Narrative:

We were being vectored for a visual approach to runway 34 at ric. We had the field in sight, but with a scattered layer of fair WX cumulus between us and the runway. The approach controller had vectored us inside the OM and down to an altitude of 2000 ft MSL. When asked whether we had the field in sight, the captain replied that we did, but did not know if we would keep it in sight. He then said to me, 'we need to get down,' in reference to the tight turn onto final that left us well above the GS. The tower said they might vector us out for the ILS, just as we had the runway without obstruction. The controller went immediately to another aircraft and we could not call the runway in a timely manner. The next thing he said to us was that he showed us at 1600 ft, to which the captain replied we had a visual on the runway. I had continued through our clearance limit of 2000 ft, partly owing to our need to lose altitude to make a safe approach, and partly because I had misunderstood that we were not 'cleared for the visual' approach. The major contributing factor was a breakdown in communication between ATC, the captain, and myself at a critical moment, when we had either to continue the descent or execute a missed approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A J41 FO WAS TOLD TO GO AROUND AT RIC, JUST AS HE BROKE OUT AND ACQUIRED VISUAL CONTACT. HE CONTINUED, EVEN THOUGH HE COULD NOT ADVISE ATC.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 34 AT RIC. WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT, BUT WITH A SCATTERED LAYER OF FAIR WX CUMULUS BTWN US AND THE RWY. THE APCH CTLR HAD VECTORED US INSIDE THE OM AND DOWN TO AN ALT OF 2000 FT MSL. WHEN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT, THE CAPT REPLIED THAT WE DID, BUT DID NOT KNOW IF WE WOULD KEEP IT IN SIGHT. HE THEN SAID TO ME, 'WE NEED TO GET DOWN,' IN REF TO THE TIGHT TURN ONTO FINAL THAT LEFT US WELL ABOVE THE GS. THE TWR SAID THEY MIGHT VECTOR US OUT FOR THE ILS, JUST AS WE HAD THE RWY WITHOUT OBSTRUCTION. THE CTLR WENT IMMEDIATELY TO ANOTHER ACFT AND WE COULD NOT CALL THE RWY IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE NEXT THING HE SAID TO US WAS THAT HE SHOWED US AT 1600 FT, TO WHICH THE CAPT REPLIED WE HAD A VISUAL ON THE RWY. I HAD CONTINUED THROUGH OUR CLRNC LIMIT OF 2000 FT, PARTLY OWING TO OUR NEED TO LOSE ALT TO MAKE A SAFE APCH, AND PARTLY BECAUSE I HAD MISUNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE NOT 'CLRED FOR THE VISUAL' APCH. THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS A BREAKDOWN IN COM BTWN ATC, THE CAPT, AND MYSELF AT A CRITICAL MOMENT, WHEN WE HAD EITHER TO CONTINUE THE DSCNT OR EXECUTE A MISSED APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.