Narrative:

On jul/sat/01 the pilot returned to his home base and the aircraft was fueled under the pilot's supervision and stored in a locked hangar. On the afternoon of jul/mon/01 the pilot, his friend (a student pilot with a current medical), and the friend's son spent 2 hours washing, waxing, and inspecting aircraft, in preparation for a group trip 4 days later. During the process, the pilot had removed the pitot tube cover and placed it aside in the hangar. The oil was changed and the filter replaced as the last act of preparation for the pending flight. The pilot instructed his group that he would like to take the aircraft up in the pattern and then return to the hangar to verify that there were no oil leaks. Aircraft is stored in a multi-plane hangar. The pilot requested help moving another aircraft blocking the exit to the hangar. The pilot and his friend's son removed the aircraft blocking the hangar. The pilot and his friend then removed aircraft from the hangar to the ramp area adjacent to the hangar. The nose of the plane was facing away from the hangar. The pilot was pushing from the rear and his friend was guiding the aircraft with the tow bar. As aircraft reached the parking area, the pilot turned his attention to the other aircraft behind aircraft. He placed the other aircraft back in the hangar with the help of his friend's son. The group then boarded aircraft from the rear. The pilot utilized his preflight checklist. The checklist includes tie-down removal, chock removal, and pitot tube cover removal. The pilot had personally removed the pitot tube cover. He knew that no chocks or tie-downs had been used. The engine was started. The pilot obtained the ATIS and taxied to the taxiway. Following instructions from the ground controller, the pilot proceeded to the run-up area where an extended and high power run-up was performed to verify oil pressure stability. The pilot was cleared for takeoff by the tower and started his takeoff roll. During the ground roll, the pilot noticed that the airspeed gauge was not active. The takeoff was aborted. The friend's son was seated in the copilot's seat. He exited the plane to verify that the pitot tube cover was removed. The pitot tube cover was still in place. Another member of the group had replaced (unknown to the pilot) the pitot cover after the pilot had removed it. The plane was then again taxied to the departure end of the runway. The pilot was cleared for takeoff and executed a normal takeoff. Fortunately for the pilot, the assigned runway's departure path takes the aircraft past the control tower. An alert controller noted that as the landing gear retracted, the tow bar was still attached to the nose gear. The gear stowed without difficulty or excessive noise. The gear indicator lights showed the gear to be locked. The pilot immediately requested a departure from the traffic pattern to vacant and uninhabited land straight ahead for fear that the tow bar may dislodge over a populated area. Once over uninhabited land, the pilot lowered the gear. The gear transitioned normally and gave the signal that all wheels were locked. No unusual sounds or noises were heard as the gear transitioned into place. While over uninhabited land the pilot initiated 2 non aerobatic, but abrupt maneuvers to try to dislodge the tow bar. The pilot then decided that further attempts could cause unpredictable harm to the engine and propeller with possible engine stoppage. The pilot contacted the controller and an arrangement was made for the pilot to make a close flight past the tower to see if the tow bar was still in place. The controller verified that the tow bar was indeed still in place. The pilot then asked for the longer parallel runway for landing. On short final the pilot shut the engine down and made a low speed landing utilizing the soft field landing technique. The propeller continued to windmill as the nose gear settled to the ground. A faint metallic sound was heard briefly as the nose gear touched down. Fire and rescue personnel followed the aircraft down the runway as the plane coasted to a stop. The tow bar was removed without difficulty. The aircraft was examined on the runway. There were no signs of visible sheet metal damage or damage to the landing gear. The propeller was found to have 1/8 inch damage to 1 blade. The remaining blades displayed slight flattening at their ends. The aircraft was restarted and taxied to the maintenance hangar for further evaluation by a mechanic. Human performance: as PIC, I am responsible for ensuring airworthiness of my aircraft prior to departure. I failed in that regard. I had spent 2 hours looking over the aircraft and knew that the aircraft was airworthy. I erred in assuming that my friend had stowed the tow bar, while I was distraction in placing another aircraft in the hangar. I knew that I had removed the pitot tube cover, but was not aware that someone had replaced it. I routinely use a checklist and knew to the best of my knowledge that the exterior preflight was accomplished. I believe that appropriate decisions were made once the condition became known to me. I attempted to avoid injury to persons on the ground by leaving the pattern and flying to uninhabited land. I ceased attempts to remove the tow bar in-flight for concern that the condition might be made worse. I shut the engine down once landing on the runway was assured. The aircraft was appropriately configured for landing. Airspeed management was executed as well as could be done to minimize damage. I have learned another lesson. As PIC, I must trust, but verify, that all actions have been carried out, as they should.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE33 PLT LET PAX DISTRACT HIS PREFLT PROCS. PLT ATTEMPTED TKOF WITH PITOT COVER IN PLACE. THEN HE TOOK OFF WITH ACFT TOW BAR STILL INSTALLED.

