Narrative:

On feb/xa/01 at approximately XB00 on a repos flight from dulles to ZZZ, we selected the gear down. I had no green light on the right main gear to indicate that the gear was down. We recycled the gear handle 2 more times with the same result, indicating the right main was not down and locked. We entered a holding pattern over manassas to complete the checklist and to contact maintenance. After completion of the appropriate checklist, it was decided by me to select flaps 20 degrees and reduce the power levers to flight idle and watch for a confign warning which we did not get although we did receive a GPWS warning of 'too low gear' while on final to iad. Maintenance, who offered no suggestions, other than to go back to dulles because they have crash fire rescue equipment available, which is what I elected to do. We went back to dulles. They offered to do a fly-by to visually confirm that the gear was down. We did that, but it was dark and the tower was unable to confirm that the gear was down. However, cpr personnel were able to confirm visually that the gear was down. We looked at the 'gear unsafe checklist' for a second time to make sure we ran it correctly and although emergency checklist did not pertain to our exact situation, we reviewed it. Since no confign was received when flaps 20 degrees and the power levers were brought to flight idle, and the 'too low gear' was received on final, and no green light to positively indicate that the right main gear was down and locked, we conducted a lamps test which indicated that the right main gear light was not burned out. The checklist said to regard the landing gear as unsafe. I declared an emergency and crash fire rescue equipment was called out to runway 19 at iad. The first officer and I reviewed landing technique with only the nose and left main gear being down and locked, and briefed the flight attendant as well of possible emergency evacuate/evacuation. As we continued on final, the 'too low gear' warning went off on final until touchdown, which was successful. We slowly exited the runway and crash fire rescue equipment confirmed that the gear appeared to be safe, and followed us to parking where we shut the aircraft down and waited for maintenance. I contacted maintenance, told them that our landing was successful and was informed that I would be ferrying the aircraft back to ZZZ after maintenance inspected the aircraft. I explained that the crew and myself were fairly shaken but was told by maintenance 'to go have a cigarette, and shake it off.' maintenance arrived and went to inspect and pin the gear and reset the flight idle stop. This took 45 mins, due to the fact that they didn't have the proper tool to reset the flight idle stop and had to borrow one from air crew. The gear was pinned and the flight idle stop was reset and a ferry permit was received. We went to the plane, started the engines to discover that the flight idle stop amber light was illuminated and that the right engine oil pressure light was on after start. Maintenance contacted ZZZ, the oil was checked to be satisfactory and both mechanics repeatedly reassured us that the aircraft was ok to be flown but that we may need to pull the flight idle stop on landing at ZZZ and the brakes will need to be used excessively while taxiing for departure to ZZZ since the power levers would not be able to be moved to ground idle while taxiing. The airplane was signed off, I received a ferry permit and was assured repeatedly that it was safe by 2 different maintenance personnel. I taxied the aircraft to runway 30, noticed nothing unusual other than using the brakes more than normal while taxiing and the takeoff roll was uneventful. We proceeded to ZZZ -- uneventful flight. We briefed having to pull the flight idle stop on landing. The winds were calm. We touched down within the touchdown zone, at reference speed on the centerline, softly. Rollout appeared to be proceeding normally. I instructed the first officer to pull the flight idle stop which we did. The antiskid flickered momentarily, but did not stay on. Before I lifted the triggers and pulled the power leers in beta, the airplane started to yaw strongly to the left. I applied right rudder and aileron. I was at approximately 100 KTS and slowing. The power levers were in beta. The airplane continued to yaw. I applied light right brake pressure. It continued to yaw to the left. At just below 60 KTS, I engaged the tiller, which had no effect on aircraft control. The aircraft continued to yaw to the left and slowly came to a stop in the mud about a few ft off the runway. I shut down the engines and we contacted company immediately. About 5 mins later, maintenance came out of the aircraft and left main outboard tire appeared to be flat. The first officer and myself were promptly taken to the hangar. We were told by dispatch, since management was coming to the hangar, that we 'probably should take off' and were released.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SF34 CREW HAD UNSAFE LNDG GEAR INDICATIONS FOR LNDG. DURING ACFT FERRY FLT BACK TO ACR MAINT BASE, THE CREW LOST ACFT CTL ON LNDG DUE TO 1 PROP NOT GOING INTO BETA RANGE.

