Narrative:

Steep descent from non precision approach. Initially both ATIS and socal approach indicated we would fly ILS runway 9, which we briefed and prepared. However, approach kept us high, despite our request to lower and the vectored us through final. When we were cleared we were at 7000 ft and 12 mi from san, we asked for a turn to descend. Instead, we were told san had switched to localizer 27 and were given a vector for downwind. We quickly briefed localizer 27. We were configured and at 2000 ft prior to reebo (FAF), but lost both localizer and DME. Went missed approach at reebo and vectored around again. (Note: fuel was not an issue, ont was alternate and we had plenty.) third time we configured again and crossed reebo at 2000 ft. I took control of aircraft for procedures and autocoupled non precision approach. We descended to MDA at 1200 FPM and leveled at 700 ft MDA. Flight visibility was close to minimums (2 NM). We were at MDA approximately 3.8 DME as we leveled. Simultaneously, the runway environment and PAPI came into sight at about 2.8 DME -- well before missed approach, however, we appeared slightly high. The captain took the aircraft, disengaged the autoplt and began immediate descent. The descent was somewhat steeper than normal, however, our airspeed was within target and aircraft was under positive control. Our touchdown was further down the runway than normal, but within touchdown zone. It was a 'clunker,' but this was not the time or place to 'float a smoothie.' we were at taxi speed about B6 exit, but continued to B7 to leave runway. Conditions for our approach were at minimums, although the ATIS made 3 mins prior called it 900 ft overcast and 4 mi visibility with blowing rain. We expected better visibility (winds 240 degrees at 4 KTS). When WX is a minimum, localizer 27 is a very tight approach and a visual descent point should be briefed. Because we experienced last min switch, we rushed brief and missed mentioning a visual descent point. We also thought WX was slightly better than minimums, until last min. Touchdown is approximately 1.1 DME. To descend from 700 (686) at 130 KTS we need 2 - 2.3 mi. This put a visual descent point at 3.1 - 3.4 localizer which is almost same time aircraft reaches MDA at 1700 FPM from 2000 ft at reebo. There is very little distance to level and look. No margin room. We were ready to go around during final descent and if we hadn't touched down where we did, we would have initiated go around. It was considered an option, it required and could have been executed safely. A note on our san page to review the conditions and suggest visual descent point plan for localizer 27 would be a good reminder for all of us. I've made lots of notes on mine now. Supplemental information from acn 515310: accepted localizer 27 approach at san. As runway cane into view, close to missed approach point, I took the aircraft and began a descent. As a result of steep final, we landed past fixed distance marker. Touchdown was solid, a bit of a clunker. Aircraft slowed normally and turnoff was at second to last runway exit. ATIS reported 4 mi visibility. Localizer 27 NOTAMS indicated new missed approach point of 1.8 DME vice 1.3. Localizer also notamed unreliable 1.8 DME inbound. Our initial approach to san was briefed ILS 9, but we refused the approach when final controller held us too high after vectoring us across final. We were then informed that san was now landing runway 27 using localizer 27 approach. We briefed localizer 27 approach on the downwind. Inbound to reebo FAF the localizer became unusable (DME intermittent, azimuth unreliable). We refused the approach and were vectored to downwind. On the next approach we used the poggi radial to locate reebo. Although we got to MDA early, we still had a steep approach. After reviewing events with critical hindsight, the following different options came to mind: a) missed approach and a go around as soon as a steep descent was discerned. 2) although we planned and briefed (at cruise altitude) the ILS 9, the contingency brief for localizer 27 with its attendant crucial NOTAMS was in order. Instead, we briefed the localizer 27 in the tense close vectoring environment on downwind. 3) looking forward, I will alternate approachs using heads up guidance display. I did not realize how dependent on the heads up guidance display I had become since it has been my practice to use it on all approachs. Unfortunately, this aircraft was not heads up guidance display equipped.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 CREW HAD UNSTABILIZED APCH TO RWY 27 AT SAN IN MINIMUM WX CONDITIONS.

