Narrative:

During this takeoff, using 'reduced thrust,' and sometime shortly after rotation was initiated, I felt a very slight vibration, lasting only an instant. The rotation was commenced at vr, and was accomplished smoothly and slowly, at a rate of approximately 2 degrees per second. I was referencing the pitch during rotation with the attitude indicator, and my intent was to allow the aircraft to fly off when it was ready. I recall that the pitch indicated less than 10 degrees when the vibration occurred. The landing gear was raised at the 'positive rate' call. After we were airborne, I asked the crew if they noticed a 'vibration.' my first officer and the flight engineer did not feel or notice what I was referring to. There was a flight mechanic in the observer's seat, who stated to me that he did feel something, and thought it might be a bag shifting in the cargo compartment. The flight engineer then reported that the tailskid light was on. After switching to departure control, it was reported to us that there was some debris on the runway, reported by a person on the ground, and they would get back to us. We continued to climb and the aircraft was pressurizing normally. We all assumed if something had fallen off the tailskid, preventing it from retracting, that would light the 'tailskid' light, but all other system were normal. As the flight to tallahassee was only 1 hour, and we had adequate fuel (in case the tailskid was down), we continued normally, while carefully tracking the fuel burn, and landed with no other problems. An after landing inspection revealed a part of the tailskid foot was missing, along with the compression cartridge, and the actuator/door was damaged. I don't believe that this part was intended to tail or separate as it did, just compress when it was hit. The indicator clip was not sheared, not was the chain broken, which would be a sign of a tail strike. Additionally, on the ferry flight back to miami, we were unable to pressurize, and we found a heavy, cloth-like material of some sort stuck in the left outflow valve, which prevented the valve from functioning properly. On apr/xa/01, my director of operations reviewed with me the flight data recorder readouts, which confirm the crew recollection that the aircraft was not excessively rotated. In fact, the rotation from initiation to 10.3 degrees took almost 8 seconds. At the 'assumed liftoff point' (determined by the firm that read the flight data recorder), the pitch was less than 10 degrees, and the airspeed was 141 KTS (vr was 132 KTS), exactly as it should be. No one can understand why, using the proper rotation technique as described in every available boeing manual, combined with numerous yrs of cumulative experience with the B727, that this time the aircraft did not fly off as expected, without dragging the tailskid.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727-200 CREW HAD TAILSKID CONTACT ON RWY AT TKOF ROTATION AT MIA.

Narrative: DURING THIS TKOF, USING 'REDUCED THRUST,' AND SOMETIME SHORTLY AFTER ROTATION WAS INITIATED, I FELT A VERY SLIGHT VIBRATION, LASTING ONLY AN INSTANT. THE ROTATION WAS COMMENCED AT VR, AND WAS ACCOMPLISHED SMOOTHLY AND SLOWLY, AT A RATE OF APPROX 2 DEGS PER SECOND. I WAS REFING THE PITCH DURING ROTATION WITH THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR, AND MY INTENT WAS TO ALLOW THE ACFT TO FLY OFF WHEN IT WAS READY. I RECALL THAT THE PITCH INDICATED LESS THAN 10 DEGS WHEN THE VIBRATION OCCURRED. THE LNDG GEAR WAS RAISED AT THE 'POSITIVE RATE' CALL. AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE, I ASKED THE CREW IF THEY NOTICED A 'VIBRATION.' MY FO AND THE FE DID NOT FEEL OR NOTICE WHAT I WAS REFERRING TO. THERE WAS A FLT MECH IN THE OBSERVER'S SEAT, WHO STATED TO ME THAT HE DID FEEL SOMETHING, AND THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE A BAG SHIFTING IN THE CARGO COMPARTMENT. THE FE THEN RPTED THAT THE TAILSKID LIGHT WAS ON. AFTER SWITCHING TO DEP CTL, IT WAS RPTED TO US THAT THERE WAS SOME DEBRIS ON THE RWY, RPTED BY A PERSON ON THE GND, AND THEY WOULD GET BACK TO US. WE CONTINUED TO CLB AND THE ACFT WAS PRESSURIZING NORMALLY. WE ALL ASSUMED IF SOMETHING HAD FALLEN OFF THE TAILSKID, PREVENTING IT FROM RETRACTING, THAT WOULD LIGHT THE 'TAILSKID' LIGHT, BUT ALL OTHER SYS WERE NORMAL. AS THE FLT TO TALLAHASSEE WAS ONLY 1 HR, AND WE HAD ADEQUATE FUEL (IN CASE THE TAILSKID WAS DOWN), WE CONTINUED NORMALLY, WHILE CAREFULLY TRACKING THE FUEL BURN, AND LANDED WITH NO OTHER PROBS. AN AFTER LNDG INSPECTION REVEALED A PART OF THE TAILSKID FOOT WAS MISSING, ALONG WITH THE COMPRESSION CARTRIDGE, AND THE ACTUATOR/DOOR WAS DAMAGED. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THIS PART WAS INTENDED TO TAIL OR SEPARATE AS IT DID, JUST COMPRESS WHEN IT WAS HIT. THE INDICATOR CLIP WAS NOT SHEARED, NOT WAS THE CHAIN BROKEN, WHICH WOULD BE A SIGN OF A TAIL STRIKE. ADDITIONALLY, ON THE FERRY FLT BACK TO MIAMI, WE WERE UNABLE TO PRESSURIZE, AND WE FOUND A HVY, CLOTH-LIKE MATERIAL OF SOME SORT STUCK IN THE L OUTFLOW VALVE, WHICH PREVENTED THE VALVE FROM FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. ON APR/XA/01, MY DIRECTOR OF OPS REVIEWED WITH ME THE FLT DATA RECORDER READOUTS, WHICH CONFIRM THE CREW RECOLLECTION THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT EXCESSIVELY ROTATED. IN FACT, THE ROTATION FROM INITIATION TO 10.3 DEGS TOOK ALMOST 8 SECONDS. AT THE 'ASSUMED LIFTOFF POINT' (DETERMINED BY THE FIRM THAT READ THE FLT DATA RECORDER), THE PITCH WAS LESS THAN 10 DEGS, AND THE AIRSPD WAS 141 KTS (VR WAS 132 KTS), EXACTLY AS IT SHOULD BE. NO ONE CAN UNDERSTAND WHY, USING THE PROPER ROTATION TECHNIQUE AS DESCRIBED IN EVERY AVAILABLE BOEING MANUAL, COMBINED WITH NUMEROUS YRS OF CUMULATIVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE B727, THAT THIS TIME THE ACFT DID NOT FLY OFF AS EXPECTED, WITHOUT DRAGGING THE TAILSKID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.