Narrative: ON FEB/XA/01 AT APPROX XB00 ON A REPOS FLT FROM DULLES TO ZZZ, WE SELECTED THE GEAR DOWN. I HAD NO GREEN LIGHT ON THE R MAIN GEAR TO INDICATE THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN. WE RECYCLED THE GEAR HANDLE 2 MORE TIMES WITH THE SAME RESULT, INDICATING THE R MAIN WAS NOT DOWN AND LOCKED. WE ENTERED A HOLDING PATTERN OVER MANASSAS TO COMPLETE THE CHKLIST AND TO CONTACT MAINT. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST, IT WAS DECIDED BY ME TO SELECT FLAPS 20 DEGS AND REDUCE THE PWR LEVERS TO FLT IDLE AND WATCH FOR A CONFIGN WARNING WHICH WE DID NOT GET ALTHOUGH WE DID RECEIVE A GPWS WARNING OF 'TOO LOW GEAR' WHILE ON FINAL TO IAD. MAINT, WHO OFFERED NO SUGGESTIONS, OTHER THAN TO GO BACK TO DULLES BECAUSE THEY HAVE CFR AVAILABLE, WHICH IS WHAT I ELECTED TO DO. WE WENT BACK TO DULLES. THEY OFFERED TO DO A FLY-BY TO VISUALLY CONFIRM THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN. WE DID THAT, BUT IT WAS DARK AND THE TWR WAS UNABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN. HOWEVER, CPR PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO CONFIRM VISUALLY THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN. WE LOOKED AT THE 'GEAR UNSAFE CHKLIST' FOR A SECOND TIME TO MAKE SURE WE RAN IT CORRECTLY AND ALTHOUGH EMER CHKLIST DID NOT PERTAIN TO OUR EXACT SIT, WE REVIEWED IT. SINCE NO CONFIGN WAS RECEIVED WHEN FLAPS 20 DEGS AND THE PWR LEVERS WERE BROUGHT TO FLT IDLE, AND THE 'TOO LOW GEAR' WAS RECEIVED ON FINAL, AND NO GREEN LIGHT TO POSITIVELY INDICATE THAT THE R MAIN GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED, WE CONDUCTED A LAMPS TEST WHICH INDICATED THAT THE R MAIN GEAR LIGHT WAS NOT BURNED OUT. THE CHKLIST SAID TO REGARD THE LNDG GEAR AS UNSAFE. I DECLARED AN EMER AND CFR WAS CALLED OUT TO RWY 19 AT IAD. THE FO AND I REVIEWED LNDG TECHNIQUE WITH ONLY THE NOSE AND L MAIN GEAR BEING DOWN AND LOCKED, AND BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANT AS WELL OF POSSIBLE EMER EVAC. AS WE CONTINUED ON FINAL, THE 'TOO LOW GEAR' WARNING WENT OFF ON FINAL UNTIL TOUCHDOWN, WHICH WAS SUCCESSFUL. WE SLOWLY EXITED THE RWY AND CFR CONFIRMED THAT THE GEAR APPEARED TO BE SAFE, AND FOLLOWED US TO PARKING WHERE WE SHUT THE ACFT DOWN AND WAITED FOR MAINT. I CONTACTED MAINT, TOLD THEM THAT OUR LNDG WAS SUCCESSFUL AND WAS INFORMED THAT I WOULD BE FERRYING THE ACFT BACK TO ZZZ AFTER MAINT INSPECTED THE ACFT. I EXPLAINED THAT THE CREW AND MYSELF WERE FAIRLY SHAKEN BUT WAS TOLD BY MAINT 'TO GO HAVE A CIGARETTE, AND SHAKE IT OFF.' MAINT ARRIVED AND WENT TO INSPECT AND PIN THE GEAR AND RESET THE FLT IDLE STOP. THIS TOOK 45 MINS, DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE PROPER TOOL TO RESET THE FLT IDLE STOP AND HAD TO BORROW ONE FROM AIR CREW. THE GEAR WAS PINNED AND THE FLT IDLE STOP WAS RESET AND A FERRY PERMIT WAS RECEIVED. WE WENT TO THE PLANE, STARTED THE ENGS TO DISCOVER THAT THE FLT IDLE STOP AMBER LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED AND THAT THE R ENG OIL PRESSURE LIGHT WAS ON AFTER START. MAINT CONTACTED ZZZ, THE OIL WAS CHKED TO BE SATISFACTORY AND BOTH MECHS REPEATEDLY REASSURED US THAT THE ACFT WAS OK TO BE FLOWN BUT THAT WE MAY NEED TO PULL THE FLT IDLE STOP ON LNDG AT ZZZ AND THE BRAKES WILL NEED TO BE USED EXCESSIVELY WHILE TAXIING FOR DEP TO ZZZ SINCE THE PWR LEVERS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BE MOVED TO GND IDLE WHILE TAXIING. THE AIRPLANE WAS SIGNED OFF, I RECEIVED A FERRY PERMIT AND WAS ASSURED REPEATEDLY THAT IT WAS SAFE BY 2 DIFFERENT MAINT PERSONNEL. I TAXIED THE ACFT TO RWY 30, NOTICED NOTHING UNUSUAL OTHER THAN USING THE BRAKES MORE THAN NORMAL WHILE TAXIING AND THE TKOF ROLL WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE PROCEEDED TO ZZZ -- UNEVENTFUL FLT. WE BRIEFED HAVING TO PULL THE FLT IDLE STOP ON LNDG. THE WINDS WERE CALM. WE TOUCHED DOWN WITHIN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE, AT REF SPD ON THE CTRLINE, SOFTLY. ROLLOUT APPEARED TO BE PROCEEDING NORMALLY. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO PULL THE FLT IDLE STOP WHICH WE DID. THE ANTISKID FLICKERED MOMENTARILY, BUT DID NOT STAY ON. BEFORE I LIFTED THE TRIGGERS AND PULLED THE PWR LEERS IN BETA, THE AIRPLANE STARTED TO YAW STRONGLY TO THE L. I APPLIED R RUDDER AND AILERON. I WAS AT APPROX 100 KTS AND SLOWING. THE PWR LEVERS WERE IN BETA. THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED TO YAW. I APPLIED LIGHT R BRAKE PRESSURE. IT CONTINUED TO YAW TO THE L. AT JUST BELOW 60 KTS, I ENGAGED THE TILLER, WHICH HAD NO EFFECT ON ACFT CTL. THE ACFT CONTINUED TO YAW TO THE L AND SLOWLY CAME TO A STOP IN THE MUD ABOUT A FEW FT OFF THE RWY. I SHUT DOWN THE ENGS AND WE CONTACTED COMPANY IMMEDIATELY. ABOUT 5 MINS LATER, MAINT CAME OUT OF THE ACFT AND L MAIN OUTBOARD TIRE APPEARED TO BE FLAT. THE FO AND MYSELF WERE PROMPTLY TAKEN TO THE HANGAR. WE WERE TOLD BY DISPATCH, SINCE MGMNT WAS COMING TO THE HANGAR, THAT WE 'PROBABLY SHOULD TAKE OFF' AND WERE RELEASED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.