Narrative:

Climbing through FL140 at 330 KIAS, aircraft struck a flock of large birds. At least 1 impacted the exterior of cockpit creating a large hole adjacent to nosewheel steering handle. I could see daylight and aircraft began losing pressurization with accompanying extremely loud noise. Captain donned oxygen mask as first officer descended to FL100. Captain established communication with ATC, declared an emergency, requested vectors to cdg. First officer did control check as aircraft was slowed to 180 KIAS at flaps 15 degrees. Crew reviewed emergency landing and overweight landing procedures. Landed flaps 25 degrees at 373500 pounds vref 161. Winds at landing were 180 degrees at 8 KTS, landed on runway 27L. Touched down at 200 FPM 168 KIAS. Applied full reverse and initiated soft brake application at 100 KIAS. Maintenance inspected brakes and aircraft held off gate for 30 mins as per brake cooling chart. Personal observations: I was looking at a chart when we had the bird strike, so I didn't initially know what had happened. I heard a loud bang and rush of air, so I immediately put on my oxygen mask. I initially thought we had a broken window, so I looked up and saw massive blood on my side window and daylight through a hole above the eyeball vent above my speaker. I then checked the engine indications and was relieved to see them normal. It was extremely loud and I couldn't understand first officer's comments to me, but I was satisfied with how he was handling the aircraft. I then called ATC coming through FL120 and declared an emergency and informed them that we had a pressurization problem and requested return to cdg. First officer could hear my communication through his ear piece but I still couldn't hear him until the aircraft was slowed to about 280 KIAS. Impact was at 330 KIAS. Meanwhile the relief pilot asked me if I wanted him to make a PA. I took my mask off as we were now at FL090. At that point all 3 of us started interacting through normal voice levels. Relief pilot made PA while first officer and I got back on the same page. I elected not to dump fuel as aircraft was flying well and knew we had more than adequate runway available. I felt we did a good job allowing information and ideas to circulate during this event as I was task saturated. First officer and relief pilot were outstanding in taking initiative and asking me all the right questions as we went through the problem. The relief pilot was invaluable and I wonder how difficult it would have been if we had lost an engine without his assistance. Lessons learned: 1) I had my mask on but the first officer and relief pilot didn't as we were soon at FL100. Crew communication in this noisy environment would have been facilitated by us all wearing our masks until noise level subsided. 2) even though I am not always an avid endorser of the CRM program, I do feel that some benefit was derived in having a simulated exercise focusing on crew coordination and problem solving in an unscripted problem solving exercise. 3) on my initial crew brief, I always stress the fact that I may be out of the loop conducting the problem solving with outsiders, ie, ATC and dispatch, and to always pull me back into the loop and/or give me ideas if they see a need. This was reinforced in this scenario. Crew training might be improved by stressing the importance of initiative to new hires going into the right seat. I was lucky to have an experienced crew. 4) we had to pull teeth to get maintenance to inspect the brakes. Ground control didn't understand why we couldn't return to the gate immediately until we explained the exact cause. Crews should be aware that you must be prepared to explain your needs and be forceful in getting what you want. It's your airplane, take care of it. Supplemental information from acn 506793: I was the PF scanning outside/inside when at approximately 14000 ft I noticed 4-6 large birds inside my field of vision. A millisecond later, a very pronounced bang was heard and felt. I made a conscious decision not to don the oxygen mask since the airplane was at a habitable altitude and descending. I assessed the condition of the captain and the cockpit. Captain was in full command. I, in turn, was responding to ATC via his requests. The cockpit did not fair well. Feathers and guts of a bird strike. My windshield was covered with blood, but most of my view was unobstructed. Bird debris as well as insulation was splattered on the captain and myself. I chose not to engage the autoplt because I was concerned with aircraft integrity. In other words, I did not want the autoplt to mask a control problem. The captain and the relief pilot concentrated on checklists, flight attendants, passenger, ATC and operations. We were asked if we wanted a short approach and we declined. Instead, we requested normal sequencing to buy us time. The captain did request that the fire trucks stand by. At this point, I engaged the center autoplt to confirm the FMC, reference speeds, and ILS tuning. I noted the heavy weight and advised the captain that we were overweight and that we will make an overweight landing. I asked for flaps 1 degree. The captain did not respond. The ensuing noise and ATC made communications very difficult. I announced and initiated all flap deployments. At each flap setting, I conducted minor lateral inputs to determine aircraft response. Cdg ground control was reluctant to have us wait and did not understand why we could not go to the gate. The captain and cdg agreed on a remote parking to inspect the brakes and wait. The captain did an outstanding job under arduous conditions. Supplemental information from acn 506791: as soon as the aircraft started to depressurize through the hole in the cockpit, the cockpit door flew open. I had to hold it closed until the pressure equalized because the lock wasn't strong enough. I would like to personally commend the captain for his immediate command of the situation and the professional manner in which he handled the operation. As maverick told iceman -- he can fly my wing any time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 FLC MAKES A DIFFICULT RETURN LANDING AFTER THE ACFT STRIKES A LARGE FLOCK OF BIRDS WHILE CLBING OUT AT 14000 FT W OF CDG.

