Narrative:

My aircraft was descending into msp for landing. The msp WX was approximately 4000 ft overcast with approximately 10 mi visibility underneath. Msp approach was working our flight and the airport was landing to the west. We were given a 220 KT airspeed assignment and were told we would be landing on runway 30L. Approach brought us in from the south and it appeared that we would be making a 10-15 mi final. As we approached abeam the FAF, we were given a descent clearance from 6000 ft to 2000 ft and were turned towards the airport on an angling base still above the overcast. We were asked if we had the airport and we replied no. When we broke out, we were just outside the OM at 4000 ft and reducing airspeed to get down. Just as we popped out of the overcast, we got a TCASII alert for traffic on the parallel runway. Approach asked us to maintain 4000 ft, which we did, and at the same time we picked up the airport. We were then cleared for the visual approach to runway 30L. I remarked to the first officer that it was going to be difficult to get down as we were high. I only had about 300 hours in this aircraft, but felt that we could do it. As we configured and descended it looked like everything would work out fine. However, our airspeed was about 25 KTS too high, and with the autothrust being used I could tell that the engines were going to spool up too close to the ground for my comfort level. As we passed through 1000 ft, I disconnected the autothrust. Unfortunately, I hadn't retarded the throttles far enough to match up the position of the thrust levers with the actual power setting. At approximately 300-400 ft, the engines went to almost full climb power and we were almost instantly 25 KTS fast. I pulled the power back and made a normal power landing, however, we did land long, but were able to use normal braking and turned off before the end of the runway. To make things worse, we had an FAA maintenance person on the cockpit jump seat. They asked why approach had kept us so high, and I explained that they were sitting in a dark radar room and probably figured we were looking at the airport all along and would adjust accordingly. However, when we didn't see the airport initially, they were required to maintain vertical separation which only made things worse. So this interesting occurrence was the result of a combination of my inexperience in the aircraft and the approach controller making our life harder by keeping us high and not telling us to expect a short approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW HAD TCASII ADVISORY AT MSP. CREW CONTINUED WITH UNSTABILIZED APCH CAUSED BY BEING HIGH AND AUTOTHRUST SYS OVERRIDING THE CREW THROTTLE INPUT.

Narrative: MY ACFT WAS DSNDING INTO MSP FOR LNDG. THE MSP WX WAS APPROX 4000 FT OVCST WITH APPROX 10 MI VISIBILITY UNDERNEATH. MSP APCH WAS WORKING OUR FLT AND THE ARPT WAS LNDG TO THE W. WE WERE GIVEN A 220 KT AIRSPD ASSIGNMENT AND WERE TOLD WE WOULD BE LNDG ON RWY 30L. APCH BROUGHT US IN FROM THE S AND IT APPEARED THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING A 10-15 MI FINAL. AS WE APCHED ABEAM THE FAF, WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC FROM 6000 FT TO 2000 FT AND WERE TURNED TOWARDS THE ARPT ON AN ANGLING BASE STILL ABOVE THE OVCST. WE WERE ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT AND WE REPLIED NO. WHEN WE BROKE OUT, WE WERE JUST OUTSIDE THE OM AT 4000 FT AND REDUCING AIRSPD TO GET DOWN. JUST AS WE POPPED OUT OF THE OVCST, WE GOT A TCASII ALERT FOR TFC ON THE PARALLEL RWY. APCH ASKED US TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT, WHICH WE DID, AND AT THE SAME TIME WE PICKED UP THE ARPT. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 30L. I REMARKED TO THE FO THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT TO GET DOWN AS WE WERE HIGH. I ONLY HAD ABOUT 300 HRS IN THIS ACFT, BUT FELT THAT WE COULD DO IT. AS WE CONFIGURED AND DSNDED IT LOOKED LIKE EVERYTHING WOULD WORK OUT FINE. HOWEVER, OUR AIRSPD WAS ABOUT 25 KTS TOO HIGH, AND WITH THE AUTOTHRUST BEING USED I COULD TELL THAT THE ENGS WERE GOING TO SPOOL UP TOO CLOSE TO THE GND FOR MY COMFORT LEVEL. AS WE PASSED THROUGH 1000 FT, I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHRUST. UNFORTUNATELY, I HADN'T RETARDED THE THROTTLES FAR ENOUGH TO MATCH UP THE POS OF THE THRUST LEVERS WITH THE ACTUAL PWR SETTING. AT APPROX 300-400 FT, THE ENGS WENT TO ALMOST FULL CLB PWR AND WE WERE ALMOST INSTANTLY 25 KTS FAST. I PULLED THE PWR BACK AND MADE A NORMAL PWR LNDG, HOWEVER, WE DID LAND LONG, BUT WERE ABLE TO USE NORMAL BRAKING AND TURNED OFF BEFORE THE END OF THE RWY. TO MAKE THINGS WORSE, WE HAD AN FAA MAINT PERSON ON THE COCKPIT JUMP SEAT. THEY ASKED WHY APCH HAD KEPT US SO HIGH, AND I EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE SITTING IN A DARK RADAR ROOM AND PROBABLY FIGURED WE WERE LOOKING AT THE ARPT ALL ALONG AND WOULD ADJUST ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER, WHEN WE DIDN'T SEE THE ARPT INITIALLY, THEY WERE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VERT SEPARATION WHICH ONLY MADE THINGS WORSE. SO THIS INTERESTING OCCURRENCE WAS THE RESULT OF A COMBINATION OF MY INEXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT AND THE APCH CTLR MAKING OUR LIFE HARDER BY KEEPING US HIGH AND NOT TELLING US TO EXPECT A SHORT APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.