Narrative: ON JUL/SAT/01 THE PLT RETURNED TO HIS HOME BASE AND THE ACFT WAS FUELED UNDER THE PLT'S SUPERVISION AND STORED IN A LOCKED HANGAR. ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUL/MON/01 THE PLT, HIS FRIEND (A STUDENT PLT WITH A CURRENT MEDICAL), AND THE FRIEND'S SON SPENT 2 HRS WASHING, WAXING, AND INSPECTING ACFT, IN PREPARATION FOR A GROUP TRIP 4 DAYS LATER. DURING THE PROCESS, THE PLT HAD REMOVED THE PITOT TUBE COVER AND PLACED IT ASIDE IN THE HANGAR. THE OIL WAS CHANGED AND THE FILTER REPLACED AS THE LAST ACT OF PREPARATION FOR THE PENDING FLT. THE PLT INSTRUCTED HIS GROUP THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE ACFT UP IN THE PATTERN AND THEN RETURN TO THE HANGAR TO VERIFY THAT THERE WERE NO OIL LEAKS. ACFT IS STORED IN A MULTI-PLANE HANGAR. THE PLT REQUESTED HELP MOVING ANOTHER ACFT BLOCKING THE EXIT TO THE HANGAR. THE PLT AND HIS FRIEND'S SON REMOVED THE ACFT BLOCKING THE HANGAR. THE PLT AND HIS FRIEND THEN REMOVED ACFT FROM THE HANGAR TO THE RAMP AREA ADJACENT TO THE HANGAR. THE NOSE OF THE PLANE WAS FACING AWAY FROM THE HANGAR. THE PLT WAS PUSHING FROM THE REAR AND HIS FRIEND WAS GUIDING THE ACFT WITH THE TOW BAR. AS ACFT REACHED THE PARKING AREA, THE PLT TURNED HIS ATTN TO THE OTHER ACFT BEHIND ACFT. HE PLACED THE OTHER ACFT BACK IN THE HANGAR WITH THE HELP OF HIS FRIEND'S SON. THE GROUP THEN BOARDED ACFT FROM THE REAR. THE PLT UTILIZED HIS PREFLT CHKLIST. THE CHKLIST INCLUDES TIE-DOWN REMOVAL, CHOCK REMOVAL, AND PITOT TUBE COVER REMOVAL. THE PLT HAD PERSONALLY REMOVED THE PITOT TUBE COVER. HE KNEW THAT NO CHOCKS OR TIE-DOWNS HAD BEEN USED. THE ENG WAS STARTED. THE PLT OBTAINED THE ATIS AND TAXIED TO THE TXWY. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE GND CTLR, THE PLT PROCEEDED TO THE RUN-UP AREA WHERE AN EXTENDED AND HIGH PWR RUN-UP WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY OIL PRESSURE STABILITY. THE PLT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF BY THE TWR AND STARTED HIS TKOF ROLL. DURING THE GND ROLL, THE PLT NOTICED THAT THE AIRSPEED GAUGE WAS NOT ACTIVE. THE TKOF WAS ABORTED. THE FRIEND'S SON WAS SEATED IN THE COPLT'S SEAT. HE EXITED THE PLANE TO VERIFY THAT THE PITOT TUBE COVER WAS REMOVED. THE PITOT TUBE COVER WAS STILL IN PLACE. ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE GROUP HAD REPLACED (UNKNOWN TO THE PLT) THE PITOT COVER AFTER THE PLT HAD REMOVED IT. THE PLANE WAS THEN AGAIN TAXIED TO THE DEP END OF THE RWY. THE PLT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AND EXECUTED A NORMAL TKOF. FORTUNATELY FOR THE PLT, THE ASSIGNED RWY'S DEP PATH TAKES THE ACFT PAST THE CTL TWR. AN ALERT CTLR NOTED THAT AS THE LNDG GEAR RETRACTED, THE TOW BAR WAS STILL ATTACHED TO THE NOSE GEAR. THE GEAR STOWED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY OR EXCESSIVE NOISE. THE GEAR INDICATOR LIGHTS SHOWED THE GEAR TO BE LOCKED. THE PLT IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED A DEP FROM THE TFC PATTERN TO VACANT AND UNINHABITED