Narrative: CLBING THROUGH FL140 AT 330 KIAS, ACFT STRUCK A FLOCK OF LARGE BIRDS. AT LEAST 1 IMPACTED THE EXTERIOR OF COCKPIT CREATING A LARGE HOLE ADJACENT TO NOSEWHEEL STEERING HANDLE. I COULD SEE DAYLIGHT AND ACFT BEGAN LOSING PRESSURIZATION WITH ACCOMPANYING EXTREMELY LOUD NOISE. CAPT DONNED OXYGEN MASK AS FO DSNDED TO FL100. CAPT ESTABLISHED COM WITH ATC, DECLARED AN EMER, REQUESTED VECTORS TO CDG. FO DID CTL CHK AS ACFT WAS SLOWED TO 180 KIAS AT FLAPS 15 DEGS. CREW REVIEWED EMER LNDG AND OVERWT LNDG PROCS. LANDED FLAPS 25 DEGS AT 373500 LBS VREF 161. WINDS AT LNDG WERE 180 DEGS AT 8 KTS, LANDED ON RWY 27L. TOUCHED DOWN AT 200 FPM 168 KIAS. APPLIED FULL REVERSE AND INITIATED SOFT BRAKE APPLICATION AT 100 KIAS. MAINT INSPECTED BRAKES AND ACFT HELD OFF GATE FOR 30 MINS AS PER BRAKE COOLING CHART. PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS: I WAS LOOKING AT A CHART WHEN WE HAD THE BIRD STRIKE, SO I DIDN'T INITIALLY KNOW WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I HEARD A LOUD BANG AND RUSH OF AIR, SO I IMMEDIATELY PUT ON MY OXYGEN MASK. I INITIALLY THOUGHT WE HAD A BROKEN WINDOW, SO I LOOKED UP AND SAW MASSIVE BLOOD ON MY SIDE WINDOW AND DAYLIGHT THROUGH A HOLE ABOVE THE EYEBALL VENT ABOVE MY SPEAKER. I THEN CHKED THE ENG INDICATIONS AND WAS RELIEVED TO SEE THEM NORMAL. IT WAS EXTREMELY LOUD AND I COULDN'T UNDERSTAND FO'S COMMENTS TO ME, BUT I WAS SATISFIED WITH HOW HE WAS HANDLING THE ACFT. I THEN CALLED ATC COMING THROUGH FL120 AND DECLARED AN EMER AND INFORMED THEM THAT WE HAD A PRESSURIZATION PROB AND REQUESTED RETURN TO CDG. FO COULD HEAR MY COM THROUGH HIS EAR PIECE BUT I STILL COULDN'T HEAR HIM UNTIL THE ACFT WAS SLOWED TO ABOUT 280 KIAS. IMPACT WAS AT 330 KIAS. MEANWHILE THE RELIEF PLT ASKED ME IF I WANTED HIM TO MAKE A PA. I TOOK MY MASK OFF AS WE WERE NOW AT FL090. AT THAT POINT ALL 3 OF US STARTED INTERACTING THROUGH NORMAL VOICE LEVELS. RELIEF PLT MADE PA WHILE FO AND I GOT BACK ON THE SAME PAGE. I ELECTED NOT TO DUMP FUEL AS ACFT WAS FLYING WELL AND KNEW WE HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE RWY AVAILABLE. I FELT WE DID A GOOD JOB ALLOWING INFO AND IDEAS TO CIRCULATE DURING THIS EVENT AS I WAS TASK SATURATED. FO AND RELIEF PLT WERE OUTSTANDING IN TAKING INITIATIVE AND ASKING ME ALL THE RIGHT QUESTIONS AS WE WENT THROUGH THE PROB. THE RELIEF PLT WAS INVALUABLE AND I WONDER HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IF WE HAD LOST AN ENG WITHOUT HIS ASSISTANCE. LESSONS LEARNED: 1) I HAD MY MASK ON BUT THE FO AND RELIEF PLT DIDN'T AS WE WERE SOON AT FL100. CREW COM IN THIS NOISY ENVIRONMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN FACILITATED BY US ALL WEARING OUR MASKS UNTIL NOISE LEVEL SUBSIDED. 2) EVEN THOUGH I AM NOT ALWAYS AN AVID ENDORSER OF THE CRM PROGRAM, I DO FEEL THAT SOME BENEFIT WAS DERIVED IN HAVING A SIMULATED EXERCISE FOCUSING ON CREW COORD AND PROB SOLVING IN AN UNSCRIPTED PROB SOLVING EXERCISE. 