Narrative:

After takeoff in bhm, on a repos flight (empty) to huntsville, al, we had a caution message on the EICAS, which read 'tat 2 heat inoperative.' immediately following the message, the first officer and I noticed an electrical burning smell in the cockpit. Smoke was then seen coming from what we thought was the right side air supply to the cockpit. We donned the masks and ran the checklists. Since both the APU and the tat probe were both worked on, repaired, and cleared by maintenance the night before, I elected to shut down the APU right away. The smoke had dissipated as quickly as it had appeared. We declared an emergency and landed without incident. Crash fire rescue equipment secured the aircraft at the gate and checked the rear APU compartment for possible fire damage. It was later determined that the tat probe relay located behind the first officer's seat had shorted and it had caused the smoke. Company dispatch was notified upon return to the field. I completed the necessary company occurrence report and faxed it to the company immediately following the incident. Since it was determined that immediate notification to the NTSB was not necessary (no in-flight fire), the aircraft was repaired/MEL'ed and we repositioned it to dca to be returned to service. My concern after the event is, even though we departed to dca after the emergency with the aircraft's problem MEL'ed (tat probe inoperative) and all MEL's complied with (no icing conditions), we were required to depart as quickly as possibly to return the aircraft to service. I did not give immediate notification to the FAA or NTSB and to my knowledge neither did the company although none may have been required. Also, the tat probe that had been cleared by maintenance had obviously not been repaired correctly or a faulty new part was installed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E145 CREW HAD ELECTRICAL SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE COCKPIT IN BHM CLASS C AIRSPACE.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF IN BHM, ON A REPOS FLT (EMPTY) TO HUNTSVILLE, AL, WE HAD A CAUTION MESSAGE ON THE EICAS, WHICH READ 'TAT 2 HEAT INOP.' IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MESSAGE, THE FO AND I NOTICED AN ELECTRICAL BURNING SMELL IN THE COCKPIT. SMOKE WAS THEN SEEN COMING FROM WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS THE R SIDE AIR SUPPLY TO THE COCKPIT. WE DONNED THE MASKS AND RAN THE CHKLISTS. SINCE BOTH THE APU AND THE TAT PROBE WERE BOTH WORKED ON, REPAIRED, AND CLRED BY MAINT THE NIGHT BEFORE, I ELECTED TO SHUT DOWN THE APU RIGHT AWAY. THE SMOKE HAD DISSIPATED AS QUICKLY AS IT HAD APPEARED. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. CFR SECURED THE ACFT AT THE GATE AND CHKED THE REAR APU COMPARTMENT FOR POSSIBLE FIRE DAMAGE. IT WAS LATER DETERMINED THAT THE TAT PROBE RELAY LOCATED BEHIND THE FO'S SEAT HAD SHORTED AND IT HAD CAUSED THE SMOKE. COMPANY DISPATCH WAS NOTIFIED UPON RETURN TO THE FIELD. I COMPLETED THE NECESSARY COMPANY OCCURRENCE RPT AND FAXED IT TO THE COMPANY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT. SINCE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION TO THE NTSB WAS NOT NECESSARY (NO INFLT FIRE), THE ACFT WAS REPAIRED/MEL'ED AND WE REPOSITIONED IT TO DCA TO BE RETURNED TO SVC. MY CONCERN AFTER THE EVENT IS, EVEN THOUGH WE DEPARTED TO DCA AFTER THE EMER WITH THE ACFT'S PROB MEL'ED (TAT PROBE INOP) AND ALL MEL'S COMPLIED WITH (NO ICING CONDITIONS), WE WERE REQUIRED TO DEPART AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLY TO RETURN THE ACFT TO SVC. I DID NOT GIVE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION TO THE FAA OR NTSB AND TO MY KNOWLEDGE NEITHER DID THE COMPANY ALTHOUGH NONE MAY HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. ALSO, THE TAT PROBE THAT HAD BEEN CLRED BY MAINT HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT BEEN REPAIRED CORRECTLY OR A FAULTY NEW PART WAS INSTALLED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.