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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 508450 |
Time | |
Date | 200104 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ind.airport |
State Reference | IN |
Altitude | agl single value : 100 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : msp.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 1200 flight time type : 8500 |
ASRS Report | 508450 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : diverted to another airport none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Weather Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft Company |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
After takeoff from indianapolis, the left main gear would not retract. The gear handle was placed back down and all gear indicated safe. I unstrapped, got out of my seat and discovered we only had 2 of the 3 gear downlock safety pins. I informed the passenger and flight attendants of our need to return to indianapolis. Uneventful landing and return to the gate. The left main gear pin was still in the gear lock. I removed the pin, talked to dispatch, maintenance, and the chief pilot on call. We refueled and departed again for las, nv. We had an uneventful flight. I feel the following are contributing factors: 1) the van scheduled to leave the hotel did not get us to the gate 30 mins prior to departure. The first officer felt rushed. 2) the first officer was on his second day of IOE and he was not used to pulling aircraft gear pins. 3) the WX was overcast with rain and winds gusting to 20 KTS and dark. 4) due to a logbook discrepancy, I had to ensure a required aircraft inspection had been accomplished the day prior, therefore, I was not available to supervise the first officer's preflight -- although he was prior B737 qualified. 5) when the first officer showed me the gear pins, he had them wrapped up in the red streamers, and I did not notice there were only 2 versus 3 pins. 6) we had to stow the pins under the fold-up jump seat bin because the pouch behind the captain's seat was too full of snacks to hold them. Therefore, when we read the 'before start originating' checklist, I could not physically reach and count the pins when I answered 'aboard.' to prevent this from happening again, I offer the following suggestions: 1) schedule the hotel van appropriately. 2) find or make a standard place to stow the gear pins within the captain's reach on our -700 aircraft. 3) any required maintenance inspection should be recorded in the logbook for the captain to review, even if it is recorded on a non routine maintenance card. 4) emphasis to new first officer's during their preflight training the importance of pulling all 3 gear pins, proper wrapping of the pins, and showing all 3 pins to the captain when returning to the cockpit.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RETURN LAND FOR A B737 FLT CREW WHEN THE L MAIN GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT DUE THE GEAR DOWN LOCK PIN BEING LEFT IN DURING PREFLT PROC AT IND, IN.
Narrative: AFTER TKOF FROM INDIANAPOLIS, THE L MAIN GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. THE GEAR HANDLE WAS PLACED BACK DOWN AND ALL GEAR INDICATED SAFE. I UNSTRAPPED, GOT OUT OF MY SEAT AND DISCOVERED WE ONLY HAD 2 OF THE 3 GEAR DOWNLOCK SAFETY PINS. I INFORMED THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS OF OUR NEED TO RETURN TO INDIANAPOLIS. UNEVENTFUL LNDG AND RETURN TO THE GATE. THE L MAIN GEAR PIN WAS STILL IN THE GEAR LOCK. I REMOVED THE PIN, TALKED TO DISPATCH, MAINT, AND THE CHIEF PLT ON CALL. WE REFUELED AND DEPARTED AGAIN FOR LAS, NV. WE HAD AN UNEVENTFUL FLT. I FEEL THE FOLLOWING ARE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE VAN SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THE HOTEL DID NOT GET US TO THE GATE 30 MINS PRIOR TO DEP. THE FO FELT RUSHED. 2) THE FO WAS ON HIS SECOND DAY OF IOE AND HE WAS NOT USED TO PULLING ACFT GEAR PINS. 3) THE WX WAS OVCST WITH RAIN AND WINDS GUSTING TO 20 KTS AND DARK. 4) DUE TO A LOGBOOK DISCREPANCY, I HAD TO ENSURE A REQUIRED ACFT INSPECTION HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THE DAY PRIOR, THEREFORE, I WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO SUPERVISE THE FO'S PREFLT -- ALTHOUGH HE WAS PRIOR B737 QUALIFIED. 5) WHEN THE FO SHOWED ME THE GEAR PINS, HE HAD THEM WRAPPED UP IN THE RED STREAMERS, AND I DID NOT NOTICE THERE WERE ONLY 2 VERSUS 3 PINS. 6) WE HAD TO STOW THE PINS UNDER THE FOLD-UP JUMP SEAT BIN BECAUSE THE POUCH BEHIND THE CAPT'S SEAT WAS TOO FULL OF SNACKS TO HOLD THEM. THEREFORE, WHEN WE READ THE 'BEFORE START ORIGINATING' CHKLIST, I COULD NOT PHYSICALLY REACH AND COUNT THE PINS WHEN I ANSWERED 'ABOARD.' TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, I OFFER THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS: 1) SCHEDULE THE HOTEL VAN APPROPRIATELY. 2) FIND OR MAKE A STANDARD PLACE TO STOW THE GEAR PINS WITHIN THE CAPT'S REACH ON OUR -700 ACFT. 3) ANY REQUIRED MAINT INSPECTION SHOULD BE RECORDED IN THE LOGBOOK FOR THE CAPT TO REVIEW, EVEN IF IT IS RECORDED ON A NON ROUTINE MAINT CARD. 4) EMPHASIS TO NEW FO'S DURING THEIR PREFLT TRAINING THE IMPORTANCE OF PULLING ALL 3 GEAR PINS, PROPER WRAPPING OF THE PINS, AND SHOWING ALL 3 PINS TO THE CAPT WHEN RETURNING TO THE COCKPIT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.