3) ON MY INITIAL CREW BRIEF, I ALWAYS STRESS THE FACT THAT I MAY BE OUT OF THE LOOP CONDUCTING THE PROB SOLVING WITH OUTSIDERS, IE, ATC AND DISPATCH, AND TO ALWAYS PULL ME BACK INTO THE LOOP AND/OR GIVE ME IDEAS IF THEY SEE A NEED. THIS WAS REINFORCED IN THIS SCENARIO. CREW TRAINING MIGHT BE IMPROVED BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF INITIATIVE TO NEW HIRES GOING INTO THE R SEAT. I WAS LUCKY TO HAVE AN EXPERIENCED CREW. 4) WE HAD TO PULL TEETH TO GET MAINT TO INSPECT THE BRAKES. GND CTL DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY WE COULDN'T RETURN TO THE GATE IMMEDIATELY UNTIL WE EXPLAINED THE EXACT CAUSE. CREWS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOU MUST BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN YOUR NEEDS AND BE FORCEFUL IN GETTING WHAT YOU WANT. IT'S YOUR AIRPLANE, TAKE CARE OF IT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 506793: I WAS THE PF SCANNING OUTSIDE/INSIDE WHEN AT APPROX 14000 FT I NOTICED 4-6 LARGE BIRDS INSIDE MY FIELD OF VISION. A MILLISECOND LATER, A VERY PRONOUNCED BANG WAS HEARD AND FELT. I MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION NOT TO DON THE OXYGEN MASK SINCE THE AIRPLANE WAS AT A HABITABLE ALT AND DSNDING. I ASSESSED THE CONDITION OF THE CAPT AND THE COCKPIT. CAPT WAS IN FULL COMMAND. I, IN TURN, WAS RESPONDING TO ATC VIA HIS REQUESTS. THE COCKPIT DID NOT FAIR WELL. FEATHERS AND GUTS OF A BIRD STRIKE. MY WINDSHIELD WAS COVERED WITH BLOOD, BUT MOST OF MY VIEW WAS UNOBSTRUCTED. BIRD DEBRIS AS WELL AS INSULATION WAS SPLATTERED ON THE CAPT AND MYSELF. I CHOSE NOT TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT BECAUSE I WAS CONCERNED WITH ACFT INTEGRITY. IN OTHER WORDS, I DID NOT WANT THE AUTOPLT TO MASK A CTL PROB. THE CAPT AND THE RELIEF PLT CONCENTRATED ON CHKLISTS, FLT ATTENDANTS, PAX, ATC AND OPS. WE WERE ASKED IF WE WANTED A SHORT APCH AND WE DECLINED. INSTEAD, WE REQUESTED NORMAL SEQUENCING TO BUY US TIME. THE CAPT DID REQUEST THAT THE FIRE TRUCKS STAND BY. AT THIS POINT, I ENGAGED THE CTR AUTOPLT TO CONFIRM THE FMC, REF SPDS, AND ILS TUNING. I NOTED THE HVY WT AND ADVISED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE OVERWT AND THAT WE WILL MAKE AN OVERWT LNDG. I ASKED FOR FLAPS 1 DEG. THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND. THE ENSUING NOISE AND ATC MADE COMS VERY DIFFICULT. I ANNOUNCED AND INITIATED ALL FLAP DEPLOYMENTS. AT EACH FLAP SETTING, I CONDUCTED MINOR LATERAL INPUTS TO DETERMINE ACFT RESPONSE. CDG GND CTL WAS RELUCTANT TO HAVE US WAIT AND DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE COULD NOT GO TO THE GATE. THE CAPT AND CDG AGREED ON A REMOTE PARKING TO INSPECT THE BRAKES AND WAIT. THE CAPT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB UNDER ARDUOUS CONDITIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 506791: AS SOON AS THE ACFT STARTED TO DEPRESSURIZE THROUGH THE HOLE IN THE COCKPIT, THE COCKPIT DOOR FLEW OPEN. I HAD TO HOLD IT CLOSED UNTIL THE PRESSURE EQUALIZED BECAUSE THE LOCK WASN'T STRONG ENOUGH. I WOULD LIKE TO PERSONALLY COMMEND THE CAPT FOR HIS IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF THE SIT AND THE PROFESSIONAL MANNER IN WHICH HE HANDLED THE OP. AS MAVERICK TOLD ICEMAN -- HE CAN FLY MY WING ANY TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.