Narrative: STEEP DSCNT FROM NON PRECISION APCH. INITIALLY BOTH ATIS AND SOCAL APCH INDICATED WE WOULD FLY ILS RWY 9, WHICH WE BRIEFED AND PREPARED. HOWEVER, APCH KEPT US HIGH, DESPITE OUR REQUEST TO LOWER AND THE VECTORED US THROUGH FINAL. WHEN WE WERE CLRED WE WERE AT 7000 FT AND 12 MI FROM SAN, WE ASKED FOR A TURN TO DSND. INSTEAD, WE WERE TOLD SAN HAD SWITCHED TO LOC 27 AND WERE GIVEN A VECTOR FOR DOWNWIND. WE QUICKLY BRIEFED LOC 27. WE WERE CONFIGURED AND AT 2000 FT PRIOR TO REEBO (FAF), BUT LOST BOTH LOC AND DME. WENT MISSED APCH AT REEBO AND VECTORED AROUND AGAIN. (NOTE: FUEL WAS NOT AN ISSUE, ONT WAS ALTERNATE AND WE HAD PLENTY.) THIRD TIME WE CONFIGURED AGAIN AND CROSSED REEBO AT 2000 FT. I TOOK CTL OF ACFT FOR PROCS AND AUTOCOUPLED NON PRECISION APCH. WE DSNDED TO MDA AT 1200 FPM AND LEVELED AT 700 FT MDA. FLT VISIBILITY WAS CLOSE TO MINIMUMS (2 NM). WE WERE AT MDA APPROX 3.8 DME AS WE LEVELED. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE RWY ENVIRONMENT AND PAPI CAME INTO SIGHT AT ABOUT 2.8 DME -- WELL BEFORE MISSED APCH, HOWEVER, WE APPEARED SLIGHTLY HIGH. THE CAPT TOOK THE ACFT, DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. THE DSCNT WAS SOMEWHAT STEEPER THAN NORMAL, HOWEVER, OUR AIRSPD WAS WITHIN TARGET AND ACFT WAS UNDER POSITIVE CTL. OUR TOUCHDOWN WAS FURTHER DOWN THE RWY THAN NORMAL, BUT WITHIN TOUCHDOWN ZONE. IT WAS A 'CLUNKER,' BUT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME OR PLACE TO 'FLOAT A SMOOTHIE.' WE WERE AT TAXI SPD ABOUT B6 EXIT, BUT CONTINUED TO B7 TO LEAVE RWY. CONDITIONS FOR OUR APCH WERE AT MINIMUMS, ALTHOUGH THE ATIS MADE 3 MINS PRIOR CALLED IT 900 FT OVCST AND 4 MI VISIBILITY WITH BLOWING RAIN. WE EXPECTED BETTER VISIBILITY (WINDS 240 DEGS AT 4 KTS). WHEN WX IS A MINIMUM, LOC 27 IS A VERY TIGHT APCH AND A VISUAL DSCNT POINT SHOULD BE BRIEFED. BECAUSE WE EXPERIENCED LAST MIN SWITCH, WE RUSHED BRIEF AND MISSED MENTIONING A VISUAL DSCNT POINT. WE ALSO THOUGHT WX WAS SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN MINIMUMS, UNTIL LAST MIN. TOUCHDOWN IS APPROX 1.1 DME. TO DSND FROM 700 (686) AT 130 KTS WE NEED 2 - 2.3 MI. THIS PUT A VISUAL DSCNT POINT AT 3.1 - 3.4 LOC WHICH IS ALMOST SAME TIME ACFT REACHES MDA AT 1700 FPM FROM 2000 FT AT REEBO. THERE IS VERY LITTLE DISTANCE TO LEVEL AND LOOK. NO MARGIN ROOM. WE WERE READY TO GO AROUND DURING FINAL DSCNT AND IF WE HADN'T TOUCHED DOWN WHERE WE DID, WE WOULD HAVE INITIATED GAR. IT WAS CONSIDERED AN OPTION, IT REQUIRED AND COULD HAVE BEEN EXECUTED SAFELY. A NOTE ON OUR SAN PAGE TO REVIEW THE CONDITIONS AND SUGGEST VISUAL DSCNT POINT PLAN FOR LOC 27 WOULD BE A GOOD REMINDER FOR ALL OF US. I'VE MADE LOTS OF NOTES ON MINE NOW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 515310: ACCEPTED LOC 27 APCH AT SAN. AS RWY CANE INTO VIEW, CLOSE TO MISSED APCH POINT, I TOOK THE ACFT AND BEGAN A DSCNT. AS A RESULT OF STEEP FINAL, WE LANDED PAST FIXED DISTANCE MARKER. TOUCHDOWN WAS SOLID, A BIT OF A CLUNKER. ACFT SLOWED NORMALLY AND TURNOFF WAS AT SECOND TO LAST RWY EXIT. ATIS RPTED 4 MI VISIBILITY. LOC 27 NOTAMS INDICATED NEW MISSED APCH POINT OF 1.8 DME VICE 1.3. LOC ALSO NOTAMED UNRELIABLE 1.8 DME INBOUND. OUR INITIAL APCH TO SAN WAS BRIEFED ILS 9, BUT WE REFUSED THE APCH WHEN FINAL CTLR HELD US TOO HIGH AFTER VECTORING US ACROSS FINAL. WE WERE THEN INFORMED THAT SAN WAS NOW LNDG RWY 27 USING LOC 27 APCH. WE BRIEFED LOC 27 APCH ON THE DOWNWIND. INBOUND TO REEBO FAF THE LOC BECAME UNUSABLE (DME INTERMITTENT, AZIMUTH UNRELIABLE). WE REFUSED THE APCH AND WERE VECTORED TO DOWNWIND. ON THE NEXT APCH WE USED THE POGGI RADIAL TO LOCATE REEBO. ALTHOUGH WE GOT TO MDA EARLY, WE STILL HAD A STEEP APCH. AFTER REVIEWING EVENTS WITH CRITICAL HINDSIGHT, THE FOLLOWING DIFFERENT OPTIONS CAME TO MIND: A) MISSED APCH AND A GAR AS SOON AS A STEEP DSCNT WAS DISCERNED. 2) ALTHOUGH WE PLANNED AND BRIEFED (AT CRUISE ALT) THE ILS 9, THE CONTINGENCY BRIEF FOR LOC 27 WITH ITS ATTENDANT CRUCIAL NOTAMS WAS IN ORDER. INSTEAD, WE BRIEFED THE LOC 27 IN THE TENSE CLOSE VECTORING ENVIRONMENT ON DOWNWIND. 3) LOOKING FORWARD, I WILL ALTERNATE APCHS USING HEADS UP GUIDANCE DISPLAY. I DID NOT REALIZE HOW DEPENDENT ON THE HEADS UP GUIDANCE DISPLAY I HAD BECOME SINCE IT HAS BEEN MY PRACTICE TO USE IT ON ALL APCHS. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS ACFT WAS NOT HEADS UP GUIDANCE DISPLAY EQUIPPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.