asked if we could see the airport. While in the turn, I could see the runway lights for runway 24R and instructed the first officer to report the field in sight. The first officer said 'I don't see the runway.' this was misunderstood by me as 'I see the runway.' socal approach issued a heading of 220 degrees and cleared us for a visual approach to runway 24R. We had the 108.5 ioss ILS frequency tuned on both pilots' navigation radios and 249 degrees set in the course window. As we started the turn to 220 degrees the first officer's master instrument warning light came on. The first officer informed the so and me of the warning light. At the same time socal approach told us to contact the los angeles tower on 133.9. As I thought we might have a serious problem, I looked inside at the first officer's flight instruments to compare them with my own. The first officer turned his attention inside the cockpit to change radio frequency to lax tower. His attention was diverted longer than normal due to his selection of the wrong frequency on the VHF communication radio (eg, 123.9 versus 133.9). During this time, the so was checking the cockpit operations manual to deal with the flight instrument warning. He was checking the cockpit operations manual due to his misunderstanding of a request by the first officer and myself to check the cockpit operations manual when we got on the ground. Upon redirecting my attention outside the aircraft, I discovered that runway 24R was no longer in visual contact. A broken layer of stratus clouds (that we were not aware of when accepting the visual approach) had moved on shore and obscured the approach end of runway 24R. After approximately 5 seconds of looking for runway 24R, I realized we had flown through the runway 24R localizer. I could see the runway 25L approach lights and runway lights, and I could see that we were about to encroach on the runway 25L final approach course. I started a turn to the right from our 220 degree intercept heading toward the missed approach heading of 250 degrees. I also arrested my descent and started a climb toward 2500 ft. As we started the turn, lax tower instructed us to turn right to a heading of 270 degrees and climb to and maintain 2500 ft. We reported that we were executing a missed approach and acknowledged the heading and altitude issued by lax tower. During the turn to the 270 degree heading, I observed an aircraft at our 8 O'clock position and 3/4 mi, 500 ft below us, on our TCASII. After the go around, we were radar vectored to an ILS runway 25R, and a normal approach and landing were made. After landing, we were given a telephone number to contact the watch supervisor at socal approach. We discussed the events of our first approach. He told me that traffic was heavy but our request for runway 25L should have been granted. Moreover, socal approach was requesting aircraft to accept visual approachs so as to increase their acceptance rate.this was being done with the knowledge that coastal stratus existed along the shoreline, sometimes obscuring the runways. The watch supervisor accepted our explanation of being distraction by our flight instrument warning lights, resulting in an overshoot of the runway 24R final approach course. Contributing factors in this incident are as follows: a last min change to a visual approach when expecting an ILS. The captain misunderstanding the first officer when he said, 'I don't have the airport,' thinking he said, 'I have the airport.' the stratus clouds moving onshore but not being reported by ATC. The first officer's and so's distraction by the instrument warning light, leading the first officer to question the validity of his navigation and flight instruments. The first officer being further distraction by mistuning the VHF communication radio. All of this contributed to the overshoot of the runway 24R final approach course. Factors, which avoided additional problems, are as follows: the captain's familiarity with the lax airport environment. TCASII that provided situational awareness of other aircraft, facilitating the decision to execute a missed approach. The tower's monitoring of aircraft on the final approach course.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MULTIPLE DISTRS AND A NIGHT VISUAL APCH FOLLOWED BY WRONG RWY LINEUP AND TFC CONFLICT LEAD TO A MISSED APCH AT LAX, CA.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT ON A B747 CARGO FLT FROM ANC TO LAX. FLT CONDITIONS WERE NIGHT VMC WITH 8 MI VISIBILITY AND FEW CLOUDS AT 1000 FT. LAX ATIS RPTED ILS APCHS TO RWYS 25L AND 24R WERE IN USE. WE STARTED A DSCNT FROM FL370 ON THE SADDE 6 STAR, WITH A CLRNC TO CROSS THE FIM VOR AT 250 KTS AND SYMON INTXN AT 12000 FT. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE CLRED TO DEPART THE SMO VOR ON A 060 DEG HDG AND A DSCNT TO 4000 FT AFTER SMO. WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS APCH TO RWY 24R. PRIOR TO THE TOP OF DSCNT, WE ASKED ZLA TO COORDINATE WITH SOCAL APCH CTL FOR AN ILS TO RWY 25L. THIS REQUEST WAS MADE DUE TO OUR LNDG WT. OUR ACFT WAS VERY CLOSE TO OUR MAX LNDG WT, AND WHILE NOT TOO HVY FOR RWY 24R, THE MUCH LONGER RWY 25L WAS DESIRABLE TO MINIMIZE BRAKE OVERHEATING. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH SOCAL APCH THE REQUEST FOR RWY 25L WAS REITERATED. WE WERE INFORMED THAT SOCAL WAS UNABLE RWY 25L DUE TO HVY TFC. WE AGAIN EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT OUR LNDG WT AND USING RWY 24R. SOCAL APCH SAID THEY WOULD KEEP OUR REQUEST IN MIND. AFTER DEPARTING SMO VOR ON A HDG OF 060 DEGS, SOCAL SAID THIS WILL BE VECTORS FOR AN ILS TO RWY 24R AND THAT THEY WERE UNABLE RWY 25L DUE TO TFC. WE SET UP AND BRIEFED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 24R. WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 8 MI E OF THE SMO VOR ON DOWNWIND, SOCAL APCH ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO ACCEPT THE VISUAL APCH AS WE COULD SEE THE ARPT WHEN OVER THE SMO VOR. WE WERE GIVEN A 160 DEG HDG FROM SOCAL APCH AND ASKED IF WE COULD SEE THE ARPT. WHILE IN THE TURN, I COULD SEE THE RWY LIGHTS FOR RWY 24R AND INSTRUCTED THE FO TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT. THE FO SAID 'I DON'T SEE THE RWY.' THIS WAS MISUNDERSTOOD BY ME AS 'I SEE THE RWY.' SOCAL APCH ISSUED A HDG OF 220 DEGS AND CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. WE HAD THE 108.5 IOSS ILS FREQ TUNED ON BOTH PLTS' NAV RADIOS AND 249 DEGS SET IN THE COURSE WINDOW. AS WE STARTED THE TURN TO 220 DEGS THE FO'S MASTER INST WARNING LIGHT CAME ON. THE FO INFORMED THE SO AND ME OF THE WARNING LIGHT. AT THE SAME TIME SOCAL APCH TOLD US TO CONTACT THE LOS ANGELES TWR ON 133.9. AS I THOUGHT WE MIGHT HAVE A SERIOUS PROB, I LOOKED INSIDE AT THE FO'S FLT INSTS TO COMPARE THEM WITH MY OWN. THE FO TURNED HIS ATTN INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO CHANGE RADIO FREQ TO LAX TWR. HIS ATTN WAS DIVERTED LONGER THAN NORMAL DUE TO HIS SELECTION OF THE WRONG FREQ ON THE VHF COM RADIO (EG, 123.9 VERSUS 133.9). DURING THIS TIME, THE SO WAS CHKING THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL TO DEAL WITH THE FLT INST WARNING. HE WAS CHKING THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL DUE TO HIS MISUNDERSTANDING OF A REQUEST BY THE FO AND MYSELF TO CHK THE COCKPIT OPS MANUAL WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. UPON REDIRECTING MY ATTN OUTSIDE THE ACFT, I DISCOVERED THAT RWY 24R WAS NO LONGER IN VISUAL CONTACT. A BROKEN LAYER OF STRATUS CLOUDS (THAT WE WERE NOT AWARE OF WHEN ACCEPTING THE VISUAL APCH) HAD MOVED ON SHORE AND OBSCURED THE APCH END OF RWY 24R. AFTER APPROX 5 SECONDS OF LOOKING FOR RWY 24R, I REALIZED WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE RWY 24R LOC. I COULD SEE THE RWY 25L APCH LIGHTS AND RWY LIGHTS, AND I COULD SEE THAT WE WERE ABOUT TO ENCROACH ON THE RWY 25L FINAL APCH COURSE. I STARTED A TURN TO THE R FROM OUR 220 DEG INTERCEPT HDG TOWARD THE MISSED APCH HDG OF 250 DEGS. I ALSO ARRESTED MY DSCNT AND STARTED A CLB TOWARD 2500 FT. AS WE STARTED THE TURN, LAX TWR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN R TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS AND CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 2500 FT. WE RPTED THAT WE WERE EXECUTING A MISSED APCH AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE HDG AND ALT ISSUED BY LAX TWR. DURING THE TURN TO THE 270 DEG HDG, I OBSERVED AN ACFT AT OUR 8 O'CLOCK POS AND 3/4 MI, 500 FT BELOW US, ON OUR TCASII. AFTER THE GAR, WE WERE RADAR VECTORED TO AN ILS RWY 25R, AND A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WERE MADE. AFTER LNDG, WE WERE GIVEN A TELEPHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT THE WATCH SUPVR AT SOCAL APCH. WE DISCUSSED THE EVENTS OF OUR FIRST APCH. HE TOLD ME THAT TFC WAS HVY BUT OUR REQUEST FOR RWY 25L SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. MOREOVER, SOCAL APCH WAS REQUESTING ACFT TO ACCEPT VISUAL APCHS SO AS TO INCREASE THEIR ACCEPTANCE RATE.THIS WAS BEING DONE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT COASTAL STRATUS EXISTED ALONG THE SHORELINE, SOMETIMES OBSCURING THE RWYS. THE WATCH SUPVR ACCEPTED OUR EXPLANATION OF BEING DISTR BY OUR FLT INST WARNING LIGHTS, RESULTING IN AN OVERSHOOT OF THE RWY 24R FINAL APCH COURSE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: A LAST MIN CHANGE TO A VISUAL APCH WHEN EXPECTING AN ILS. THE CAPT MISUNDERSTANDING THE FO WHEN HE SAID, 'I DON'T HAVE THE ARPT,' THINKING HE SAID, 'I HAVE THE ARPT.' THE STRATUS CLOUDS MOVING ONSHORE BUT NOT BEING RPTED BY ATC. THE FO'S AND SO'S DISTR BY THE INST WARNING LIGHT, LEADING THE FO TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF HIS NAV AND FLT INSTS. THE FO BEING FURTHER DISTR BY MISTUNING THE VHF COM RADIO. ALL OF THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERSHOOT OF THE RWY 24R FINAL APCH COURSE. FACTORS, WHICH AVOIDED ADDITIONAL PROBS, ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE CAPT'S FAMILIARITY WITH THE LAX ARPT ENVIRONMENT. TCASII THAT PROVIDED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF OTHER ACFT, FACILITATING THE DECISION TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. THE TWR'S MONITORING OF ACFT ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.