Narrative:

On departure from pvd runway 23L, we were cleared to climb to 2000 ft. At 2200 ft, as my head was down doing climb checks, I heard the altitude alerter go off. I looked at our altitude and it was between 2200-2300 ft. I told the first officer to 'get back down to 2000 ft!' at 2000 ft, we were cleared to 4000 ft, which I set in the alerter and the first officer/PF acknowledged. As I again looked down to compute our climb torque, I heard the alerter again! This time it's 4200-4300 ft. Again, I told the first officer/PF to 'get back down!' there was a frequency shift at this time which I completed as '4200 ft going down to 4000 ft.' I asked the first officer what his altimeter setting was, and it was the same as mine. In a quandary as to why this first officer, who had flown very well for the pervious 4 legs over 2 days, could miss 2 leveloffs, I then noticed that he was not using the flight director command bars (not required by company operation specifications/procedures). I commanded him to do so, which he did with no other altdevs during the remainder of the flight. Lessons learned: 1) stop checklists/chart reading close to leveloff. 2) do not expect low-time (he had only 43 hours in the saab) pilots to be consistent. He had been ahead of the aircraft for most of our flying to that point. 3) use automation when it is available. Fewer pilots would bust altitudes and headings if they would use the flight director and its command bars.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF340 PIC RPTS ON 2 SUCCESSIVE ALTDEVS PERFORMED BY HIS LOW TIME FO AFTER DEP AT PVD, RI.

Narrative: ON DEP FROM PVD RWY 23L, WE WERE CLRED TO CLB TO 2000 FT. AT 2200 FT, AS MY HEAD WAS DOWN DOING CLB CHKS, I HEARD THE ALT ALERTER GO OFF. I LOOKED AT OUR ALT AND IT WAS BTWN 2200-2300 FT. I TOLD THE FO TO 'GET BACK DOWN TO 2000 FT!' AT 2000 FT, WE WERE CLRED TO 4000 FT, WHICH I SET IN THE ALERTER AND THE FO/PF ACKNOWLEDGED. AS I AGAIN LOOKED DOWN TO COMPUTE OUR CLB TORQUE, I HEARD THE ALERTER AGAIN! THIS TIME IT'S 4200-4300 FT. AGAIN, I TOLD THE FO/PF TO 'GET BACK DOWN!' THERE WAS A FREQ SHIFT AT THIS TIME WHICH I COMPLETED AS '4200 FT GOING DOWN TO 4000 FT.' I ASKED THE FO WHAT HIS ALTIMETER SETTING WAS, AND IT WAS THE SAME AS MINE. IN A QUANDARY AS TO WHY THIS FO, WHO HAD FLOWN VERY WELL FOR THE PERVIOUS 4 LEGS OVER 2 DAYS, COULD MISS 2 LEVELOFFS, I THEN NOTICED THAT HE WAS NOT USING THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMAND BARS (NOT REQUIRED BY COMPANY OP SPECS/PROCS). I COMMANDED HIM TO DO SO, WHICH HE DID WITH NO OTHER ALTDEVS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. LESSONS LEARNED: 1) STOP CHKLISTS/CHART READING CLOSE TO LEVELOFF. 2) DO NOT EXPECT LOW-TIME (HE HAD ONLY 43 HRS IN THE SAAB) PLTS TO BE CONSISTENT. HE HAD BEEN AHEAD OF THE ACFT FOR MOST OF OUR FLYING TO THAT POINT. 3) USE AUTOMATION WHEN IT IS AVAILABLE. FEWER PLTS WOULD BUST ALTS AND HDGS IF THEY WOULD USE THE FLT DIRECTOR AND ITS COMMAND BARS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.