LAND STRAIGHT AHEAD FOR FEAR THAT THE TOW BAR MAY DISLODGE OVER A POPULATED AREA. ONCE OVER UNINHABITED LAND, THE PLT LOWERED THE GEAR. THE GEAR TRANSITIONED NORMALLY AND GAVE THE SIGNAL THAT ALL WHEELS WERE LOCKED. NO UNUSUAL SOUNDS OR NOISES WERE HEARD AS THE GEAR TRANSITIONED INTO PLACE. WHILE OVER UNINHABITED LAND THE PLT INITIATED 2 NON AEROBATIC, BUT ABRUPT MANEUVERS TO TRY TO DISLODGE THE TOW BAR. THE PLT THEN DECIDED THAT FURTHER ATTEMPTS COULD CAUSE UNPREDICTABLE HARM TO THE ENG AND PROP WITH POSSIBLE ENG STOPPAGE. THE PLT CONTACTED THE CTLR AND AN ARRANGEMENT WAS MADE FOR THE PLT TO MAKE A CLOSE FLT PAST THE TWR TO SEE IF THE TOW BAR WAS STILL IN PLACE. THE CTLR VERIFIED THAT THE TOW BAR WAS INDEED STILL IN PLACE. THE PLT THEN ASKED FOR THE LONGER PARALLEL RWY FOR LNDG. ON SHORT FINAL THE PLT SHUT THE ENG DOWN AND MADE A LOW SPD LNDG UTILIZING THE SOFT FIELD LNDG TECHNIQUE. THE PROP CONTINUED TO WINDMILL AS THE NOSE GEAR SETTLED TO THE GND. A FAINT METALLIC SOUND WAS HEARD BRIEFLY AS THE NOSE GEAR TOUCHED DOWN. FIRE AND RESCUE PERSONNEL FOLLOWED THE ACFT DOWN THE RWY AS THE PLANE COASTED TO A STOP. THE TOW BAR WAS REMOVED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THE ACFT WAS EXAMINED ON THE RWY. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF VISIBLE SHEET METAL DAMAGE OR DAMAGE TO THE LNDG GEAR. THE PROP WAS FOUND TO HAVE 1/8 INCH DAMAGE TO 1 BLADE. THE REMAINING BLADES DISPLAYED SLIGHT FLATTENING AT THEIR ENDS. THE ACFT WAS RESTARTED AND TAXIED TO THE MAINT HANGAR FOR FURTHER EVALUATION BY A MECH. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: AS PIC, I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING AIRWORTHINESS OF MY ACFT PRIOR TO DEP. I FAILED IN THAT REGARD. I HAD SPENT 2 HRS LOOKING OVER THE ACFT AND KNEW THAT THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY. I ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT MY FRIEND HAD STOWED THE TOW BAR, WHILE I WAS DISTR IN PLACING ANOTHER ACFT IN THE HANGAR. I KNEW THAT I HAD REMOVED THE PITOT TUBE COVER, BUT WAS NOT AWARE THAT SOMEONE HAD REPLACED IT. I ROUTINELY USE A CHKLIST AND KNEW TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THAT THE EXTERIOR PREFLT WAS ACCOMPLISHED. I BELIEVE THAT APPROPRIATE DECISIONS WERE MADE ONCE THE CONDITION BECAME KNOWN TO ME. I ATTEMPTED TO AVOID INJURY TO PERSONS ON THE GND BY LEAVING THE PATTERN AND FLYING TO UNINHABITED LAND. I CEASED ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE THE TOW BAR INFLT FOR CONCERN THAT THE CONDITION MIGHT BE MADE WORSE. I SHUT THE ENG DOWN ONCE LNDG ON THE RWY WAS ASSURED. THE ACFT WAS APPROPRIATELY CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. AIRSPD MGMNT WAS EXECUTED AS WELL AS COULD BE DONE TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE. I HAVE LEARNED ANOTHER LESSON. AS PIC, I MUST TRUST, BUT VERIFY, THAT ALL ACTIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT, AS THEY SHOULD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.