Narrative:

The incident occurred during a part 91 reposition flight from dca to iad. We were up against the end of our slot time and were trying to get underway prior to the next hour. We received clearance from ground to taxi to runway 33 from GA parking via txwys P and J to hold short of runway 1 at taxiway F. Ground then issued a clearance to cross runway 1 and contact the tower on the other side in the runway 33 run-up area. As soon as contact with the tower was established the controller issued a clearance that both crew members understood to be cleared for takeoff on runway 33. Subsequent radio xmissions to other landing and departing aircraft that, '...a giii is departing runway 33,' bolstered our (the crew's) belief that we had been cleared for takeoff. Radio congestion as well as arrival/departure traffic was very heavy. We completed our final takeoff items, I confirmed with my first officer that we were cleared for takeoff which he did, checked both sides of the aircraft for conflicting traffic, and initiated the takeoff roll on runway 33. As takeoff power was reached, and at a speed of 35-45 KTS, the captain (PF) noticed an air carrier Y CL65 regional jet entering his field of view from the left landing on runway 1. The takeoff was aborted at that time. Simultaneously, the local controller issued the following instruction: '(aircraft identify) cancel takeoff clearance, cancel takeoff clearance!' he then proceeded to exclaim that we had only been cleared into position and hold. He issued instructions to exit runway 33 at taxiway M and enter the run-up area which we were easily able to comply with. The CL65 exited the runway at taxiway north to the left. Both of these txwys fall short of the actual intersection of runways 1 and 33. It is thus the opinion of the reporter that under the circumstances, no actual collision threat existed once the abort was initiated since both aircraft exited the runway prior to a conflict point. This should however, in no way, be construed as minimizing or dismissing the gravity of the situation in the first place. It is simply an observation of operational fact. The controller's focus from that point on was to get us back to runway 33 for departure. The taxi instructions were received to taxi down runway 22 and then to turn left and back taxi runway 33 into position and hold. Subsequent takeoff clearance was issued and the remainder of the flight proceeded uneventfully to iad. No phone number was issued to the crew at any time nor was any subsequent attempt made by ATC to initiate telephone contact.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GULFSTREAM III FLC MISINTERPRETED THAT THEY WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON A DCA INTERSECTING RWY ON WHICH A CL65 WAS ON LNDG ROLL RESULTING IN THE G3 CAPT ABORTING TKOF AND THE CTLR CANCELING TKOF CLRNC.

Narrative: THE INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING A PART 91 REPOSITION FLT FROM DCA TO IAD. WE WERE UP AGAINST THE END OF OUR SLOT TIME AND WERE TRYING TO GET UNDERWAY PRIOR TO THE NEXT HR. WE RECEIVED CLRNC FROM GND TO TAXI TO RWY 33 FROM GA PARKING VIA TXWYS P AND J TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1 AT TXWY F. GND THEN ISSUED A CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 1 AND CONTACT THE TWR ON THE OTHER SIDE IN THE RWY 33 RUN-UP AREA. AS SOON AS CONTACT WITH THE TWR WAS ESTABLISHED THE CTLR ISSUED A CLRNC THAT BOTH CREW MEMBERS UNDERSTOOD TO BE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 33. SUBSEQUENT RADIO XMISSIONS TO OTHER LNDG AND DEPARTING ACFT THAT, '...A GIII IS DEPARTING RWY 33,' BOLSTERED OUR (THE CREW'S) BELIEF THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. RADIO CONGESTION AS WELL AS ARR/DEP TFC WAS VERY HVY. WE COMPLETED OUR FINAL TKOF ITEMS, I CONFIRMED WITH MY FO THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF WHICH HE DID, CHKED BOTH SIDES OF THE ACFT FOR CONFLICTING TFC, AND INITIATED THE TKOF ROLL ON RWY 33. AS TKOF PWR WAS REACHED, AND AT A SPD OF 35-45 KTS, THE CAPT (PF) NOTICED AN ACR Y CL65 REGIONAL JET ENTERING HIS FIELD OF VIEW FROM THE L LNDG ON RWY 1. THE TKOF WAS ABORTED AT THAT TIME. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE LCL CTLR ISSUED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION: '(ACFT IDENT) CANCEL TKOF CLRNC, CANCEL TKOF CLRNC!' HE THEN PROCEEDED TO EXCLAIM THAT WE HAD ONLY BEEN CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD. HE ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO EXIT RWY 33 AT TXWY M AND ENTER THE RUN-UP AREA WHICH WE WERE EASILY ABLE TO COMPLY WITH. THE CL65 EXITED THE RWY AT TXWY N TO THE L. BOTH OF THESE TXWYS FALL SHORT OF THE ACTUAL INTXN OF RWYS 1 AND 33. IT IS THUS THE OPINION OF THE RPTR THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NO ACTUAL COLLISION THREAT EXISTED ONCE THE ABORT WAS INITIATED SINCE BOTH ACFT EXITED THE RWY PRIOR TO A CONFLICT POINT. THIS SHOULD HOWEVER, IN NO WAY, BE CONSTRUED AS MINIMIZING OR DISMISSING THE GRAVITY OF THE SIT IN THE FIRST PLACE. IT IS SIMPLY AN OBSERVATION OF OPERATIONAL FACT. THE CTLR'S FOCUS FROM THAT POINT ON WAS TO GET US BACK TO RWY 33 FOR DEP. THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE RECEIVED TO TAXI DOWN RWY 22 AND THEN TO TURN L AND BACK TAXI RWY 33 INTO POS AND HOLD. SUBSEQUENT TKOF CLRNC WAS ISSUED AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY TO IAD. NO PHONE NUMBER WAS ISSUED TO THE CREW AT ANY TIME NOR WAS ANY SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT MADE BY ATC TO INITIATE TELEPHONE CONTACT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.